exploiting-bgp-hijacking-vulnerabilities

name	exploiting-bgp-hijacking-vulnerabilities
description	Analyzes and simulates BGP hijacking scenarios in authorized lab environments to assess route origin validation, RPKI deployment, and BGP monitoring defenses against prefix hijacking and route leak attacks on internet routing infrastructure.
domain	cybersecurity
subdomain	network-security
tags	["network-security","bgp","routing-security","rpki","route-hijacking"]
version	1.0
author	mahipal
license	Apache-2.0
nist_csf	["PR.IR-01","DE.CM-01","ID.AM-03","PR.DS-02"]

Exploiting BGP Hijacking Vulnerabilities

When to Use

• Assessing an organization's exposure to BGP prefix hijacking and route leak attacks
• Testing RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) deployment and route origin validation effectiveness
• Validating BGP monitoring and alerting systems detect unauthorized route announcements
• Simulating BGP hijacking in isolated lab environments to train network operations teams
• Evaluating ISP prefix filtering and route origin authorization (ROA) configurations

Do not use to perform actual BGP hijacking on the live internet, against BGP peers without authorization, or to disrupt real internet routing infrastructure. BGP attacks on production systems are illegal and can cause widespread internet outages.

Prerequisites

• Isolated BGP lab environment using GNS3, EVE-NG, or Containerlab with virtual routers (FRRouting, BIRD, or Cisco IOS)
• Understanding of BGP path attributes, AS path, prefix announcements, and route selection
• Access to BGP looking glass servers and RPKI validators for monitoring real-world route status
• bgpstream, RIPEstat, and BGPalerter tools for route monitoring
• Written authorization for any testing that involves real AS numbers or prefix announcements

Workflow

Step 1: Build an Isolated BGP Lab Environment

# Install Containerlab for BGP simulation
sudo bash -c "$(curl -sL https://get.containerlab.dev)"

# Create a BGP lab topology file
cat > bgp-lab.clab.yml << 'EOF'
name: bgp-hijack-lab
topology:
  nodes:
    # Legitimate AS (AS65001) announcing 10.0.0.0/24
    legitimate-router:
      kind: linux
      image: frrouting/frr:v8.5.0
      binds:
        - legitimate-frr.conf:/etc/frr/frr.conf
    # Attacker AS (AS65002) that will hijack the prefix
    attacker-router:
      kind: linux
      image: frrouting/frr:v8.5.0
      binds:
        - attacker-frr.conf:/etc/frr/frr.conf
    # Transit provider (AS65000) connecting both
    transit-router:
      kind: linux
      image: frrouting/frr:v8.5.0
      binds:
        - transit-frr.conf:/etc/frr/frr.conf
    # Victim network receiving routes
    victim-router:
      kind: linux
      image: frrouting/frr:v8.5.0
      binds:
        - victim-frr.conf:/etc/frr/frr.conf
  links:
    - endpoints: [, ]
    - endpoints: [, ]
    - endpoints: [, ]
EOF


 > legitimate-frr.conf << 
frr defaults traditional
hostname legitimate-router
router bgp 65001
 bgp router-id 1.1.1.1
 neighbor 10.0.1.2 remote-as 65000
 address-family ipv4 unicast
  network 10.0.0.0/24
  neighbor 10.0.1.2 activate
 exit-address-family
!
interface eth1
 ip address 10.0.1.1/30
!
interface lo
 ip address 10.0.0.1/24
EOF


 > attacker-frr.conf << 
frr defaults traditional
hostname attacker-router
router bgp 65002
 bgp router-id 2.2.2.2
 neighbor 10.0.2.2 remote-as 65000
 address-family ipv4 unicast
  neighbor 10.0.2.2 activate
 exit-address-family
!
interface eth1
 ip address 10.0.2.1/30
EOF


 containerlab deploy -t bgp-lab.clab.yml