| name | extracting-credentials-from-memory-dump |
| description | Extract cached credentials, password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and authentication tokens from memory dumps using Volatility and Mimikatz for forensic investigation. |
| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | digital-forensics |
| tags | ["forensics","credential-extraction","memory-forensics","volatility","mimikatz","password-hashes","incident-response"] |
| mitre_attack | ["T1005","T1074","T1119","T1070","T1003"] |
| mitre_f3 | {"version":"1.1","tactics":["reconnaissance","positioning","initial-access"],"techniques":[{"id":"T1555","name":"Credentials from Password Stores","tactic":"reconnaissance","source":"attack"},{"id":"T1555.003","name":"Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers","tactic":"reconnaissance","source":"attack"},{"id":"T1539","name":"Steal Web Session Cookie","tactic":"positioning","source":"attack"},{"id":"F1006","name":"Account Takeover","tactic":"initial-access","source":"f3"},{"id":"F1006.002","name":"Account Takeover: Exposed Login Credential","tactic":"initial-access","source":"f3"},{"id":"F1006.001","name":"Account Takeover: Exposed API Key","tactic":"initial-access","source":"f3"}]} |
| version | 1.0 |
| author | mahipal |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| nist_csf | ["RS.AN-01","RS.AN-03","DE.AE-02","RS.MA-01"] |
Extracting Credentials from Memory Dump
When to Use
- During incident response to determine what credentials an attacker had access to
- When assessing the scope of credential compromise after a breach
- For identifying accounts that need immediate password resets
- When investigating lateral movement and pass-the-hash/pass-the-ticket attacks
- For recovering encryption keys or authentication tokens from process memory
Prerequisites
- Memory dump in raw, ELF, or crash dump format
- Volatility 3 with Windows symbol tables
- Mimikatz (for offline analysis of extracted LSASS dumps)
- pypykatz (Python implementation of Mimikatz for Linux-based analysis)
- Understanding of Windows authentication (NTLM, Kerberos, DPAPI)
- Appropriate legal authorization for credential extraction
Workflow
Step 1: Prepare Tools and Verify Memory Dump
pip install volatility3 pypykatz
sha256sum /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw
vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.info
vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.pslist | grep -i lsass
Step 2: Extract Credential Hashes with Volatility
vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.hashdump \
| tee /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/hashdump.txt
vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.lsadump \
| tee /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/lsadump.txt
vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.cachedump \
| tee /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/cachedump.txt
Step 3: Dump LSASS Process Memory for Detailed Analysis
vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.memmap --pid 684 --dump \
-o /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/lsass_dump/
vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.dumpfiles --pid 684 \
-o /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/lsass_files/
vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.dumpfiles \
--pid 684 -o /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/
mv /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/lsass_dump/pid.684.dmp \
/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/lsass.dmp
Step 4: Extract Credentials with pypykatz
pypykatz lsa minidump /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/lsass.dmp \
> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/pypykatz_results.txt 2>&1
pypykatz rekall /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw \
> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/pypykatz_full.txt 2>&1
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import json
import subprocess
result = subprocess.run(
['pypykatz', 'lsa', 'minidump', '/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/lsass.dmp', '-j'],
capture_output=True, text=True
)
if result.stdout:
data = json.loads(result.stdout)
print("=== EXTRACTED CREDENTIALS ===\n")
for session_key, session in data.get('logon_sessions', {}).items():
username = session.get('username', 'Unknown')
domain = session.get('domainname', '')
logon_server = session.get('logon_server', '')
logon_time = session.get('logon_time', '')
sid = session.get('sid', '')
if username and username != '(null)':
print(f"Session: {domain}\\{username}")
print(f" SID: {sid}")
print(f" Logon Server: {logon_server}")
print(f" Logon Time: {logon_time}")
msv = session.get('msv_creds', [])
for cred in msv:
nt = cred.get('NThash', '')
lm = cred.get('LMHash', '')
if nt:
print(f" NTLM Hash: {nt}")
if lm:
print(f" LM Hash: {lm}")
kerb = session.get('kerberos_creds', [])
for cred in kerb:
password = cred.get('password', '')
if password:
print(f" Kerberos Password: {password}")
tickets = cred.get('tickets', [])
for ticket in tickets:
print(f" Kerberos Ticket: {ticket.get('server', '')} (type: {ticket.get('enc_type', '')})")
wdigest = session.get('wdigest_creds', [])
for cred in wdigest:
pwd = cred.get('password', '')
if pwd:
print(f" WDigest Password: {pwd}")
dpapi = session.get('dpapi_creds', [])
for cred in dpapi:
mk = cred.get('masterkey', '')
if mk:
print(f" DPAPI Master Key: {mk[:40]}...")
print()
PYEOF
Step 5: Extract Kerberos Tickets and Tokens
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import subprocess, json
result = subprocess.run(
['pypykatz', 'lsa', 'minidump', '/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/lsass.dmp', '-j', '-k', '/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/kerberos/'],
capture_output=True, text=True
)
import os
kirbi_dir = '/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/kerberos/'
if os.path.exists(kirbi_dir):
for f in os.listdir(kirbi_dir):
if f.endswith('.kirbi'):
filepath = os.path.join(kirbi_dir, f)
size = os.path.getsize(filepath)
print(f" Kerberos ticket: {f} ({size} bytes)")
PYEOF
vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.strings --pid 684 | \
grep -iE '(bearer |authorization:|api[_-]key|token=|password=|secret=)' \
> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/auth_strings.txt
vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.strings | \
grep -iE '(AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}|ASIA[A-Z0-9]{16}|aws_secret_access_key)' \
> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/aws_credentials.txt
vol -f /cases/case-2024-001/memory/memory.raw windows.strings | \
grep -iE '(session_id=|PHPSESSID=|JSESSIONID=|_ga=|sid=)' \
> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/session_tokens.txt
Step 6: Compile Credential Findings Report
python3 << 'PYEOF'
print("""
CREDENTIAL EXTRACTION REPORT
==============================
Case: 2024-001
Source: memory.raw (16 GB Windows 10 memory dump)
Analysis Date: 2024-01-20
COMPROMISED ACCOUNTS:
=====================
1. Local Accounts (SAM):
- Administrator (RID 500): NTLM hash extracted
- svcbackup (RID 1001): NTLM hash extracted
- SQLService (RID 1002): NTLM hash extracted
2. Domain Accounts (LSASS):
- CORP\\admin.user: NTLM hash + Kerberos TGT
- CORP\\svc.backup: NTLM hash + plaintext password (WDigest)
- CORP\\domain.admin: Kerberos TGS tickets for 3 services
3. Cached Domain Credentials:
- CORP\\helpdesk.user: DCC2 hash
- CORP\\it.manager: DCC2 hash
4. Cloud Credentials:
- AWS Access Key: AKIA... found in process memory (PID 3456)
- Azure AD token found in browser process memory
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS REQUIRED:
- Reset passwords for all listed accounts
- Revoke and rotate AWS access keys
- Invalidate all active Kerberos tickets (krbtgt reset)
- Review DPAPI-protected data for additional exposure
""")
PYEOF
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|
| LSASS (Local Security Authority) | Windows process managing authentication, storing credentials in memory |
| NTLM hash | NT LAN Manager hash of user password used for authentication |
| Kerberos TGT | Ticket Granting Ticket allowing request of service tickets |
| WDigest | Legacy authentication protocol storing plaintext passwords in memory (pre-Win8.1) |
| DPAPI | Data Protection API using master keys derived from user credentials |
| DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials) | Cached domain password hashes for offline logon |
| LSA Secrets | Encrypted service account passwords and other secrets stored by LSA |
| Pass-the-Hash | Attack technique using extracted NTLM hashes without knowing the plaintext password |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|
| Volatility 3 | Memory forensics framework with hashdump, lsadump, cachedump plugins |
| pypykatz | Python implementation of Mimikatz for cross-platform LSASS analysis |
| Mimikatz | Windows credential extraction tool (used offline against dumps) |
| secretsdump.py | Impacket tool for extracting secrets from SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY |
| hashcat | Password hash cracking for recovered NTLM and DCC2 hashes |
| John the Ripper | Alternative password cracking tool |
| Rubeus | Kerberos ticket manipulation and extraction tool |
| Impacket | Python toolkit for working with Windows network protocols and credentials |
Common Scenarios
Scenario 1: Post-Breach Credential Assessment
Extract all cached credentials from LSASS memory to determine which accounts were exposed, prioritize password resets based on privilege level, check for golden ticket material (krbtgt hash), assess if cloud credentials were accessible.
Scenario 2: Lateral Movement Investigation
Extract NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets to understand how the attacker moved between systems, identify pass-the-hash/pass-the-ticket artifacts, correlate extracted credentials with network logon events in event logs.
Scenario 3: Ransomware Operator Credential Theft
Analyze pre-encryption memory dump for Mimikatz execution evidence, extract all available credential types, determine if domain admin credentials were obtained, assess if krbtgt was compromised (golden ticket), plan credential rotation strategy.
Scenario 4: Cloud Credential Theft from Endpoint
Search endpoint memory for AWS access keys, Azure tokens, and GCP service account keys stored by CLI tools and browsers, identify exposed cloud permissions, immediately rotate discovered credentials, audit cloud audit logs for unauthorized access.
Output Format
Credential Extraction Summary:
Source: memory.raw (16 GB, Windows 10 Build 19041)
LSASS PID: 684
Credentials Recovered:
Local NTLM Hashes: 4 accounts
Domain NTLM Hashes: 3 accounts
Kerberos TGTs: 2 tickets
Kerberos TGS: 5 service tickets
Plaintext Passwords: 1 (WDigest - svc.backup)
Cached Domain Creds: 2 DCC2 hashes
LSA Secrets: 3 service account passwords
DPAPI Master Keys: 4 keys recovered
Cloud Credentials: 1 AWS access key, 1 Azure token
Highest Privilege Compromised: Domain Admin (CORP\domain.admin)
Recommended Actions:
- Immediate: Reset all extracted account passwords
- Immediate: Rotate AWS access key AKIA...
- Urgent: Double krbtgt password reset (golden ticket mitigation)
- High: Revoke all Kerberos tickets via krbtgt rotation
- Medium: Audit DPAPI-protected data exposure