delegating-code-review

name	delegating-code-review
description	Use when you have made code changes and want another CLI agent to review them before committing or continuing — a second-opinion, security, correctness, requirements, or test-coverage review, or a cross-agent independent review. Keywords: reviewer agent, read-only review, disallowed_tools, git diff review, review uncommitted changes.

Delegating Code Review to Another Agent

Use AgentShell to invoke another CLI agent to review changes in a repository. The reviewing agent has its own tools — point it at the repo, tell it what to look at, and let it run git diff itself.

Assumes familiarity with AgentShell basics. See invoking-cli-agents for setup, the full parameter list, and the per-agent capability matrix.

When to Use

• You have made code changes and want a second opinion before committing
• You want to validate that changes meet requirements before marking work complete
• You need a security, performance, or correctness review
• You want to check for regressions or unintended side effects

Keep the Reviewer Read-Only

A reviewer should not modify the code it reviews. Don't rely on a "don't edit files" instruction in the prompt — restrict the tools. But mind how the two controls actually enforce (the core skill has the detail):

• Claude Code / Copilot / Pi — whitelist read + git tools and set auto_approve=False. The whitelist is inert under the default auto_approve=True (--dangerously-skip-permissions auto-approves everything), so the auto_approve=False is what makes it bite: allowed_tools=["Read", "Glob", "Grep", "Bash"], auto_approve=False.
• OpenCode / Codex — they ignore allowed_tools; use the enforced denylist instead: disallowed_tools=["edit"].

This is defence-in-depth, not a sandbox. Any reviewer that keeps bash (for git diff) can still write via the shell, and in-library scoping doesn't cover MCP-provided tools. For a hard guarantee — an untrusted model, or reviewing hostile input that could prompt-inject the reviewer — capture git diff yourself, pass it in the prompt, remove the shell too (disallowed_tools=["edit", "bash"], or allowed_tools=["Read","Glob","Grep"], auto_approve=False), and/or run under an OS-level read-only mount.

Review Uncommitted Changes

from agent_shell.shell import AgentShell
from agent_shell.models.agent import AgentType

reviewer = AgentShell(agent_type=AgentType.CLAUDE_CODE)

review = await reviewer.execute(
    cwd="/path/to/project",
    prompt="""Review the uncommitted changes in this repository.
Focus on correctness, security, and design.
Flag issues by severity: CRITICAL, WARNING, or SUGGESTION.""",
    allowed_tools=["Read", "Glob", "Grep", "Bash"],   # read + git, no edit tool
    auto_approve=False,                               # required for the whitelist to enforce
    model="sonnet",
)

The reviewer will run git diff itself, read surrounding code for context, and report findings.

Review a Specific Commit or Range

Point the reviewer at a particular changeset — only the prompt changes.

review = await reviewer.execute(
    cwd="/path/to/project",
    prompt="""Review the changes in commit abc1234.
Focus on correctness, security, and design.
Flag issues by severity: CRITICAL, WARNING, or SUGGESTION.""",
    allowed_tools=["Read", "Glob", "Grep", "Bash"],
    auto_approve=False,
    model="sonnet",
)

# Or a range:  "Review all changes between main and HEAD. ..."

Follow Up

Use session resumption to ask the reviewer to clarify or elaborate.

clarification = await reviewer.execute(
    cwd="/path/to/project",
    prompt="Explain the security concern in more detail and suggest a specific fix.",
    allowed_tools=["Read", "Glob", "Grep", "Bash"],
    auto_approve=False,
    model="sonnet",
    session_id=review.session_id,
)

Cross-Agent Review

Use a different agent or model than the one that wrote the code for genuine independence. OpenCode ignores allowed_tools, so restrict it with disallowed_tools instead.

reviewer = AgentShell(agent_type=AgentType.OPENCODE)

review = await reviewer.execute(
    cwd="/path/to/project",
    prompt="""Review the uncommitted changes in this repository.
Focus on correctness, security, and design.
Flag issues by severity: CRITICAL, WARNING, or SUGGESTION.""",
    disallowed_tools=["edit"],          # enforced: cannot Edit/Write/patch
    model="github-copilot/gpt-5.4",
)

OpenCode reports cost as 0.0 for many models — use output_tokens if you need a usage figure. And execute() gives no failure signal: an empty review.response likely means the reviewer failed. If a reliable verdict matters, stream() and require a result event with content == "ok" — OpenCode can truncate a review with no terminal event and no error (see the core skill's Error Handling).

Prompt Patterns

General Review

Review the uncommitted changes in this repository.
Focus on correctness, security, and design.
Flag issues by severity: CRITICAL, WARNING, or SUGGESTION.

Focused Security Review

Review the uncommitted changes for security vulnerabilities only. Check for:
- SQL injection, XSS, command injection
- Authentication/authorisation gaps
- Secrets or credentials in code
- Unsafe deserialization

Requirements Validation

The requirement was: "{original_requirement}"

Review the uncommitted changes and assess whether they fully satisfy the requirement.
Identify any gaps, missing edge cases, or partial implementations.

Test Coverage Review

Review the uncommitted changes and identify test scenarios that are missing.
For each gap, describe the test case that should exist and why it matters.

Common Mistakes

Mistake	Fix
Relying on a "do not modify files" prompt instruction for safety	Enforce it (whitelist + auto_approve=False, or disallowed_tools)
Whitelisting tools but leaving the default auto_approve=True	--dangerously-skip-permissions makes the whitelist inert — set auto_approve=False
Assuming allowed_tools restricts OpenCode	OpenCode ignores it — use disallowed_tools
Believing disallowed_tools=["edit"] makes the reviewer read-only	It doesn't — the model writes via bash; also deny bash (and OS-sandbox for a hard guarantee)
Not giving the reviewer Bash/git access	Without it the reviewer can't run git diff — keep bash, or pass the diff in the prompt
Not checking for empty responses from execute()	execute() gives no failure signal — an empty review.response likely means failure; use stream() to detect it
Reviewing with the same model that wrote the code	Use a different model or agent type for independence
Ignoring the review and committing anyway	At minimum, address all CRITICAL items first