exposure-investigation

name	exposure-investigation
description	Use this skill when asked to generate a vulnerability and exposure management report, assess security posture, or review CVEs, security configurations, and attack paths. Triggers on keywords like "vulnerability report", "exposure report", "CVE assessment", "security posture", "vulnerability assessment", "exposure management", "patch status", "end of support", "security recommendations", "attack paths", "critical assets", "configuration compliance", "Defender device health", "security score", "TVM", "threat and vulnerability management", or when asking about overall organizational vulnerability/exposure state. This skill queries DeviceTvm* tables and ExposureGraphNodes/Edges to produce a comprehensive posture report covering CVEs, exploitable vulnerabilities, security configuration compliance, end-of-support software, critical asset inventory, attack paths, Defender device health, and certificate status. Supports org-wide and per-device scoping with inline chat and markdown file output.
threat_pulse_domains	["exposure"]
drill_down_prompt	Run vulnerability and exposure report — CVEs, attack paths, critical assets, configuration compliance

Vulnerability & Exposure Management Report — Instructions

Purpose

This skill generates a comprehensive Vulnerability & Exposure Management Report covering the full security posture of the organization (or a specific device). It goes beyond CVEs to include security configuration compliance, end-of-support software, Exposure Management critical assets, attack paths, and certificate status.

Entity Type: Organization-wide (default) or single device

Scope	Primary Tables	Use Case
Org-wide (default)	DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities, ExposureGraphNodes, ExposureGraphEdges	Full organizational posture assessment
Per-device	DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities, DeviceTvmSecureConfigurationAssessment	Focused device vulnerability review

What this skill covers:

Section	Data Source	Coverage
CVE Vulnerabilities	DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities + DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilitiesKB	Severity distribution, exploitable CVEs, CVSS scores
Security Configuration	DeviceTvmSecureConfigurationAssessment + ...KB	OS, Network, Security Controls, Accounts, Application compliance
End-of-Support Software	DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory	EoS/EoL software with dates and affected devices
Critical Assets	ExposureGraphNodes	Criticality levels, internet-facing, RCE/privesc flags
Attack Paths	ExposureGraphEdges + ExposureGraphNodes	Multi-hop paths from vulnerable to critical assets
Defender Device Health	DeviceTvmSecureConfigurationAssessment + DeviceInfo	AV mode, signatures, RTP, tamper protection, cloud protection compliance by active/inactive status
Certificate Status	DeviceTvmCertificateInfo	Expired and expiring certificates
Software Evidence (drill-down)	DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidenceBeta	File paths, registry paths linking vulnerable software to on-disk locations — used for targeted remediation

---

📑 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Critical Workflow Rules - Start here!
2. Output Modes - Inline chat vs. Markdown file
3. Quick Start - 8-step execution pattern
4. Execution Workflow - Complete phased process
5. Sample KQL Queries - Validated query patterns (Queries 1-11, 13-16)
6. Drill-Down Reference Queries - Targeted file-level evidence for remediation (Queries 17-19)
7. Report Template - Output structure and formatting
8. Per-Device Mode - Single device scoping
9. Known Pitfalls - Edge cases
10. Error Handling - Troubleshooting guide

Investigation shortcuts:

• Specific CVE assessment (TP Q12): Q2 (exploitable CVEs + KB details) → Q5 (per-device vuln counts, scoped) → Q14 (top vulnerable software) → Q17/Q18 (file evidence drill-down)
• Internet-facing critical asset exposure (TP Q11): Q7 (critical asset inventory) → Q15 (internet-facing + vulns) → Q10a (vulnerable device summary) → Q10b (blast radius edges) → Q16 (multi-hop attack paths, optional)
• Per-device vulnerability review (TP Q12, TP Q1): Q5 (per-device vuln counts) → Q6 (per-device compliance) → Q8 (high-impact misconfigs) → Q13 (certificates)
• Fleet-wide posture report (standalone): Q1 (severity dist) → Q2 (exploitable) → Q3 (config compliance) → Q4 (EoS software) → Q7 (critical assets) → Q9 (Defender health)
• Defender health audit (TP Q11, standalone): Q9 (fleet summary by control×OS) → Q11 (non-compliant exceptions, active only) → Q6 (per-device compliance scorecard)
• Attack path analysis (TP Q11+Q12): Q10a (vulnerable device exposure) → Q10b (1-hop blast radius) → Q15 (internet-facing critical + vulns) → Q16 (multi-hop paths, optional)
• Software version sprawl (after Q14 or Q2): Q14 (top vulnerable software) → Q17 (version sprawl by source) → Q18 (CVE to file mapping) → Q19 (stale extension folders)

⛔ Shortcut Default Rule: When a matching shortcut exists for the investigation context, use it — don't run the full workflow. Only run the full query set when the user explicitly requests "full investigation", "comprehensive", or "deep dive". Shortcuts render only the report sections relevant to their query chain (plus Executive Summary and Recommendations, always).

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⚠️ CRITICAL WORKFLOW RULES - READ FIRST ⚠️

Before starting ANY vulnerability/exposure report:

1. ALL queries in this skill use RunAdvancedHuntingQuery — DeviceTvm* and ExposureGraph* tables are Advanced Hunting only (NOT in Sentinel Data Lake)
2. No Sentinel workspace selection is required — this skill does NOT query Sentinel Data Lake tables
3. ALWAYS ask the user for output mode if not specified: inline chat summary, markdown file report, or both (default: both)
4. ALWAYS ask the user for scope if ambiguous: org-wide (default) or specific device name
5. ALWAYS run independent queries in parallel for performance
6. ALWAYS use create_file for markdown reports (NEVER use PowerShell terminal commands)
7. ALWAYS sanitize PII from saved reports — use generic placeholders for real hostnames, tenant names, and UPNs in committed files (reports/ files for user's own use may contain real values)
8. ExposureGraph tables are snapshot data — no Timestamp or TimeGenerated filter needed
9. DeviceTvm assessment tables — use summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by DeviceId, ConfigurationId to get the latest assessment per device×config. Do NOT use Timestamp > ago(1d) as a pre-filter — lab/weekend environments may have stale data and return 0 results

Tool Selection

Table Pattern	Tool	Notes
DeviceTvm*	RunAdvancedHuntingQuery	AH-only tables
ExposureGraphNodes	RunAdvancedHuntingQuery	AH-only, snapshot data, no timestamp filter
ExposureGraphEdges	RunAdvancedHuntingQuery	AH-only, snapshot data, no timestamp filter

🔴 PROHIBITED:

• ❌ Using mcp_sentinel-data_query_lake for any table in this skill
• ❌ Adding TimeGenerated filters to ExposureGraph queries
• ❌ Reporting findings without actual query evidence
• ❌ Fabricating CVE IDs, CVSS scores, or device names

When invoked from a parent skill (threat-pulse, incident-investigation, etc.)

• Skip output mode and scope prompts — the parent skill controls output format
• Use the investigation shortcut that matches the parent trigger (see shortcuts above the TOC)
• For quick triage: run only the shortcut query chain
• For deep investigation: run the full phased workflow

---

Output Modes

Mode 1: Inline Chat Summary (default for quick requests)

Compact executive summary rendered directly in chat.

Mode 2: Markdown File Report

Full detailed report saved to reports/exposure/vulnerability_exposure_report_<YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS>.md.

Mode 3: Both (default when user says "report" or "generate report")

Inline chat executive summary + full markdown file.

Ask user if not specified:

"How would you like the report? I can provide:

1. Inline chat summary — executive overview in chat
2. Markdown file — detailed report saved to reports/exposure/
3. Both (recommended) — summary in chat + full report file"

---

Quick Start (TL;DR)

8-step execution pattern for org-wide report:

Step 1: Determine scope (org-wide or specific device) and output mode
Step 2: Run Phase 1 queries in parallel — CVE distribution, exploitable CVEs, config compliance
Step 3: Run Phase 2 queries in parallel — EoS software, per-device vulns, per-device compliance
Step 4: Run Phase 3 queries in parallel — ExposureGraph critical assets, high-impact misconfigs, Defender health fleet summary
Step 5: Run Phase 4 queries in parallel — Attack paths, Defender health exceptions, certificates
Step 6: Run Phase 5 (optional) — Top vulnerable software, internet-facing critical assets
Step 7: Compute summary metrics and risk assessment
Step 8: Render inline chat executive summary
Step 9: Generate markdown file report (if requested)

---

Execution Workflow

Phase 1: Core Vulnerability & Compliance (3 parallel queries)

Run these simultaneously:

Query	Description	Reference
Q1	CVE severity distribution	Query 1
Q2	Exploitable CVEs (with known exploits)	Query 2
Q3	Security config compliance by category	Query 3

Phase 2: Software & Per-Device Detail (3 parallel queries)

Query	Description	Reference
Q4	End-of-support software inventory	Query 4
Q5	Per-device vulnerability counts	Query 5
Q6	Per-device compliance scorecard	Query 6

Phase 3: Exposure Management & Defender Health (3 parallel queries)

Query	Description	Reference
Q7	Critical asset inventory	Query 7
Q8	High-impact misconfigurations with remediation	Query 8
Q9	Defender health fleet summary	Query 9

Phase 4: Attack Paths & Supplementary (4 parallel queries)

Query	Description	Reference
Q10a	Vulnerable device exposure summary (fast)	Query 10a
Q10b	Edge connectivity from vulnerable devices (fast)	Query 10b
Q11	Defender health non-compliant exceptions	Query 11
Q13	Certificate expiration status	Query 13

Phase 5: Supplementary Detail (optional, 3 parallel queries)

Run only if Phase 1-4 reveal high-risk items:

Query	Description	Reference
Q14	Top vulnerable software by CVE count	Query 14
Q15	Internet-facing critical assets with vulnerabilities	Query 15
Q16	Multi-hop attack path enumeration (slow — graph-match)	Query 16

Phase 6: Render Output

1. Compute summary metrics from all query results
2. Assign overall risk rating (see Risk Assessment)
3. Render inline chat executive summary
4. Generate markdown file (if requested)

---

Sample KQL Queries

All queries use RunAdvancedHuntingQuery via the Sentinel Triage MCP server.

Query 1: CVE Severity Distribution

DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities
| summarize 
    DeviceCount = dcount(DeviceId),
    VulnCount = count()
    by VulnerabilitySeverityLevel
| order by VulnCount desc

Purpose: Top-level severity breakdown for executive summary.

---

Query 2: Exploitable CVEs

DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities
| join kind=inner DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilitiesKB on CveId
| where IsExploitAvailable == true
| summarize 
    AffectedDevices = dcount(DeviceName),
    DeviceList = make_set(DeviceName)
    by CveId, VulnerabilitySeverityLevel, CvssScore, VulnerabilityDescription
| order by CvssScore desc, AffectedDevices desc
| take 20

Purpose: Highest-risk CVEs — known exploits mean active threat. These are always Priority 1.

---

Query 3: Security Config Compliance by Category

DeviceTvmSecureConfigurationAssessment
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by DeviceId, ConfigurationId
| summarize 
    TotalAssessments = count(),
    CompliantCount = countif(IsCompliant == true),
    NonCompliantCount = countif(IsCompliant == false)
    by ConfigurationCategory
| extend ComplianceRate = round(100.0 * CompliantCount / TotalAssessments, 1)
| order by NonCompliantCount desc

Purpose: Compliance posture across OS, Network, Security Controls, Accounts, Application categories.

---

Query 4: End-of-Support Software

DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory
| where EndOfSupportStatus != ""
| summarize 
    AffectedDevices = dcount(DeviceId),
    DeviceList = make_set(DeviceName)
    by SoftwareVendor, SoftwareName, SoftwareVersion, EndOfSupportStatus, EndOfSupportDate
| order by AffectedDevices desc

Purpose: Identify unsupported software — no patches available, high risk.

EndOfSupportStatus values:

• EOS Software — Entire product line end-of-support
• EOS Version — Specific version end-of-support
• Upcoming EOS Version — EoS within next 6 months

---

Query 5: Per-Device Vulnerability Counts

DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities
| summarize 
    Critical = countif(VulnerabilitySeverityLevel == "Critical"),
    High = countif(VulnerabilitySeverityLevel == "High"),
    Medium = countif(VulnerabilitySeverityLevel == "Medium"),
    Low = countif(VulnerabilitySeverityLevel == "Low"),
    Total = count()
    by DeviceName, OSPlatform
| order by Critical desc, High desc, Total desc

Purpose: Per-device vulnerability heatmap — identifies most vulnerable endpoints.

---

Query 6: Per-Device Compliance Scorecard

DeviceTvmSecureConfigurationAssessment
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by DeviceId, ConfigurationId
| summarize 
    TotalChecks = count(),
    Compliant = countif(IsCompliant == true),
    NonCompliant = countif(IsCompliant == false),
    NotApplicable = countif(IsApplicable == false)
    by DeviceName
| extend ComplianceRate = round(100.0 * Compliant / (Compliant + NonCompliant), 1)
| order by ComplianceRate asc

Purpose: Rank devices by compliance rate — worst-first for remediation priority.

---

Query 7: Critical Asset Inventory

🔴 MCP Property Access: NodeProperties is stored as a JSON string. Direct dot-notation (NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel) returns null through MCP serialization. MUST use double parse_json(tostring()) extraction — see Known Pitfalls.

ExposureGraphNodes
| where set_has_element(Categories, "device")
| extend rawData = parse_json(tostring(parse_json(tostring(NodeProperties)).rawData))
| extend critLevel = rawData.criticalityLevel
| extend critValue = toint(critLevel.criticalityLevel)
| extend ruleBasedCrit = toint(critLevel.ruleBasedCriticalityLevel)
| extend ruleNames = tostring(critLevel.ruleNames)
| where isnotnull(critLevel) and critValue < 4
| extend InternetFacing = iff(isnotnull(rawData.IsInternetFacing), "Yes", "No")
| extend VulnerableToRCE = iff(isnotnull(rawData.vulnerableToRCE), "Yes", "No")
| extend VulnerableToPrivEsc = iff(isnotnull(rawData.VulnerableToPrivilegeEscalation), "Yes", "No")
| extend ExposureScore = tostring(rawData.exposureScore)
| project 
    DeviceName = NodeName,
    CriticalityLevel = critValue,
    RuleBasedCriticality = ruleBasedCrit,
    RuleNames = ruleNames,
    InternetFacing,
    VulnerableToRCE,
    VulnerableToPrivEsc,
    ExposureScore,
    NodeLabel
| order by CriticalityLevel asc

Purpose: Inventory critical assets with exposure flags — feeds into prioritization.

Criticality Levels:

• 0-1: Most critical (domain controllers, high-value servers)
• 2-3: High priority
• 4+: Standard (excluded from this query)

Note on zero results: If this query returns 0 results, it means no devices have criticality classifications. Check the raw NodeProperties with ExposureGraphNodes | where set_has_element(Categories, "device") | extend rawData = parse_json(tostring(parse_json(tostring(NodeProperties)).rawData)) | project NodeName, rawData | take 5 to verify property structure. Criticality is auto-assigned for domain controllers (Level 0) and can be manually assigned in the Exposure Management portal.

---

Query 8: High-Impact Misconfigurations

DeviceTvmSecureConfigurationAssessment
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by DeviceId, ConfigurationId
| where IsCompliant == false and IsApplicable == true
| summarize AffectedDevices = dcount(DeviceId), DeviceList = make_set(DeviceName) by ConfigurationId
| join kind=inner DeviceTvmSecureConfigurationAssessmentKB on ConfigurationId
| project 
    ConfigurationId,
    ConfigurationName,
    ConfigurationCategory,
    ConfigurationSubcategory,
    ConfigurationImpact,
    RiskDescription,
    RemediationOptions,
    AffectedDevices,
    DeviceList
| order by ConfigurationImpact desc, AffectedDevices desc
| take 20

Purpose: Top misconfigurations ranked by impact score with actionable remediation steps from the KB.

ConfigurationImpact scores:

• 9-10: Critical — must remediate immediately
• 7-8: High — remediate in short term
• 4-6: Medium — plan remediation
• 1-3: Low — monitor

---

Query 9: Defender Health Fleet Summary

// Defender Health Fleet Summary — compliance by control × OS × active/inactive status
// Active = DeviceInfo last seen within 7 days; Inactive = last seen > 7 days ago
// SCID Mapping:
//   Windows: scid-2010 (AVMode), scid-2011 (AVSignatures), scid-2012 (RTP),
//            scid-2013 (PUA), scid-2016 (CloudProtection), scid-2003 (TamperProtection),
//            scid-91 (BehaviourMonitoring), scid-2030 (CoreComponentsUpdate)
//   macOS:   scid-5090 (RTP), scid-5091 (PUA), scid-5094 (Cloud), scid-5095 (AVSigs)
//   Linux:   scid-6090 (RTP), scid-6091 (PUA), scid-6094 (Cloud), scid-6095 (AVSigs)
let defenderSCIDs = dynamic([
    "scid-2010", "scid-2011", "scid-2012", "scid-2013", "scid-2016", 
    "scid-2003", "scid-91", "scid-2030",
    "scid-5090", "scid-5091", "scid-5094", "scid-5095",
    "scid-6090", "scid-6091", "scid-6094", "scid-6095"
]);
let deviceStatus = DeviceInfo
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, DeviceName, OSPlatform) by DeviceId
| extend DeviceActivity = iff(Timestamp > ago(7d), "Active", "Inactive");
DeviceTvmSecureConfigurationAssessment
| where ConfigurationId in~ (defenderSCIDs)
| where IsApplicable == 1
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by DeviceId, ConfigurationId
| extend Control = case(
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-2010", "AVMode",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-2011", "AVSignatures",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-2012", "RealtimeProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-2013", "PUAProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-2016", "CloudProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-2003", "TamperProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-91", "BehaviourMonitoring",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-2030", "CoreComponentsUpdate",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-5090", "RealtimeProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-5091", "PUAProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-5094", "CloudProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-5095", "AVSignatures",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-6090", "RealtimeProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-6091", "PUAProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-6094", "CloudProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-6095", "AVSignatures",
    ConfigurationId)
| join kind=leftouter deviceStatus on DeviceId
| extend DeviceActivity = coalesce(DeviceActivity, "Unknown")
| summarize
    Compliant = countif(IsCompliant == 1),
    NonCompliant = countif(IsCompliant == 0),
    TotalDevices = dcount(DeviceId)
    by Control, OSPlatform, DeviceActivity
| extend ComplianceRate = round(100.0 * Compliant / (Compliant + NonCompliant), 1)
| order by DeviceActivity asc, Control asc, OSPlatform asc

Purpose: Fleet-scale Defender for Endpoint health dashboard. Shows compliance rates for each security control by OS platform, split by active/inactive device status. Designed for environments with 1000+ devices — does NOT list individual devices.

Defender Controls Assessed:

Control	Description	Critical?
AVMode	Antivirus running in Active mode (vs Passive/EDR Blocked)	🔴 Yes
AVSignatures	Antivirus signature definitions are current	🟠 High
RealtimeProtection	Real-time file scanning enabled	🔴 Yes
PUAProtection	Potentially Unwanted Application blocking enabled	🟡 Medium
CloudProtection	Cloud-delivered protection (MAPS) enabled	🟠 High
TamperProtection	Tamper Protection prevents disabling security settings	🔴 Yes
BehaviourMonitoring	Behavioral analysis and monitoring enabled	🟠 High
CoreComponentsUpdate	MDE unified agent / core components current	🟡 Medium

Active vs Inactive Classification:

• Active: Device last seen in DeviceInfo within 7 days — these are operational endpoints
• Inactive: Device last seen > 7 days ago — stale signature data is expected and should NOT be flagged as a security gap

Interpretation guidance: Focus on active devices with non-compliant critical controls (AVMode, RTP, TamperProtection). Inactive devices with stale AVSignatures are expected — report as "X inactive devices not reporting" rather than "X devices with outdated signatures."

SCID reference: Based on Jeffrey Appel's Defender health guide and Azure/Azure-Sentinel MDE_DeviceHealth.YAML.

---

Query 10a: Vulnerable Device Exposure Summary

ExposureGraphNodes
| where set_has_element(Categories, "device")
| extend rawData = parse_json(tostring(parse_json(tostring(NodeProperties)).rawData))
| extend HasHighCritVulns = isnotnull(rawData.highRiskVulnerabilityInsights) 
    and tostring(parse_json(tostring(rawData.highRiskVulnerabilityInsights)).hasHighOrCritical) == "true"
| extend VulnerableToRCE = isnotnull(rawData.vulnerableToRCE)
| extend VulnerableToPrivEsc = isnotnull(rawData.VulnerableToPrivilegeEscalation)
| extend InternetFacing = isnotnull(rawData.IsInternetFacing)
| extend critLevel = rawData.criticalityLevel
| extend IsCritical = isnotnull(critLevel) and toint(critLevel.criticalityLevel) < 4
| summarize 
    TotalDevices = count(),
    HighCritVulnDevices = countif(HasHighCritVulns),
    RCEVulnDevices = countif(VulnerableToRCE),
    PrivEscVulnDevices = countif(VulnerableToPrivEsc),
    InternetFacingDevices = countif(InternetFacing),
    InternetFacingWithHighCritVulns = countif(InternetFacing and HasHighCritVulns),
    CriticalDevices = countif(IsCritical),
    CriticalWithHighCritVulns = countif(IsCritical and HasHighCritVulns)

Purpose: Fast single-table scan that produces executive-level exposure headlines:

• "X of Y devices have high/critical vulnerabilities"
• "Z internet-facing devices are vulnerable"
• "N critical assets have exploitable weaknesses"

Performance: ⚡ Fast — single ExposureGraphNodes scan, no graph-match. Always runs in <5 seconds.

Key property: highRiskVulnerabilityInsights.hasHighOrCritical is the reliable vulnerability flag on device nodes. The property is a nested JSON string requiring parse_json(tostring(...)) to extract. See queries/cloud/exposure_graph_attack_paths.md Node Property Reference for full details.

---

Query 10b: Edge Connectivity from Vulnerable Devices

let VulnDevices = ExposureGraphNodes
| where set_has_element(Categories, "device")
| extend rawData = parse_json(tostring(parse_json(tostring(NodeProperties)).rawData))
| where isnotnull(rawData.highRiskVulnerabilityInsights)
| extend HasHighCritVulns = tostring(parse_json(tostring(rawData.highRiskVulnerabilityInsights)).hasHighOrCritical) == "true"
| where HasHighCritVulns
| project NodeId;
let TargetNodes = ExposureGraphNodes
| project NodeId, TargetName = NodeName, TargetCategories = Categories, TargetLabel = NodeLabel;
ExposureGraphEdges
| join kind=inner VulnDevices on $left.SourceNodeId == $right.NodeId
| join kind=inner TargetNodes on $left.TargetNodeId == $right.NodeId
| extend TargetType = case(
    set_has_element(TargetCategories, "identity"), "Identity",
    set_has_element(TargetCategories, "compute"), "Compute",
    set_has_element(TargetCategories, "data"), "Data Store",
    set_has_element(TargetCategories, "ip_address"), "IP Address",
    tostring(TargetCategories))
| summarize 
    PathCount = count(),
    UniqueTargets = dcount(TargetNodeId),
    SampleTargets = make_set(TargetName, 5)
    by EdgeLabel, TargetType
| order by PathCount desc

Purpose: Shows the 1-hop blast radius shape from vulnerable devices WITHOUT expensive graph-match. Reveals:

• How many identities can be reached (lateral movement risk)
• How many Azure resources are reachable (data exfiltration risk)
• Which edge types dominate (authentication vs permissions vs network)

Performance: ⚡ Fast — join-based aggregation, no make-graph or graph-match. Runs in <10 seconds even on large graphs.

Interpretation: High counts on "can authenticate as" edges to identities indicate lateral movement risk. High counts on "has permissions to" edges to data stores indicate data exfiltration risk. Feed the most concerning edge types into Q16 (optional deep-dive) if needed.

Portal deep-dive: For interactive multi-hop attack path exploration, use the Exposure Management Attack Paths portal.

---

Query 11: Defender Health Non-Compliant Exceptions

// Defender Health Non-Compliant Exceptions — exception-based, active devices only
// Groups non-compliant controls per device for fleet-scale readability
// Inactive devices excluded — stale signatures on offline devices are expected
let defenderSCIDs = dynamic([
    "scid-2010", "scid-2011", "scid-2012", "scid-2013", "scid-2016", 
    "scid-2003", "scid-91", "scid-2030",
    "scid-5090", "scid-5091", "scid-5094", "scid-5095",
    "scid-6090", "scid-6091", "scid-6094", "scid-6095"
]);
let deviceStatus = DeviceInfo
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, DeviceName, OSPlatform) by DeviceId
| extend DeviceActivity = iff(Timestamp > ago(7d), "Active", "Inactive"),
         LastSeen = Timestamp;
DeviceTvmSecureConfigurationAssessment
| where ConfigurationId in~ (defenderSCIDs)
| where IsApplicable == 1
| where IsCompliant == 0
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by DeviceId, ConfigurationId
| extend Control = case(
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-2010", "AVMode",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-2011", "AVSignatures",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-2012", "RealtimeProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-2013", "PUAProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-2016", "CloudProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-2003", "TamperProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-91", "BehaviourMonitoring",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-2030", "CoreComponentsUpdate",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-5090", "RealtimeProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-5091", "PUAProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-5094", "CloudProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-5095", "AVSignatures",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-6090", "RealtimeProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-6091", "PUAProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-6094", "CloudProtection",
    ConfigurationId =~ "scid-6095", "AVSignatures",
    ConfigurationId)
| join kind=inner deviceStatus on DeviceId
| where DeviceActivity == "Active"
| summarize 
    NonCompliantControls = make_set(Control),
    FailedCount = dcount(Control),
    HighestImpact = max(toreal(ConfigurationImpact))
    by DeviceName, OSPlatform, LastSeen
| order by FailedCount desc, HighestImpact desc
| take 100

Purpose: Exception-based reporting — only surfaces active devices failing Defender health controls. Groups all non-compliant controls per device for fleet-scale readability (one row per problem device, not one row per failed check).

Design for scale:

• Inner join with DeviceInfo → only active devices (seen within 7 days)
• Summarize by device → one row per device listing all failed controls as an array
• take 100 → practical limit for very large environments; increase if needed
• Inactive devices excluded → stale signatures on offline devices are expected, not actionable

Note: If this query returns 0 results, that's a positive finding — report as "✅ All active devices pass all Defender health controls." If the fleet summary (Q9) shows non-compliant devices but all are Inactive, report as: "⚠️ X inactive devices have stale Defender configurations — verify if devices should be decommissioned or reconnected."

---

Query 13: Certificate Expiration Status

🔴 CRITICAL: DeviceTvmCertificateInfo does NOT have a DeviceName column. You MUST join with DeviceInfo to resolve device names. Using DeviceName directly will fail with SemanticError: Failed to resolve scalar expression named 'DeviceName'. The query below already includes the required join. If the table returns empty or error, skip gracefully — it requires Defender Vulnerability Management add-on licensing.

DeviceTvmCertificateInfo
| extend Status = case(
    ExpirationDate < now(), "Expired",
    ExpirationDate < datetime_add('day', 30, now()), "Expiring within 30 days",
    "Valid"
)
| where Status != "Valid"
| summarize CertCount = count() by Status, DeviceId
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceInfo | summarize arg_max(Timestamp, DeviceName) by DeviceId
) on DeviceId
| project DeviceName, Status, CertCount
| order by Status asc, CertCount desc

Purpose: Identify expired and soon-expiring certificates that can cause service outages or security gaps.

Note: DeviceTvmCertificateInfo does NOT have a DeviceName column — you must join with DeviceInfo to resolve device names. If the table returns empty or error, skip gracefully — it requires Defender Vulnerability Management add-on licensing.

---

Query 14: Top Vulnerable Software

DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities
| summarize 
    CriticalCVEs = countif(VulnerabilitySeverityLevel == "Critical"),
    HighCVEs = countif(VulnerabilitySeverityLevel == "High"),
    TotalCVEs = count(),
    AffectedDevices = dcount(DeviceId)
    by SoftwareVendor, SoftwareName
| order by CriticalCVEs desc, HighCVEs desc, TotalCVEs desc
| take 15

Purpose: Identify which software products contribute the most vulnerabilities — useful for upgrade/removal decisions.

---

Query 15: Internet-Facing Critical Assets with Vulnerabilities

ExposureGraphNodes
| where set_has_element(Categories, "device")
| extend rawData = parse_json(tostring(parse_json(tostring(NodeProperties)).rawData))
| extend critLevel = rawData.criticalityLevel
| where isnotnull(critLevel) and toint(critLevel.criticalityLevel) < 4
| where isnotnull(rawData.IsInternetFacing)
| extend VulnerableToRCE = isnotnull(rawData.vulnerableToRCE)
| extend VulnerableToPrivEsc = isnotnull(rawData.VulnerableToPrivilegeEscalation)
| project 
    DeviceName = NodeName,
    CriticalityLevel = toint(critLevel.criticalityLevel),
    VulnerableToRCE,
    VulnerableToPrivEsc,
    NodeLabel
| order by CriticalityLevel asc

Purpose: Highest-risk combination: critical + internet-facing + vulnerable. Always Priority 1 remediation.

---

Query 16: Multi-Hop Attack Path Enumeration

⚠️ Optional — slow query. Only run when Q10a/Q10b reveal high exposure (e.g., many vulnerable devices with identity edges) and the user explicitly requests attack path enumeration. Skip by default in standard reports.

let IdentitiesAndCriticalDevices = ExposureGraphNodes
| extend rawData = parse_json(tostring(parse_json(tostring(NodeProperties)).rawData))
| extend HasRCEVuln = isnotnull(rawData.vulnerableToRCE)
| extend CritLevel = toint(rawData.criticalityLevel.criticalityLevel)
| extend HasCritLevel = isnotnull(rawData.criticalityLevel)
| where 
    (set_has_element(Categories, "device") and 
        (
            (HasCritLevel and CritLevel < 4)
            or 
            HasRCEVuln
        )
    )
    or 
    set_has_element(Categories, "identity");
ExposureGraphEdges
| where EdgeLabel in~ ("can authenticate as", "CanRemoteInteractiveLogonTo")
| make-graph SourceNodeId --> TargetNodeId with IdentitiesAndCriticalDevices on NodeId
| graph-match (DeviceWithRCE)-[CanConnectAs]->(Identity)-[CanRemoteLogin]->(CriticalDevice)
    where 
        CanConnectAs.EdgeLabel =~ "can authenticate as" and
        CanRemoteLogin.EdgeLabel =~ "CanRemoteInteractiveLogonTo" and
        set_has_element(Identity.Categories, "identity") and 
        set_has_element(DeviceWithRCE.Categories, "device") and DeviceWithRCE.HasRCEVuln and
        set_has_element(CriticalDevice.Categories, "device") and CriticalDevice.HasCritLevel
    project 
        RCEDeviceName = DeviceWithRCE.NodeName,
        IdentityName = Identity.NodeName,
        CriticalDeviceName = CriticalDevice.NodeName,
        CriticalityLevel = tostring(CriticalDevice.CritLevel)
| order by CriticalityLevel asc

Purpose: Discover multi-hop attack chains: RCE-vulnerable device → user identity → critical server. This is the heavy graph-match query — use Q10a/Q10b for fast summary stats, and only run this when deep enumeration is needed.

Note: This query may return 0 results if no RCE→identity→critical-device paths exist. That's a positive finding — report as "✅ No multi-hop attack paths from RCE-vulnerable devices to critical servers detected."

Performance: ⚠️ Slow — uses make-graph + graph-match. Can take 30-60+ seconds on large environments. Filter nodes tightly BEFORE make-graph to reduce graph size.

Additional patterns: See queries/cloud/exposure_graph_attack_paths.md for 30+ query patterns covering cookie chains, permission analysis, choke point detection, and Azure Resource Graph integration.

---

Drill-Down Reference Queries

⚠️ These queries are NOT part of the standard report workflow. They use DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidenceBeta to map vulnerable software to actual file paths on disk. Use them for targeted drill-downs when the user asks to investigate a specific software's vulnerabilities, identify cleanup targets, or understand why a software has so many CVE versions.

Do NOT run these fleet-wide in large environments — the evidence table can be very large. Always scope to a specific SoftwareName and optionally a DeviceId.

When to Use

Scenario	Query	Trigger
User asks "why does software X have so many versions?"	Q17	After Q14 reveals high version sprawl
User asks "what files are causing these CVEs?"	Q18	After Q2 identifies exploitable CVEs for a software
User asks "what can I safely clean up?"	Q19	After Q17/Q18 reveal old extension/app version folders
Standard vulnerability report	None	These queries are NOT used in standard reports

DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidenceBeta — Table Reference

Beta table: Schema and table name may change in future Defender releases. The canonical table name is DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidenceBeta — NOT DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidences or DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidence.

Column	Type	Description
DeviceId	string	Device identifier (join with DeviceInfo for DeviceName)
SoftwareVendor	string	Software vendor name
SoftwareName	string	Software product name (matches DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities.SoftwareName)
SoftwareVersion	string	Detected version (matches DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities.SoftwareVersion)
DiskPaths	dynamic	JSON array of file paths where the software was detected on disk
RegistryPaths	dynamic	JSON array of registry keys evidencing the software installation
LastSeenTime	string	Last time evidence was observed

---

Query 17: Version Sprawl by Source — Per-Software Summary

// Drill-down: For a specific software, show all versions with file locations
// categorized by source (Azure extension, application, standalone install, etc.)
// Scope: Single software — ALWAYS filter by SoftwareName
DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidenceBeta
| where SoftwareName =~ '<SOFTWARE_NAME>'
| extend Paths = parse_json(DiskPaths)
| mv-expand Path = Paths
| extend FilePath = tostring(Path)
| extend Source = case(
    FilePath has "Packages\\Plugins", "Azure Extension",
    FilePath has "Program Files\\Microsoft OneDrive", "OneDrive",
    FilePath has "WindowsApps", "Store App",
    FilePath has "Program Files\\dotnet", ".NET Runtime",
    FilePath has "Python", "Python",
    FilePath has "Windows\\System32", "System",
    FilePath has "Program Files\\", "Installed Software",
    FilePath has "dpkg-query", "Linux Package",
    "Other")
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceInfo | summarize arg_max(Timestamp, DeviceName) by DeviceId
) on DeviceId
| summarize 
    Versions = make_set(SoftwareVersion),
    FileCount = dcount(FilePath),
    Devices = make_set(DeviceName)
    by Source
| extend VersionCount = array_length(Versions), DeviceCount = array_length(Devices)
| order by FileCount desc

Purpose: High-level summary showing WHERE a software's vulnerable files come from — Azure extensions leaving old versions behind, OneDrive version-per-folder sprawl, Store apps, standalone installs, etc. Useful for identifying the root cause of version sprawl and choosing the right remediation approach.

Substitute: Replace <SOFTWARE_NAME> with the software from Q14 results (e.g., openssl, curl, zlib).

When to include in reports: This query produces a compact summary table suitable for including in reports when a specific software dominates the CVE count. Present it under Section 2c (Top Vulnerable Software) as a "Source Breakdown" sub-table for the worst offender.

---

Query 18: Vulnerable File Paths — CVE to File Mapping

// Drill-down: Map specific software versions to their on-disk file paths
// and correlate with CVE count per version
// Scope: Single software — ALWAYS filter by SoftwareName
let vulnVersions = DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities
| where SoftwareName =~ '<SOFTWARE_NAME>'
| summarize CVEs = make_set(CveId) by SoftwareVersion
| extend CVECount = array_length(CVEs);
DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidenceBeta
| where SoftwareName =~ '<SOFTWARE_NAME>'
| extend Paths = parse_json(DiskPaths)
| mv-expand Path = Paths
| extend FilePath = tostring(Path)
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceInfo | summarize arg_max(Timestamp, DeviceName) by DeviceId
) on DeviceId
| join kind=leftouter vulnVersions on SoftwareVersion
| summarize 
    Devices = make_set(DeviceName),
    DeviceCount = dcount(DeviceName)
    by FilePath, SoftwareVersion, CVECount
| order by CVECount desc, DeviceCount desc

Purpose: Maps every vulnerable file path to its version and CVE count. Shows exactly which files on which devices are contributing to CVE exposure. Key for building targeted cleanup scripts.

Substitute: Replace <SOFTWARE_NAME> with the target software name.

Common patterns revealed:

• Azure extensions: C:\Packages\Plugins\<ExtensionName>\<OldVersion>\...\libcrypto-3-x64.dll — old extension versions left behind after upgrades, each bundling their own OpenSSL/curl/zlib
• OneDrive: C:\Program Files\Microsoft OneDrive\<version>\ — every OneDrive update creates a new version folder with bundled libraries
• Store apps: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\<AppName_Version>\ — managed by Microsoft Store, stale versions auto-cleaned eventually
• Standalone installs: C:\Program Files\<product>\ — requires manual update or reinstall

---

Query 19: Stale Extension Folder Detection

// Drill-down: Find OLD Azure extension version folders still on disk
// by comparing evidence paths against the latest installed version
// Scope: All Azure extension evidence — safe to run fleet-wide (small result set)
//
// ⚠️ PITFALL: Version comparison uses string max() which is LEXICOGRAPHIC.
//    "1.29.98" > "1.29.104" because '9' > '1' at position 5.
//    Review results manually — a "stale" folder with a higher numeric version
//    than "latest" means the comparison inverted. This is a known KQL limitation
//    for dotted version strings with variable-width segments.
DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidenceBeta
| extend Paths = parse_json(DiskPaths)
| mv-expand Path = Paths
| extend FilePath = tostring(Path)
| where FilePath has "packages" and FilePath has "plugins"
| extend ExtensionName = extract(@"plugins\\([^\\]+)", 1, FilePath)
| extend ExtensionVersion = extract(@"plugins\\[^\\]+\\([^\\]+)", 1, FilePath)
| where isnotempty(ExtensionName) and isnotempty(ExtensionVersion)
| join kind=inner (
    DeviceInfo | summarize arg_max(Timestamp, DeviceName) by DeviceId
) on DeviceId
| summarize 
    SoftwareVersions = make_set(SoftwareVersion),
    FileCount = dcount(FilePath),
    Devices = make_set(DeviceName)
    by ExtensionName, ExtensionVersion
| as hint.materialized=true AllExtVersions
| join kind=inner (
    AllExtVersions
    | summarize LatestVersion = max(ExtensionVersion) by ExtensionName
) on ExtensionName
| where ExtensionVersion != LatestVersion
| project ExtensionName, StaleVersion = ExtensionVersion, LatestVersion,
    BundledSoftwareVersions = SoftwareVersions, FileCount, Devices
| order by ExtensionName asc, StaleVersion asc

Purpose: Identifies old Azure extension version folders still present on disk after upgrades. These are the primary source of "phantom" CVEs from bundled libraries (OpenSSL, curl, zlib, etc.) that inflate vulnerability counts. Safe to run fleet-wide because it only returns stale folders (small result set).

Known limitation: max(ExtensionVersion) uses lexicographic string comparison, which breaks for version segments with different digit counts (e.g., 1.29.98 vs 1.29.104). Always review results — if a "stale" version number looks higher than "latest," the comparison inverted. There is no built-in KQL function for semantic version comparison.

Regex note: extract() in KQL is case-sensitive. The evidence table stores paths in lowercase (c:\packages\plugins\...), so the regex uses lowercase plugins. The has operator used for filtering is case-insensitive.

Remediation pattern: For each stale extension version folder, the entire folder tree can be safely deleted:

Remove-Item -Recurse -Force "C:\Packages\Plugins\<ExtensionName>\<StaleVersion>"

After cleanup, TVM will reflect the reduced vulnerability count within 4-24 hours.

Common culprits: Azure Monitor Agent (AzureMonitorWindowsAgent), Guest Configuration Agent (ConfigurationforWindows), Azure Security Center (MicrosoftMonitoringAgent), and other Azure Arc extensions that bundle OpenSSL, curl, or zlib.

---

Risk Assessment

Compute an overall risk rating based on query results:

Rating	Criteria
🔴 Critical	Any: exploitable Critical CVEs on internet-facing assets, OR compliance rate < 40%, OR internet-facing devices with high/critical vulnerabilities (Q10a), OR high blast radius from vulnerable devices to identities/data stores (Q10b)
🟠 High	Any: exploitable High CVEs > 5, OR EoS software on critical assets, OR compliance rate < 60%, OR active devices with RTP/TamperProtection/AVMode non-compliant
🟡 Medium	Any: total High CVEs > 50, OR EoS software present, OR compliance rate < 75%, OR expired certificates > 10
🟢 Low	None of the above criteria met

Cite specific evidence when assigning risk level (per copilot-instructions.md Evidence-Based Analysis rule).

---

Report Template

Inline Chat Executive Summary

📊 VULNERABILITY & EXPOSURE REPORT — <DATE>
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━

**Overall Risk:** 🔴 / 🟠 / 🟡 / 🟢 <RATING> — <1-sentence justification with evidence>

### Vulnerability Overview
| Severity | CVE Count | Devices Affected |
|----------|-----------|------------------|
| 🔴 Critical | X | Y |
| 🟠 High | X | Y |
| 🟡 Medium | X | Y |
| 🔵 Low | X | Y |

⚠️ **X CVEs with known exploits** — see full report for details

### Configuration Compliance
| Category | Compliant % | Non-Compliant |
|----------|-------------|---------------|
| OS | X% | Y |
| Network | X% | Y |
| Security Controls | X% | Y |
| Accounts | X% | Y |
| Application | X% | Y |

### Attack Path Exposure
| Metric | Count |
|--------|-------|
| Devices with high/critical vulnerabilities | X of Y |
| Internet-facing vulnerable devices | Z |
| Critical assets with vulnerabilities | N |
| Lateral movement paths (identity edges) | X → Y targets |
| Data access paths (permission edges) | X → Y targets |

🔗 **Full interactive attack paths:** [Exposure Management Portal](https://security.microsoft.com/exposure-management/attack-paths)

### Defender Device Health
**Active Devices:** X/Y controls fully compliant across Z active devices
**Inactive Devices:** N devices not reporting (excluded — stale signatures expected)
⚠️ / ✅ **Non-compliant active devices:** <count and failed control names, or "None">

### Key Findings
- 🔴 <Critical finding 1>
- 🟠 <High finding 2>
- ⚠️ <Notable finding 3>
- ✅ <Positive finding>

### 🎯 TOP 3 PRIORITY ACTIONS
1. 🔴 <Action 1 — e.g., Patch X exploitable CVEs on internet-facing assets>
2. 🟠 <Action 2 — e.g., Remediate Y Impact-9 security misconfigurations>
3. ⚠️ <Action 3 — e.g., Upgrade Z end-of-support software>

📄 Full report: reports/exposure/vulnerability_exposure_report_<YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS>.md

Markdown File Structure

The full markdown report file MUST follow this structure:

# Vulnerability & Exposure Management Report

**Generated:** <DATE>
**Scope:** <Org-Wide / Device: HOSTNAME>
**Overall Risk Rating:** 🔴/🟠/🟡/🟢 <RATING>

---

## 1. Executive Summary
- Overall risk rating with evidence
- Key metrics dashboard
- Top 3 priority remediation actions

## 2. CVE Vulnerability Assessment

🔗 **Browse all CVEs in Defender portal:** [Weaknesses](https://security.microsoft.com/vulnerabilities) | [Software Inventory](https://security.microsoft.com/software-inventory)

### 2a. Severity Distribution
<Table: Severity × CVE Count × Device Count>

### 2b. Exploitable Vulnerabilities
<Table: CVE ID, CVSS, Description, Affected Devices — sorted by CVSS desc>

### 2c. Top Vulnerable Software
<Table: Vendor, Software, Critical/High/Total CVEs, Affected Devices>

### 2d. Per-Device Vulnerability Matrix
<Table: Device, OS, Critical/High/Med/Low/Total>

## 3. Security Configuration Compliance

🔗 **Detailed recommendations in Defender portal:** [Security Recommendations](https://security.microsoft.com/exposure-recommendations) | [Vulnerability Management Dashboard](https://security.microsoft.com/vulnerability-management/dashboard)

### 3a. Compliance by Category
<Table: Category, Total, Compliant %, Non-Compliant>

### 3b. Per-Device Compliance Scorecard
<Table: Device, Compliance %, Compliant/NonCompliant/NA counts>

### 3c. High-Impact Misconfigurations (Impact ≥ 8)
For each misconfiguration:
- **Configuration:** <Name>
- **Category:** <Category> > <Subcategory>
- **Impact Score:** <Score>/10
- **Risk:** <RiskDescription>
- **Affected Devices:** <count> (<device list>)
- **Remediation:** <Summary of RemediationOptions — strip HTML tags>

## 4. End-of-Support Software
<Table: Vendor, Software, Version, EoS Status, EoS Date, Affected Devices>

## 5. Exposure Management

### 5a. Critical Asset Inventory
<Table: Device, Criticality Level, Internet-Facing, RCE Vuln, PrivEsc Vuln>

### 5b. Attack Path & Exposure Analysis

**Vulnerable Device Exposure (Q10a):**
| Metric | Count |
|--------|-------|
| Total devices | X |
| Devices with high/critical vulnerabilities | Y |
| Internet-facing vulnerable devices | Z |
| RCE-vulnerable devices | N |
| Critical assets with vulnerabilities | N |

**Blast Radius from Vulnerable Devices — 1-Hop Connectivity (Q10b):**
| Edge Type | Target Type | Path Count | Unique Targets | Sample Targets |
|-----------|-------------|------------|----------------|----------------|
| can authenticate as | Identity | X | Y | ... |
| has permissions to | Data Store | X | Y | ... |
| ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |

**Interpretation:** <Narrative summarizing lateral movement risk, data access risk, and key choke points>

🔗 **Full interactive attack path analysis:** [Exposure Management Portal](https://security.microsoft.com/exposure-management/attack-paths)

> If Q16 was run (optional deep-dive):
> **Multi-Hop Attack Chains (Q16):** <Table: Entry Device → Identity → Target Device / Criticality>
> Or: "✅ No multi-hop attack paths from RCE-vulnerable devices to critical servers detected."

## 6. Endpoint Health

### 6a. Defender Device Health
**Fleet Summary (Active Devices):** <Table: Control × OS Platform × Compliant / NonCompliant / ComplianceRate — active devices only>
**Inactive Device Summary:** <Count of inactive devices by OS — signature staleness is expected, flag for decommissioning review>
**Non-Compliant Exceptions (Active Only):** <Table: Device, OS, Failed Controls, Count — only active devices failing Defender controls>
If no non-compliant active devices: "✅ All active devices pass all Defender health controls"
If non-compliant only on inactive: "⚠️ X inactive devices have stale Defender configurations — verify if devices should be decommissioned or reconnected"

### 6b. Certificate Status
<Table: Device, Expired/Expiring count>

## 7. Prioritized Remediation Plan

🔗 **Track remediation in Defender portal:** [Remediation Activities](https://security.microsoft.com/vulnerability-management/remediation) | [Security Recommendations](https://security.microsoft.com/exposure-recommendations)

| Priority | Category | Action | Impact |
|----------|----------|--------|--------|
| 🔴 Immediate | ... | ... | ... |
| 🟠 Short-term | ... | ... | ... |
| 🟡 Medium-term | ... | ... | ... |
| 🟢 Ongoing | ... | ... | ... |

## 8. Appendix
- Query reference (all KQL queries used)
- Data freshness notes
- Methodology

---

Per-Device Mode

When user specifies a device name, scope all DeviceTvm queries to that device:

Add filter to Queries 1-6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14:

| where DeviceName startswith '<DEVICE_NAME>'  // Use startswith — DeviceName is often FQDN (e.g., hostname.domain.com)

ExposureGraph queries (7, 15): Filter by NodeName:

| where NodeName has '<DEVICE_NAME>'  // Use has — NodeName may be FQDN, short name, or contain domain suffix

Per-device report differences:

• Section 5b (Attack paths) — filter to paths involving the specific device
• Title changes to: Vulnerability & Exposure Report — <DEVICE_NAME>

---

Known Pitfalls

Pitfall	Impact	Mitigation
DeviceName in TVM tables is stored as FQDN (e.g., hostname.domain.com)	DeviceName =~ 'hostname' returns 0 results — exact match fails on FQDN	MUST use DeviceName startswith '<short_name>' for per-device filtering. startswith matches both short names and FQDNs. Same applies to ExposureGraphNodes.NodeName — use has instead of =~
DeviceTvmCertificateInfo requires Defender VM add-on	Query returns empty or error	Skip gracefully, note in report: "Certificate data requires Defender Vulnerability Management add-on"
DeviceTvmBrowserExtensions may be empty	No browser extension data	Skip section, note as "No browser extension data available"

| DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilitiesKB has a specific schema | Ad-hoc project using non-existent columns (CveDescription, ExploitTypes, ExploitVerified, IsExploitVerified, RecommendedSecurityUpdate, RecommendedSecurityUpdateId) returns Failed to resolve scalar expression | Verified columns (via getschema): CveId, CvssScore, CvssVector, CveSupportability, IsExploitAvailable (bool), VulnerabilitySeverityLevel, LastModifiedTime, PublishedDate, VulnerabilityDescription, AffectedSoftware (dynamic), EpssScore (real). There are NO columns named ExploitTypes, ExploitVerified, RecommendedSecurityUpdate, or RecommendedSecurityUpdateId. Those exist on DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities (the main table), not the KB. Use getschema before adding ad-hoc columns. Stick to skill queries — do NOT improvise projections | | RemediationOptions in KB tables contains HTML | Raw HTML in output | Strip HTML tags when rendering in markdown: remove <br/>, <ol>, <li>, <a> tags, convert to plain text bullet points | | NodeProperties is a JSON string, NOT a parsed dynamic object | Direct dot-notation like NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel returns null through MCP JSON serialization — queries silently return 0 results | MUST use double parse_json(tostring()) extraction: parse_json(tostring(parse_json(tostring(NodeProperties)).rawData)) then access sub-properties. This is the ONLY reliable pattern for NodeProperties access. See Q7, Q10a, Q10b, Q15, Q16 for canonical examples | | ConfigurationBenchmarks in KB contains benchmark mappings | Can enrich report | Optional: extract CIS/NIST benchmark references for compliance mapping | | DeviceTvm assessments refresh periodically | Data may be 12-24h old | Note data freshness in report appendix | | DeviceTvmSecureConfigurationAssessment with Timestamp > ago(1d) returns 0 results | Lab, weekend, and low-activity environments may not have assessments in the last 24h. The ago(1d) filter silently drops all data — the #1 cause of empty Q3/Q6/Q8 results | NEVER use Timestamp > ago(1d) as a pre-filter. Use summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by DeviceId, ConfigurationId to dedup to the latest assessment per device×config without a time floor. Q9 and Q11 already use this pattern correctly | | graph-match queries can be slow on large graphs | Timeout possible | Filter nodes BEFORE make-graph to reduce graph size | | parse_json() and graph-match project produce dynamic-typed columns | order by fails with "key can't be of dynamic type" error | Always wrap in explicit type casts (toint(), tostring(), tolong()) before using in order by, summarize, or comparisons. Applies to ALL parse_json() output — not just graph-match. Example: | extend critValue = toint(rawData.criticalityLevel.criticalityLevel) then | order by critValue asc | | DeviceTvmInfoGathering table exists but is NOT used by this skill | Agent may attempt to query it for Defender health data, causing errors due to unfamiliar schema | Defender sensor health is covered by Q9 (SCIDs in DeviceTvmSecureConfigurationAssessment). Do NOT improvise queries against DeviceTvmInfoGathering — its schema differs from other DeviceTvm* tables and is not documented here | | DeviceTvmCertificateInfo has NO DeviceName column | Failed to resolve scalar expression named 'DeviceName' | Join with DeviceInfo \| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, DeviceName) by DeviceId to resolve device names | | Context in DeviceTvmSecureConfigurationAssessment is double-nested JSON | First parse_json(Context) returns an array of JSON strings; items need a second parse_json() to extract values | Use parse_json(tostring(parse_json(Context)[0]))[N] — e.g., [0] for AV mode code, [2] for signature date | | SCID numbers are OS-specific — same control has different IDs per platform | Querying Windows SCIDs on macOS/Linux returns IsApplicable=0 | Use the SCID mapping: Windows 2010-2030, macOS 5090-5095, Linux 6090-6095. Q9/Q11 normalize OS-specific SCIDs to unified control names | | Inactive devices have naturally stale AV signatures | Non-compliant AVSignatures on devices offline >7 days is expected, not a security gap | Always join DeviceInfo to separate active (seen <7d) from inactive devices; report inactive signature staleness as informational only | | DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidenceBeta is a Beta table | Table name and schema may change in future Defender releases | Use exact name DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidenceBeta — NOT DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidences or DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidence. If the table returns SemanticError, it may have been renamed or graduated to GA — check FetchAdvancedHuntingTablesOverview for the current name | | DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidenceBeta has no DeviceName column | Cannot display device names directly | Join with DeviceInfo \| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, DeviceName) by DeviceId — same pattern as DeviceTvmCertificateInfo | | DiskPaths and RegistryPaths are dynamic arrays | Need parse_json() + mv-expand to flatten into individual paths | Pattern: \| extend Paths = parse_json(DiskPaths) \| mv-expand Path = Paths \| extend FilePath = tostring(Path) | | Evidence queries can be expensive fleet-wide | Large environments have millions of file evidence rows | ALWAYS scope to a specific SoftwareName. Never run DeviceTvmSoftwareEvidenceBeta without a filter | | max() on version strings is lexicographic | "1.29.98" > "1.29.104" because '9' > '1' at the 5th character — inverts the comparison for multi-digit segments | Q19 results must be manually reviewed. KQL has no built-in semantic version comparison | | extract() regex is case-sensitive | Evidence table paths are lowercase (c:\packages\plugins\...), but regex patterns with uppercase (e.g., Plugins) won't match | Always use lowercase in extract() patterns for file paths. Use case-insensitive has for filtering |

---

Error Handling

Error	Cause	Resolution
SemanticError: Failed to resolve table 'DeviceTvm...'	Table not available in AH	Verify Defender for Endpoint is onboarded; some DeviceTvm* tables require premium licensing
SemanticError: Failed to resolve table 'ExposureGraphNodes'	Exposure Management not enabled	Report as: "⚠️ Microsoft Security Exposure Management is not enabled in this tenant. ExposureGraph sections skipped."
Query timeout on graph-match	Graph too large	Reduce node set with tighter filters; try simpler edge queries first
Empty results from DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities	No onboarded devices or no vulns detected	Verify at least one device is MDE-onboarded: `DeviceInfo
DeviceTvmCertificateInfo not found	Requires Defender Vulnerability Management add-on	Skip section, note in report

Graceful Degradation

If a table or query fails, do not abort the entire report. Skip the affected section and note it:

### 6b. Certificate Status
❓ Certificate data not available — `DeviceTvmCertificateInfo` table not found.
This may require the Defender Vulnerability Management add-on license.

Continue with all remaining sections. The report should always produce output for at least:

• CVE Vulnerability Assessment (Sections 2a-2d)
• Security Configuration Compliance (Sections 3a-3c)

These are available in all Defender for Endpoint tenants.

---

Additional References

• Query the Enterprise Exposure Graph
• DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities schema
• DeviceTvmSecureConfigurationAssessment schema
• Microsoft Security Exposure Management overview
• Existing query library: queries/cloud/exposure_graph_attack_paths.md