secretscanning
Use when: scanning for credential leakage before version control or enforcing pre-commit secret hygiene.
التثبيت باستخدام Codex أو Claude انسخ هذا Prompt والصقه في Codex أو Claude أو مساعد آخر ليراجع صفحة Skill ويثبّتها لك.
القائمة
Use when: scanning for credential leakage before version control or enforcing pre-commit secret hygiene.
التثبيت باستخدام Codex أو Claude انسخ هذا Prompt والصقه في Codex أو Claude أو مساعد آخر ليراجع صفحة Skill ويثبّتها لك.
استنادا إلى تصنيف SOC المهني
Use when running workspace tests, choosing a test command, or summarizing results before handoff to debugger.
Use when running workspace tests, choosing a test command, or summarizing results before handoff to debugger.
Use when: running pre-commit or pre-push CI-equivalent checks in any workspace — discovers workflow commands with Cursor tools, filters for local executability, scopes to staged changes, and runs checks cheapest-first.
Use when the user wants to install or customize cursorAssistant in the current project (GitHub install or configure).
Use when: running pre-commit or pre-push CI-equivalent checks in any workspace — discovers workflow commands with Cursor tools, filters for local executability, scopes to staged changes, and runs checks cheapest-first.
Use when: discovering package manifests, assessing dependency health, finding replacements, or confirming import usage before removal — discovery only; mutating installs are handled by the deps agent.
| name | secretScanning |
| description | Use when: scanning for credential leakage before version control or enforcing pre-commit secret hygiene. |
| type | reference |
| version | 1.0 |
| license | MIT |
Skill metadata: version "1.0"; tags [security, secrets, scanning]; recommended tools [].
Use this skill in workspaces with the secure pack selected.
Detect credential leakage before it reaches version control. Secrets committed to a repository are effectively public, even in private repos.
git-filter-repo insteadsecureReviewFlag these as probable secrets requiring confirmation before staging:
| Pattern | Examples |
|---|---|
| API keys | sk-..., pk_live_..., AKIA... (AWS), ghp_... (GitHub) |
| Connection strings | postgresql://user:pass@..., mongodb+srv://..., redis://:pass@... |
| Private keys | -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----, -----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- |
| JWT secrets | Long random strings assigned to secret, jwt_secret, JWT_SECRET |
| Bearer tokens | Authorization: Bearer <long-token> hardcoded in source |
| Password literals | password = "...", passwd = "..." with a non-placeholder value |
"your-api-key-here", "changeme", "<INSERT_KEY>", "TODO"tests/, fixtures/, __tests__/ with obviously fake valuesos.getenv("SECRET"), process.env.SECRET, ${SECRET}vault://..., arn:aws:secretsmanager:...High-entropy strings (30+ random characters) assigned to names containing key, token, secret, password, passwd, credential, auth are probable secrets even without a recognizable prefix pattern. Flag them.
Low-entropy strings assigned to those names are likely placeholder text. Do not flag.