| name | security-and-hardening |
| description | Hardens code against vulnerabilities. Use when handling user input, authentication, data storage, or external integrations. Use when building any feature that accepts untrusted data, manages user sessions, or interacts with third-party services. |
| phase | build |
| produces | ["hardened-code"] |
| autoTriggers | ["task handles user input or authentication","task handles external data or integrations"] |
Security and Hardening
Overview
Security-first development practices for web applications. Treat every external input as hostile, every secret as sacred, and every authorization check as mandatory. Security isn't a phase — it's a constraint on every line of code that touches user data, authentication, or external systems.
Related: super-agent-skills:threat-modeling identifies WHAT to protect against (design time). This skill ensures the protection is correctly IMPLEMENTED (build time).
When to Use
- Building anything that accepts user input
- Implementing authentication or authorization
- Storing or transmitting sensitive data
- Integrating with external APIs or services
- Adding file uploads, webhooks, or callbacks
- Handling payment or PII data
- Adding or updating third-party dependencies
- Auditing packages for security or license compliance
- Building applications that use LLMs or AI models
The Three-Tier Boundary System
Always Do (No Exceptions)
- Validate all external input at the system boundary (API routes, form handlers)
- Parameterize all database queries — never concatenate user input into SQL
- Encode output to prevent XSS (use framework auto-escaping, don't bypass it)
- Use HTTPS for all external communication
- Hash passwords with bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 (never store plaintext)
- Set security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)
- Use httpOnly, secure, sameSite cookies for sessions
- Run
npm audit (or equivalent) before every release
Ask First (Requires Human Approval)
- Adding new authentication flows or changing auth logic
- Storing new categories of sensitive data (PII, payment info)
- Adding new external service integrations
- Changing CORS configuration
- Adding file upload handlers
- Modifying rate limiting or throttling
- Granting elevated permissions or roles
Never Do
- Never commit secrets to version control (API keys, passwords, tokens)
- Never log sensitive data (passwords, tokens, full credit card numbers)
- Never trust client-side validation as a security boundary
- Never disable security headers for convenience
- Never use
eval() or innerHTML with user-provided data
- Never store sessions in client-accessible storage (localStorage for auth tokens)
- Never expose stack traces or internal error details to users
OWASP Top 10 Prevention
1. Injection (SQL, NoSQL, OS Command)
const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '${userId}'`;
const user = await db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1', [userId]);
const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { id: userId } });
2. Broken Authentication
import { hash, compare } from 'bcrypt';
const SALT_ROUNDS = 12;
const hashedPassword = await hash(plaintext, SALT_ROUNDS);
const isValid = await compare(plaintext, hashedPassword);
app.use(session({
secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET,
resave: false,
saveUninitialized: false,
cookie: {
httpOnly: true,
secure: true,
sameSite: 'lax',
maxAge: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000,
},
}));
3. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
element.innerHTML = userInput;
return <div>{userInput}</div>;
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput);
4. Broken Access Control
app.patch('/api/tasks/:id', authenticate, async (req, res) => {
const task = await taskService.findById(req.params.id);
if (task.ownerId !== req.user.id) {
return res.status(403).json({
error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Not authorized to modify this task' }
});
}
const updated = await taskService.update(req.params.id, req.body);
return res.json(updated);
});
5. Security Misconfiguration
import helmet from 'helmet';
app.use(helmet());
app.use(helmet.contentSecurityPolicy({
directives: {
defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
scriptSrc: ["'self'"],
styleSrc: ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"],
imgSrc: ["'self'", 'data:', 'https:'],
connectSrc: ["'self'"],
},
}));
app.use(cors({
origin: process.env.ALLOWED_ORIGINS?.split(',') || 'http://localhost:3000',
credentials: true,
}));
6. Sensitive Data Exposure
function sanitizeUser(user: UserRecord): PublicUser {
const { passwordHash, resetToken, ...publicFields } = user;
return publicFields;
}
const API_KEY = process.env.STRIPE_API_KEY;
if (!API_KEY) throw new Error('STRIPE_API_KEY not configured');
Input Validation Patterns
Schema Validation at Boundaries
import { z } from 'zod';
const CreateTaskSchema = z.object({
title: z.string().min(1).max(200).trim(),
description: z.string().max(2000).optional(),
priority: z.enum(['low', 'medium', 'high']).default('medium'),
dueDate: z.string().datetime().optional(),
});
app.post('/api/tasks', async (req, res) => {
const result = CreateTaskSchema.safeParse(req.body);
if (!result.success) {
return res.status(422).json({
error: {
code: 'VALIDATION_ERROR',
message: 'Invalid input',
details: result.error.flatten(),
},
});
}
const task = await taskService.create(result.data);
return res.status(201).json(task);
});
File Upload Safety
const ALLOWED_TYPES = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp'];
const MAX_SIZE = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
function validateUpload(file: UploadedFile) {
if (!ALLOWED_TYPES.includes(file.mimetype)) {
throw new ValidationError('File type not allowed');
}
if (file.size > MAX_SIZE) {
throw new ValidationError('File too large (max 5MB)');
}
}
Triaging npm audit Results
| Severity | Reachable in prod? | Action |
|---|
| Critical/High | Yes | Fix immediately |
| Critical/High | No (dev-only, unused path) | Fix soon, not a blocker |
| Moderate | Yes | Fix next release cycle |
| Low | — | Fix during regular dependency updates |
Key question: Is the vulnerable function actually called in your code path? When deferring a fix, document the reason and set a review date.
Rate Limiting
import rateLimit from 'express-rate-limit';
app.use('/api/', rateLimit({
windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
max: 100,
standardHeaders: true,
legacyHeaders: false,
}));
app.use('/api/auth/', rateLimit({
windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
max: 10,
}));
Secrets Management
.env files:
├── .env.example → Committed (template with placeholder values)
├── .env → NOT committed (contains real secrets)
└── .env.local → NOT committed (local overrides)
.gitignore must include:
.env
.env.local
.env.*.local
*.pem
*.key
Before committing: Run git diff --cached | grep -i "password\|secret\|api_key\|token" to catch accidentally staged secrets.
For detailed security checklists and pre-commit verification steps, see references/security-checklist.md.
Supply Chain Security
Dependencies are attack surface. Every package you install runs with your application's privileges.
Before Adding a Dependency
Ask five questions before npm install:
- Do we need it? Can the standard library or existing deps solve this?
- Is it maintained? Last commit within 6 months? Active issue responses?
- Is it trusted? Check download count, maintainer count, GitHub stars. Low numbers on a critical package = risk.
- Is it safe? Run
npm audit / pip audit / cargo audit before and after adding.
- Is the license compatible? GPL in a proprietary project = legal problem. Check with
license-checker or equivalent.
Typosquatting Detection
Before installing, verify the exact package name on npm/PyPI — don't trust autocomplete (lodash not 1odash, @babel/core not @bable/core).
AI-Specific Vulnerabilities
When building applications that use LLMs:
- Prompt injection: Treat all user input that reaches an LLM as untrusted. Never concatenate user input directly into system prompts.
- Output validation: LLM output is untrusted data. Validate and sanitize before using in SQL, HTML, or system commands.
- Model supply chain: Verify model checksums. Don't load models from untrusted sources.
For detailed checklists, see references/supply-chain-security.md.
For thorough audits: Dispatch the super-agent-skills:dependency-auditor agent for a full dependency tree audit covering security, licensing, maintenance health, and impact assessment.
Common Rationalizations
| Rationalization | Reality |
|---|
| "We'll add security later" | Security retrofitting is 10x harder than building it in. Add it now. |
| "The framework handles security" | Frameworks provide tools, not guarantees. You still need to use them correctly. |
| "It's only a dev dependency" | Dev dependencies execute during build. A compromised build tool owns your CI pipeline. |
Red Flags
- User input passed directly to database queries, shell commands, or HTML rendering
- Secrets in source code or commit history
- API endpoints without authentication or authorization checks
- Missing CORS configuration or wildcard (
*) origins
- No rate limiting on authentication endpoints
- Stack traces or internal errors exposed to users
- Dependencies with known critical vulnerabilities
Verification
After implementing security-relevant code: