| name | dfir-overview |
| description | Use to close the Offensive Vaccine loop on the defender side. The Detector agent produces Sigma / YARA rules from offensive operations; this catalog validates those rules against real memory dumps, event logs, and forensic artifacts using Volatility 3, plaso, and sigma-cli. Without this catalog, detection rules are theoretical.
|
| metadata | {"subdomain":"dfir","when_to_use":"dfir validation sigma yara volatility plaso memory dump event log forensic artifact detection rule blue team","tags":"dfir, memory, volatility, plaso, sigma, validation, blue-team","upstream_ref":"Sigma rules + YARA + Volatility 3 + plaso — detection-rule validation harness for the Offensive Vaccine loop"} |
Forensicator / DFIR Skill Catalog
Decepticon emits attacks AND detection rules. This catalog feeds the
detection rules back through real forensic artifacts to confirm they fire
— closing the Offensive Vaccine loop on the operations side.
Playbooks
Inline technique reference — not separately loadable skills. The entries below
are summarized here for direct use; there is no separate SKILL.md to open for
each. Do NOT call the skill loader on them — apply the technique with your tools
using this summary and the Workflow in this file.
| Technique | Use for |
|---|
| volatility-windows | Volatility 3 Windows plugins: pslist, malfind, cmdline, netscan, dlllist, handles |
| volatility-linux | Volatility 3 Linux: linux.pslist, linux.bash, linux.malfind |
| plaso-timeline | psort + log2timeline; super-timeline construction; Sigma matchers on the timeline |
| sigma-cli-validation | sigma-cli convert + match against captured event logs |
| yara-scan | yara-x scan against memory dumps and disk images |
| event-log-mining | Windows Event Log (.evtx) extraction + key event ID reference |
| etw-trace | ETW provider triage; .etl file extraction |
| edr-validation | Replay an attack against a target with Velociraptor / OSQuery active; capture artifacts |
Loop closure workflow
- Run an offensive technique (e.g.,
dcsync from the ad-operator agent).
- Detector agent emits Sigma rule describing the expected detection
pattern (event 4662 with right
ControlAccessRights, etc.).
- Defender pushes the Sigma to the customer SIEM via
sigma_to_splunk_savedsearch / sigma_to_sentinel_analyticrule /
sigma_to_elastic_detection_rule.
- Forensicator validates by:
- Collecting the event log from the DC at attack time.
- Running
sigma-cli convert --target sqlite and matching against
the log file.
- If the match count is 0 → detection rule has a bug. Iterate with
Detector.
- If match count is N → detection works. Record the validation
evidence in the engagement knowledge graph.
- Patcher proposes the fix; Forensicator validates the patch
doesn't break the detection (verify the rule still fires on attempted
exploitation of the patched build).
Tools sandbox
- Volatility 3 (
vol, volshell) — already in operator's AGENTS.md tooling.
- plaso (
log2timeline, psort).
- sigma-cli (
sigma convert, sigma check).
- yara-x (
yr) — operator already has it installed at C:\Tools\yara-x\yr.exe.
- Velociraptor + OSQuery (for live-system validation paths).
Why this is differentiating
Strix doesn't have this. XBOW doesn't have this. The "Offensive Vaccine"
promise (every attack becomes a defense improvement) is only deliverable
when someone validates the detection. Without Forensicator, the loop
stops at "rule written". With it, the loop completes at "rule verified to
fire on this attack class against this client's stack".
