| name | T1525_implant-internal-image |
| description | Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. |
| category | configuration |
| version | 18.1 |
| author | cyberstrike-official |
| tags | ["mitre-attack","enterprise","t1525","persistence","iaas","containers"] |
| technique_id | T1525 |
| tactic | persistence |
| all_tactics | ["persistence"] |
| platforms | ["IaaS","Containers"] |
| mitre_url | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1525 |
| tech_stack | ["cloud","containers"] |
| cwe_ids | ["CWE-276"] |
| chains_with | [] |
| prerequisites | [] |
| severity_boost | {} |
T1525 Implant Internal Image
High-Level Description
Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike Upload Malware, this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.
A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images. If an adversary has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a Web Shell.
Kill Chain Phase
Platforms: IaaS, Containers
What to Check
How to Test
Manual Testing
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Identify Attack Surface: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Implant Internal Image by examining the target platforms (IaaS, Containers).
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Assess Existing Defenses: Review whether mitigations for T1525 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.
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Execute Test: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.
Note: No Atomic Red Team tests available for this technique. See Atomic Red Team GitHub for updates.
Remediation Guide
M1045 Code Signing
Several cloud service providers support content trust models that require container images be signed by trusted sources.
