بنقرة واحدة
pr-quick-check
Fast security pass over a pull request diff — scanners plus a targeted grep for risky patterns.
التثبيت باستخدام Codex أو Claude انسخ هذا Prompt والصقه في Codex أو Claude أو مساعد آخر ليراجع صفحة Skill ويثبّتها لك.
القائمة
Fast security pass over a pull request diff — scanners plus a targeted grep for risky patterns.
التثبيت باستخدام Codex أو Claude انسخ هذا Prompt والصقه في Codex أو Claude أو مساعد آخر ليراجع صفحة Skill ويثبّتها لك.
استنادا إلى تصنيف SOC المهني
White-box detection of broken authorization (BOLA/IDOR, BFLA, access-control logic flaws) in an API or web codebase. Use when asked to audit authorization, hunt IDOR/BOLA, check object-level or function-level access control, or verify that handlers scope data access to the current principal/tenant. Reconstructs the app's ownership model first, then finds access paths that skip the per-object/per-role check their peers enforce. Static, read-only; delegates injection/secrets/path-traversal to run_semgrep/run_gitleaks.
Find committed secrets and draft a prioritised, step-by-step rotation plan saved to context.
Build a STRIDE threat model of a codebase from its structure and code, using the bundled template.
| name | pr-quick-check |
| description | Fast security pass over a pull request diff — scanners plus a targeted grep for risky patterns. |
| tags | ["pr","review","quick","security"] |
A fast, repeatable security pass over the changes under review. Use it when someone asks for a quick read on a pull request or a set of local changes before a deeper review. It favours signal over completeness: run the scanners, skim for the usual footguns, report what matters.
Frame the change. Use list_files and read_file to understand what
the diff touches — which packages, which entry points, whether secrets,
auth, or input handling are involved. Keep this lightweight; you are
orienting, not auditing every line.
Run the static scanners.
run_semgrep for code-level vulnerability patterns (injection, unsafe
deserialization, weak crypto, path traversal, …).run_gitleaks for committed secrets — API keys, tokens, private keys.Grep for risky patterns the scanners miss. Use grep to look for
anything that warrants a human eye, for example:
TODO|FIXME|HACK|XXX near security-relevant codeeval|exec|os/exec|subprocess (command execution)password|secret|api[_-]?key|token in source (hardcoded credentials)http:// URLs (cleartext transport)InsecureSkipVerify, verify=False)Triage. For each finding, decide: is it introduced by this change, or pre-existing? Is it exploitable, or noise? Prefer reporting a handful of real issues over a long list of low-confidence hits.
Report. Summarise: a one-line verdict (safe to merge / needs changes / blocked), then the findings that drove it, each with file, line, severity, and a concrete fix. Note explicitly if a scanner could not run.