detecting-t1003-credential-dumping-with-edr

name	detecting-t1003-credential-dumping-with-edr
description	Detect OS credential dumping techniques targeting LSASS memory, SAM database, NTDS.dit, and cached credentials using EDR telemetry, Sysmon process access monitoring, and Windows security event correlation.
domain	cybersecurity
subdomain	threat-hunting
tags	["threat-hunting","credential-dumping","lsass","mitre-t1003","edr","mimikatz","ntds","sam-database"]
version	1.0
author	mahipal
license	Apache-2.0

Detecting T1003 Credential Dumping with EDR

When to Use

• When hunting for credential theft activity in the environment
• After compromise indicators suggest attacker has elevated privileges
• When EDR alerts fire for LSASS access or suspicious process memory reads
• During incident response to determine scope of credential compromise
• When auditing LSASS protection controls (Credential Guard, RunAsPPL)

Prerequisites

• EDR agent deployed with LSASS access monitoring (CrowdStrike, Defender for Endpoint, SentinelOne)
• Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) with LSASS-specific filters
• Windows Security Event ID 4656/4663 (Object Access Auditing)
• LSASS SACL auditing enabled (Windows 10+)
• Registry auditing for SAM hive access

Workflow

1. Monitor LSASS Process Access: Track all processes opening handles to lsass.exe with suspicious access rights (PROCESS_VM_READ 0x0010, PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS 0x1FFFFF). Non-privileged or unusual processes accessing LSASS are strong indicators.
2. Detect Credential Dumping Tools: Hunt for known tool signatures -- Mimikatz (sekurlsa::logonpasswords), procdump.exe targeting LSASS, comsvcs.dll MiniDump, and Task Manager creating LSASS dumps.
3. Monitor NTDS.dit Access: Detect Volume Shadow Copy creation (vssadmin, wmic shadowcopy) followed by NTDS.dit file access, or ntdsutil.exe IFM creation.
4. Track SAM/SECURITY/SYSTEM Hive Access: Hunt for reg.exe save commands targeting SAM, SECURITY, and SYSTEM registry hives.
5. Detect DCSync Activity: Monitor for non-DC accounts requesting directory replication (Event 4662 with replication GUIDs).
6. Correlate with Lateral Movement: After credential dumping, attackers typically move laterally. Correlate credential access events with subsequent remote logon attempts.
7. Assess Impact: Determine which credentials were potentially compromised and initiate password resets.

Key Concepts

Concept	Description
T1003.001	LSASS Memory -- dumping credentials from LSASS process
T1003.002	Security Account Manager -- extracting local account hashes from SAM
T1003.003	NTDS -- extracting domain hashes from Active Directory database
T1003.004	LSA Secrets -- extracting service account passwords
T1003.005	Cached Domain Credentials -- extracting DCC2 hashes
T1003.006	DCSync -- replicating credentials from domain controller
Credential Guard	Virtualization-based isolation of LSASS secrets
RunAsPPL	Protected Process Light for LSASS

Detection Queries

Splunk -- LSASS Access Detection

index=sysmon EventCode=10
| where match(TargetImage, "(?i)lsass\.exe$")
| where GrantedAccess IN ("0x1FFFFF", "0x1F3FFF", "0x143A", "0x1F0FFF", "0x0040", "0x1010", "0x1410")
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(?i)(csrss|lsass|svchost|MsMpEng|WmiPrvSE|taskmgr|procexp|SecurityHealthService)\.exe$")
| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace

Splunk -- Credential Dumping Tool Detection

index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(sekurlsa|lsadump|kerberos::list|crypto::certificates)")
    OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)procdump.*-ma.*lsass")
    OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)comsvcs\.dll.*MiniDump")
    OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)ntdsutil.*\"ac i ntds\".*ifm")
    OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)reg\s+save\s+hklm\\\\(sam|security|system)")
    OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)vssadmin.*create\s+shadow")
| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage

KQL -- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint

DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("LsassAccess", "CredentialDumpingActivity")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,
    InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ActionType, AdditionalFields
| sort by Timestamp desc

Sigma Rule -- LSASS Credential Dumping

title: LSASS Memory Credential Dumping Attempt
status: stable
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_access
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        GrantedAccess|contains:
            - '0x1FFFFF'
            - '0x1F3FFF'
            - '0x143A'
            - '0x0040'
    filter:
        SourceImage|endswith:
            - '\csrss.exe'
            - '\lsass.exe'
            - '\MsMpEng.exe'
            - '\svchost.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
level: critical
tags:
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1003.001

Common Scenarios

1. Mimikatz sekurlsa: Direct LSASS memory reading via sekurlsa::logonpasswords to extract plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets.
2. ProcDump LSASS: procdump.exe -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp creating a memory dump for offline credential extraction.
3. Comsvcs.dll MiniDump: rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll MiniDump [LSASS_PID] dump.bin full using a built-in Windows DLL for LSASS dumping.
4. NTDS.dit Extraction: Creating a Volume Shadow Copy and copying NTDS.dit + SYSTEM hive for offline domain hash extraction with secretsdump.
5. SAM Hive Export: reg save HKLM\SAM sam.save followed by reg save HKLM\SYSTEM system.save for local account hash extraction.
6. Task Manager Dump: Right-clicking LSASS in Task Manager to create a memory dump -- a legitimate tool abused for credential theft.

Output Format

Hunt ID: TH-CRED-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
Dumping Method: [LSASS_Access/NTDS/SAM/DCSync]
Source Process: [Tool or process used]
Target: [LSASS/NTDS.dit/SAM/SECURITY]
Access Rights: [Granted access mask]
User Context: [Account performing the dump]
ATT&CK Technique: [T1003.00x]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium]
Credentials at Risk: [Scope assessment]