القائمة
Cloud security pentest — AWS/Azure/GCP IAM analysis, lateral path, container escape pattern, serverless abuse advisory. Triggers on cloud pentest, AWS, Azure, GCP, IAM, S3 misconfig, EC2 metadata, Azure AD, GCP IAM, Pacu, ScoutSuite, Prowler, CloudGoat.
التثبيت باستخدام Codex أو Claude انسخ هذا Prompt والصقه في Codex أو Claude أو مساعد آخر ليراجع صفحة Skill ويثبّتها لك.
Market and demand research procedures. Niche discovery, demand sizing, competitor/gap analysis, opportunity scoring, and pricing/positioning signals BEFORE building. Triggers on: market research, demand, niche, opportunity sizing, competitor analysis, TAM, positioning, pricing, go-to-market, validate idea, is there demand.
Choosing between app.json vs app.config.ts vs app.config.js, environment variables, variants, extra fields, plugin chain, and slug/scheme/bundle/version discipline. Triggers on app.json, app.config.ts, app.config.js, expo config, environment variable, .env, eas secret, variant, extra field, slug, scheme, bundle identifier, package name, version, build number, version code.
Writing Expo config plugins, withInfoPlist, withAndroidManifest, withDangerousMod, mod compose, plugin testing, and registration in app.config.ts. Triggers on config plugin, with-plugin, withInfoPlist, withAndroidManifest, withDangerousMod, withEntitlementsPlist, withGradleProperties, mod, native config, expo plugin, plugin test, app.config plugin.
Custom development builds with expo-dev-client, build profiles, a custom dev menu, runtime-version compatibility, and EAS Update integration. Triggers on expo-dev-client, dev client, custom dev build, development build, dev menu, expo go, runtime version, debug build, dev launcher, scan qr, dev server.
iOS and Android build profiles with EAS Build, credentials management, build cache, secrets, and monorepo support. Triggers on eas build, eas.json, build profile, credentials, provisioning profile, keystore, push certificate, service account, build cache, eas secret, monorepo, development build, preview build, production build.
App Store Connect and Google Play Console upload flow with EAS Submit, metadata, build-artifact selection, review notes, and phased release. Triggers on eas submit, app store connect, google play, asc api key, service account, metadata, screenshot, phased release, review notes, testflight, internal testing, production submit, release management.
استنادا إلى تصنيف SOC المهني
| name | pentest-cloud |
| description | Cloud security pentest — AWS/Azure/GCP IAM analysis, lateral path, container escape pattern, serverless abuse advisory. Triggers on cloud pentest, AWS, Azure, GCP, IAM, S3 misconfig, EC2 metadata, Azure AD, GCP IAM, Pacu, ScoutSuite, Prowler, CloudGoat. |
| license | MIT |
| compatibility | Works with Claude Code |
| allowed-tools | Read Write Edit Bash Grep |
| metadata | {"author":"badi","homepage":"https://github.com/fatihkan/badi-skills/tree/main/skills/pentest-cloud","badi-version":">=1.24.0","category":"pentest","scope":"advisory","inspired-by":"0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents cloud-security"} |
AWS / Azure / GCP pentest methodology. IAM lateral path, public asset enum, container escape pattern.
| Attack Surface | Test |
|---|---|
| S3 public read/write | aws s3 ls s3://<bucket> --no-sign-request |
| EC2 IMDSv1 | curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ |
| Lambda env leak | Lambda invoke + env var dump |
| IAM privilege esc | iam:CreateAccessKey, iam:AttachUserPolicy, sts:AssumeRole |
| CloudTrail bypass | sts:GetSessionToken (logged as user, not source) |
| Misconfigured IAM | * action on * resource |
| Cross-account roles | external Principal "arn:aws:iam::OTHER:root" |
| Resource policy | S3 bucket policy with "Principal": "*" |
| SSM RunCommand | EC2 to OS via SSM session manager |
| Attack Surface | Test |
|---|---|
| Anonymous storage container | https://<acc>.blob.core.windows.net/<container>?restype=container&comp=list |
| Azure AD enumeration | UserList API anonymous |
| Service Principal abuse | Excessive RBAC role assignment |
| Managed Identity | VM -> token endpoint -> assume role |
| Azure DevOps PAT | Repo scan for PAT in code |
| Key Vault | RBAC misconfig, public access |
| Attack Surface | Test |
|---|---|
| GCS public bucket | gsutil ls gs://<bucket> (no auth) |
| Compute metadata | curl http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" |
| IAM lateral | iam.serviceAccounts.actAs, iam.roles.update |
| GKE container | RBAC misconfig + IMDS reach |
# QUIET — AWS misconfig audit (read-only IAM)
prowler aws --profile <profile> --severity high,critical
# QUIET — ScoutSuite multi-cloud audit
scout aws --profile <profile> --report-dir ./scout-report
# MODERATE — Pacu enumeration (Pacu CLI)
# Pacu is tied to its db; --modules for specific recon
# MODERATE — Azure recon
roadtools roadrecon auth --device-code
roadtools roadrecon gather
# MODERATE — GCP enum (enumerates the whole project, careful)
gcloud projects list
gcloud iam service-accounts list --project=<project>
AWS PrivEsc (common 25):
1. iam:CreateAccessKey on another user
2. iam:CreateLoginProfile on another user
3. iam:UpdateLoginProfile on another user
4. iam:AttachUserPolicy + ManagedPolicy AdministratorAccess
5. iam:AttachGroupPolicy
6. iam:AttachRolePolicy
7. iam:PutUserPolicy (inline policy)
8. iam:PutGroupPolicy
9. iam:PutRolePolicy
10. iam:AddUserToGroup
11. iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
12. iam:PassRole + service action (lambda, ec2)
13. sts:AssumeRole (broad principal)
14. lambda:UpdateFunctionCode + lambda:InvokeFunction
15. lambda:CreateFunction + iam:PassRole
... (automated with Pacu modules)
# QUIET — pod RBAC check (kubectl in pod)
kubectl auth can-i --list
# Pod escape signal:
# - hostPID: true
# - hostNetwork: true
# - privileged: true
# - hostPath mount /
# - Capabilities: SYS_ADMIN, SYS_PTRACE
# Service account token
cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
# IMDSv1 reach from pod
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
## Cloud Pentest — <account>
### IAM Path
- User: dev-readonly
- Excessive: iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy on role "prod-admin"
- Path: dev-readonly -> update trust policy -> sts:AssumeRole prod-admin -> *
- Time-to-DA: 2 minutes
### Public Asset
- S3 bucket "company-backups" — anonymous list + read (1.2TB exposure)
- 3 prod EC2 instances IMDSv1 only -> SSRF chain risk
### Defensive Recommendations
- IAM policy review: iam:* actions only for the break-glass account
- S3 bucket policy: Principal "*" forbidden (block public access at account level)
- EC2 metadata: IMDSv2 required (hop limit 1)