بنقرة واحدة
incident-postmortem
Draft a blameless postmortem from an incident timeline.
التثبيت باستخدام Codex أو Claude انسخ هذا Prompt والصقه في Codex أو Claude أو مساعد آخر ليراجع صفحة Skill ويثبّتها لك.
القائمة
Draft a blameless postmortem from an incident timeline.
التثبيت باستخدام Codex أو Claude انسخ هذا Prompt والصقه في Codex أو Claude أو مساعد آخر ليراجع صفحة Skill ويثبّتها لك.
استنادا إلى تصنيف SOC المهني
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Sharpen a fuzzy intention into one measurable objective string that drives the rest of the work.
Convert a Prompt Flow PRS pipeline submission to run a Microsoft Agent Framework workflow.
Build a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that lets an LLM call into external tools and resources.
Summarize PDF documents into concise bullet-point digests.
Bump a dependency version across a pnpm workspace and update lockfile.
| slug | incident-postmortem |
| name | Incident Postmortem |
| version | 0.1.0 |
| description | Draft a blameless postmortem from an incident timeline. |
| category | dev-tools |
| tags | ["incident","postmortem","sre","reliability"] |
| inputs | [{"name":"timeline","type":"string","required":true,"description":"Chronological incident timeline"},{"name":"impact","type":"string","required":true,"description":"User or business impact"}] |
| output | {"format":"markdown","description":"Blameless postmortem with summary, timeline, root cause, and action items."} |
| author | badhope |
| license | MIT |
| created | "2026-06-21T00:00:00.000Z" |
| updated | "2026-06-21T00:00:00.000Z" |
After resolving a production incident and before the team review meeting.
Provide the incident timeline and impact statement.
A structured postmortem document ready for team review.
Draft a blameless postmortem from the provided timeline and impact.
Sections:
1. Summary: what happened, duration, impact
2. Timeline: reformatted in plain language with UTC timestamps
3. Root Cause: 5-Whys style, focused on systems not people
4. Impact: users affected, data lost, SLIs breached
5. Detection: how the incident was found, gaps in alerting
6. Recovery: steps taken, what worked, what slowed recovery
7. Action Items: owner, due date, priority; split into prevent/detect/respond
8. Lessons: one paragraph on what the team learned
Tone: blameless, specific, and forward-looking. No "someone should have".
Input:
timeline: '14:02 deploy; 14:05 error rate spike; 14:12 rollback; 14:20 recovery'
impact: 'Checkout API 503 for 18 minutes, ~1200 failed orders'
Output:
## Summary
Checkout API returned 503s for 18 minutes after a deployment at 14:02 UTC.
## Root Cause
The new release added a required config that was missing in production. The service failed fast instead of defaulting.
## Action Items
- [P0] Add config validation at startup with a clear fatal log (owner: platform, due: 2026-06-28)
- [P1] Add canary deploy gate on checkout error rate (owner: sre, due: 2026-07-05)
## Footguns
These are the bugs that bite every new user.
Check them before shipping:
- **Blaming individuals**: Postmortems that focus on who failed rather than what failed.
- how to detect: action items say "engineer should have" instead of "system should"
- how to fix: focus on systemic causes, not human error
- **Root cause too shallow**: Stopping at the immediate cause without understanding why.
- how to detect: same incident recurs with slightly different trigger
- how to fix: apply 5 Whys, dig into contributing factors
- **No concrete action items**: "Improve monitoring" or "be more careful" aren't actionable.
- how to detect: action items never get done
- how to fix: make action items specific with owners and due dates
- **Timeline reconstruction fails**: Logs deleted or gaps make it impossible to reconstruct what happened.
- how to detect: timeline has gaps during the incident window
- how to fix: ensure logs are preserved, use structured logging with trace IDs
- **Lessons learned forgotten**: Action items completed but no one remembers why.
- how to detect: similar incidents happen again because lessons weren't shared
- how to fix: share postmortems broadly, review previous incidents before major changes