t2000-verify

name	t2000-verify
description	Check — don't trust — a confidential (GPU-TEE) AI response by its receipt id. Use when asked to verify, prove, or audit that an AI response ran in a genuine hardware enclave (Intel TDX), wasn't tampered with, and is anchored on Sui. Works on any t2000 Private Inference confidential (`phala/*`) response. No key needed.
license	MIT
metadata	{"author":"t2000","version":"1.0","requires":"t2000 CLI (npm install -g @t2000/cli)"}

t2000: Verify a Confidential Response

Purpose

Confidential (phala/*) responses from t2000 Private Inference run inside a verified GPU-TEE and carry a signed receipt that's auto-anchored on Sui. t2 verify checks the whole chain client-side and fails closed on any forgery — you (or your agent) prove the response is genuine without trusting t2000.

Where the receipt id comes from

Any confidential inference call returns one — e.g. the MCP t2000_chat tool with a phala/* model surfaces it inline:

🔒 confidential · attested · receipt rcpt-…

The API returns it in the x-receipt-id header (streaming: x_receipt_id on the final usage chunk). Any phala/* model is confidential; non-phala/* responses aren't (nothing to verify).

Command

t2 verify <receipt-id>            # full check (incl. client-side Intel TDX quote)
t2 verify <receipt-id> --quick    # skip the slower DCAP quote check
t2 verify <receipt-id> --json     # machine-readable per-check result

No API key required — verification is public + trustless.

What it checks (fails closed on any mismatch)

• Receipt — well-formed signed transparency log (hashes, never your prompt).
• Confidential upstream — the upstream was an attested TEE (typed TCB claims).
• Sui anchor (trustless) — reads the on-chain ReceiptAnchored event straight from a fullnode; confirms the committed wire_hash + workload_id match. t2000 can't forge it.
• Receipt signature (trustless) — recovers the signer, matches the attested key.
• TDX quote / DCAP (trustless) — re-verifies the hardware quote against Intel's root CA locally (skip with --quick).

Exit code is non-zero if anything doesn't line up.

Other surfaces

• Browser: paste any receipt id at verify.t2000.ai — same checks + a live public feed of every confidential response anchored on Sui.
• MCP: the t2000_verify tool takes a receiptId and returns the per-check result (verified:false on any forgery). No key required.
• SDK: verifyReceipt(receiptId) from @t2000/sdk; agent.verify(id) on a T2000 instance.

Honest framing (don't overclaim)

Verified = genuine TDX + TEE-signed receipt + Sui anchor, all checked client-side — that's trustless. What it does NOT claim: the gateway's forwarding leg still sees plaintext (zero data retention, but not end-to-end encrypted — that's a future rung). State exactly what's proven; a wrong "verified" claim is worse than honest.