tinybrain-threat-intel

name

tinybrain-threat-intel

description

Collect, structure, and correlate threat intelligence in TinyBrain — indicators, threat actors, campaigns, and TTPs — mapped to MITRE ATT&CK so the picture builds across sources and sessions instead of living in scattered notes. Use this skill when the TinyBrain MCP tools are available AND you are doing intelligence analysis, threat modeling, OSINT collection, IOC tracking, actor/campaign profiling, or the user mentions threat intel, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, IOCs, "track this threat actor", or "model the threats against". Builds on the using-tinybrain skill.

Threat intelligence & threat modeling with TinyBrain

Intelligence work is the canonical "many sources, one evolving picture" problem — exactly what TinyBrain's categories, relationships, and ATT&CK tagging are designed for. The goal is a living graph: indicators tied to the actors and campaigns they belong to, behaviors mapped to ATT&CK, and correlations that emerge as you add sources.

Read the using-tinybrain skill first for the core loop. This skill adds intel-specific structure.

Workflow

1. Open an intelligence session. create_session with task_type: "intelligence_analysis", set intelligence_type (osint, cybint, sigint, ...), and classification / threat_level as appropriate. For defensive modeling of a system, use task_type: "threat_modeling" instead.

2. Use the right object categories. Intel has its own vocabulary — use it so the graph stays queryable:

   • ioc — indicators (hashes, IPs, domains, URLs). Tag with type and the actor/campaign.
   • threat_actor — actor profiles (capabilities, motivation, known targeting).
   • attack_campaign — campaigns (timeline, victims, attribution confidence).
   • ttp / technique — observed behaviors. Tag these with their ATT&CK ids.
   • correlation — a link you've inferred across sources. Plus the collection categories (osint, humint, ...) for raw collected material.

3. Map behaviors to MITRE ATT&CK. When you record a TTP, pass mitre_tactic and mitre_technique (e.g. tactic TA0001 Initial Access, technique T1566 Phishing). TinyBrain stores these as searchable tags, so you can later pull "every technique this actor uses" or "everything mapped to Initial Access" across the whole graph. Use query_attack to look up technique details to enrich a record.

4. Build the actor/campaign graph. Link aggressively — this is where intel value lives:

   • ioc → related_to → threat_actor (this indicator belongs to this actor)
   • technique → child_of → attack_campaign (this behavior was seen in this campaign)
   • attack_campaign → related_to → threat_actor (attribution)
   • evidence → supports → any attribution or assessment claim Use the relationship description to record why you linked them and your confidence in the link — attribution is probabilistic, and the reasoning matters as much as the edge.

5. Calibrate confidence like an analyst. Attribution and correlation are rarely certain. A confirmed indicator is high confidence; an inferred actor link is mid; a single-source attribution claim is low. Store the uncertain ones — labeled honestly — so the assessment shows its work.

6. Correlate and assess. analyze_risk_correlation and search_memories by ATT&CK tag or actor surface patterns across sources. get_related_entries from an actor walks out to its indicators, campaigns, and techniques for a full profile.

Enrich from the knowledge hub

query_attack, query_nvd, and query_owasp pull authoritative data you can attach to records as reference memories. map_to_cve connects a CWE to CVEs an actor might exploit. get_security_data_summary shows what hub data is loaded (run download_security_data if it's empty).

Producing an intelligence product

For a briefing or assessment, retrieve and traverse rather than recall: get_context_summary for the overview, then walk the graph from the central actor/campaign to assemble indicators, techniques (with ATT&CK mapping), and the evidence behind each assessment. Surface confidence levels explicitly — a good intel product distinguishes what's confirmed from what's inferred.