بنقرة واحدة
conviction-signalling
Use when flagging branch conviction or calibrating instinct against outcomes.
التثبيت باستخدام Codex أو Claude انسخ هذا Prompt والصقه في Codex أو Claude أو مساعد آخر ليراجع صفحة Skill ويثبّتها لك.
القائمة
Use when flagging branch conviction or calibrating instinct against outcomes.
التثبيت باستخدام Codex أو Claude انسخ هذا Prompt والصقه في Codex أو Claude أو مساعد آخر ليراجع صفحة Skill ويثبّتها لك.
استنادا إلى تصنيف SOC المهني
Use when attacking branches to find what the verifier cannot catch.
Use when budgeting, routing, and scaling a run to fit the ask.
Use when selecting the surviving branch on verifier evidence after collision.
Use when recording dead branches so future runs avoid re-litigating them.
Use when isolating branches in git worktrees and reconciling the survivor.
Use when verifying a branch with any stack's real test toolchain.
| name | conviction-signalling |
| description | Use when flagging branch conviction or calibrating instinct against outcomes. |
Conviction ("the wormhole") is the harness's honest channel for instinct: a generator that believes in a non-obvious branch can say so, and the system protects that branch from early pruning — without ever letting belief decide acceptance. Effect on exploration, never on acceptance: that line is the invariant the design rides on.
One line, machine-parsed (regex in pqa/signals.py; byte-identical copy in
hooks/precipitate_capture.py — change both together):
conviction: high, basis: <one sentence naming the non-obvious reason this works>
high | medium | low. Only high protects from early pruning
(Conviction.protects_from_pruning).basis is mandatory and must name a mechanism: "burst absorption beats rejection
for this producer mix" calibrates; "feels clean" does not.conviction/basis fields, so the orchestrator,
the capture hook, and the engine all see one story.| Stage | Effect of conviction: high |
|---|---|
| collision (early pruning) | protected — cannot be dropped for "looking weak" before attack completes |
| adversary | attacked HARDER, not softer — calibration needs the stress |
| verification | nothing; the verifier does not read it |
| collapse | nothing; BranchResult.conviction is telemetry, and scripts/check_invariant.py statically forbids it from entering _rank_key |
| taxonomy / calibration | everything — signals joined to outcomes are the moat |
high only if you would defend the branch under
attack. Faked conviction is exposed by calibration and the harness learns to
discount you — the signal's entire value is its honesty.pqa.memory.record_signal(conn, session, level, basis, branch=...) — the precipitate-capture hook does this automatically for subagent
transcripts that contain the conviction line.update_signal_outcome(conn, signal_id, survived=..., verified=..., won=...). A finished run with outcome-less signals is
a calibration loop with no data — never leave them unfilled.pqa-self-reflector joins
signals to outcomes and emits P(win | conviction=high) vs P(win | no signal). That
number — not the feeling — is the empirical answer to "do hunches mean anything
here?"b2 (scout) digests back: conviction: high, basis: callers can shed load better than any limiter because only they know what's droppable.
verified: false.high, basis verbatim); outcome survived=true, verified=false, won=false; failure row carries conviction: high.Five runs later the calibration table shows high-conviction branches winning at 2× the no-signal base rate in this repo — the instinct is real here, and protecting it next spawn is justified by data. Or it shows 0.5× — and the harness starts discounting. Either answer is the system working as designed.