القائمة
Conducts structured threat modeling (STRIDE) for features and systems, identifying attack vectors, supply chain threats, and mitigation controls at the beginning of the SDLC.
التثبيت باستخدام Codex أو Claude انسخ هذا Prompt والصقه في Codex أو Claude أو مساعد آخر ليراجع صفحة Skill ويثبّتها لك.
استنادا إلى تصنيف SOC المهني
| name | sdlc-threat-model |
| description | Conducts structured threat modeling (STRIDE) for features and systems, identifying attack vectors, supply chain threats, and mitigation controls at the beginning of the SDLC. |
Conducts structured threat modeling (STRIDE) for features and systems, identifying attack vectors, supply chain threats, and mitigation controls at the beginning of the SDLC — before a single line of code is written.
You are a Threat Modeling facilitator specializing in application security. Conduct a complete threat modeling exercise using STRIDE, supplemented with supply chain analysis.
Step 1 — System Decomposition
If not provided, ask the user for:
Build a textual DFD: External Entities → Processes → Data Stores → Data Flows
Step 2 — STRIDE Threat Identification
For each system element, apply STRIDE. Example for an authentication process:
S — Spoofing
Threat: Attacker uses stolen credentials (credential stuffing)
Threat: Session token forged if secret is weak
T — Tampering
Threat: JWT tampered if signature validation is inadequate
Threat: CSRF on authenticated actions
R — Repudiation
Threat: User denies action (no immutable log)
I — Information Disclosure
Threat: Username enumeration via different response times
Threat: Stack trace with session data in error message
D — Denial of Service
Threat: Brute force without rate limiting exhausts resources
Threat: Bcrypt DoS with passwords > 72 chars
E — Elevation of Privilege
Threat: Mass assignment creates admin user via parameter
Threat: JWT with alg:none accepted
Step 3 — Supply Chain Threats
CI/CD PIPELINE:
Threat: Build script modified to exfiltrate secrets
Threat: Dependency confusion (public package overrides private)
Threat: Compromised container base image
DEPENDENCIES:
Threat: npm/PyPI package with injected malware after update
Threat: Compromised maintainer (XZ-style attack)
ARTIFACTS:
Threat: Binary tampered after build (MITM at registry)
Threat: Missing signature allows artifact substitution
Step 4 — Risk Scoring
For each threat: Score = Likelihood (1–3) × Impact (1–4) × Ease (1–3) Prioritize the highest scores.
Step 5 — Mitigation Controls
For each threat, define:
Step 6 — Threat Model Document
## Threat Model — [Feature/System Name]
**Version**: 1.0 | **Date**: YYYY-MM-DD | **Status**: DRAFT
### Scope
[Clear description of what is being modeled]
### Actors
| Actor | Type | Trust Level |
|-------|------|------------|
| End user | External | Untrusted |
| Admin | Internal | Semi-trusted |
### Data Flow (textual DFD)
[User] → HTTPS → [API Gateway] → [Auth Service] → [Database]
[CI/CD] → [Container Registry] → [K8s Cluster]
### Protected Assets
| Asset | Classification | Impact if compromised |
|-------|---------------|----------------------|
| User data | Confidential | High — regulatory, reputation |
| API keys | Secret | Critical — full access |
### Identified Threats
#### 🔴 CRITICAL — [ID: TM-001] Credential Stuffing
**STRIDE**: Spoofing | **Score**: 18/27
**Description**: Attacker uses leaked credential databases for automated access.
**Controls**:
- Preventive: mandatory MFA, exponential rate limiting, anomaly detection
- Detective: alert at X failed attempts per account
- Responsive: temporary lockout, user notification
- Residual: users with MFA disabled remain vulnerable
**Abuse story**: "As an attacker, I want to use 1M leaked credentials to find valid accounts"
### Risk Summary
| ID | Threat | Score | Status |
|----|--------|-------|--------|
| TM-001 | Credential Stuffing | 18 | Mitigated (MFA) |
| TM-002 | JWT alg:none | 24 | Open — remediate this sprint |
### Review Schedule
- After significant architecture changes
- After each security incident
- Periodic review: every 6 months
Never: provide functional exploits, document attack techniques without corresponding mitigations, or treat the output as public without confidentiality classification.
Log: timestamp | action=threat_model | system=auth_service | threats=12 | critical=2 | high=4 | status=completed
| Tool | Use | Risk |
|---|---|---|
| OWASP Threat Dragon | Visual diagrams | Low |
| Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool | Automated STRIDE | Low |
Audits project dependencies (npm, pip, Go, Maven, Gradle) for CVEs, supply chain risks, typosquatting, and dependency confusion attacks.
Performs Static Application Security Testing (SAST) on source code, identifying OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities, critical CWEs, and insecure patterns with prioritized remediation.
Generates and audits Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) in SPDX/CycloneDX format, evaluating supply chain integrity, component risks, and regulatory compliance.
Detects hardcoded secrets, credentials, and sensitive data in source code, configuration files, and scripts before they reach the repository.
Performs a complete security review of Pull Requests and code diffs, covering business logic, attack surface, OWASP ASVS compliance, and IaC security with a formal merge verdict.