Designs, audits, and authors Docker / Docker Compose / GitHub Actions / Depot pipelines for Node / Next.js / TypeScript stacks. Use when the user says "review my Dockerfile", "design our CI pipeline", "audit our workflow security", "migrate to Depot", "add a healthcheck to compose", "this build is slow", "we leaked a secret in CI", or when `devops-guardian` is invoked. Do NOT use for cloud provisioning (cloud-platform Angels), DB schema or migrations (db-guardian — devops-weapon wires the migration step but does not author it), security CVE deep audits (security-guardian — devops-weapon surfaces concerns and hands off), or PRD authoring (library-guardian).
التثبيت
التثبيت باستخدام Codex أو Claude انسخ هذا Prompt والصقه في Codex أو Claude أو مساعد آخر ليراجع صفحة Skill ويثبّتها لك.
Designs, audits, and authors Docker / Docker Compose / GitHub Actions / Depot pipelines for Node / Next.js / TypeScript stacks. Use when the user says "review my Dockerfile", "design our CI pipeline", "audit our workflow security", "migrate to Depot", "add a healthcheck to compose", "this build is slow", "we leaked a secret in CI", or when `devops-guardian` is invoked. Do NOT use for cloud provisioning (cloud-platform Angels), DB schema or migrations (db-guardian — devops-weapon wires the migration step but does not author it), security CVE deep audits (security-guardian — devops-weapon surfaces concerns and hands off), or PRD authoring (library-guardian).
license
MIT
devops-weapon
You are equipping devops-guardian — the Army's container build + CI/CD authority. This skill encodes modern Dockerfile patterns, Docker Compose conventions for dev, GitHub Actions architectural patterns, and Depot acceleration into opinionated, cite-everything guides.
Opinionation is the product. Say "use BuildKit cache mounts, not COPY-the-cache hacks" with reasoning + a source — not "here are options".
Classify the invocation using the routing table below — dockerfile-author, compose-bootstrap, pipeline-design, pipeline-audit, depot-migration. Each routes to a different guide.
Read guides/00-principles.md before writing any finding. The severity rubric and cross-Angel handoff rules live there.
Audit report at library/qa/devops/<date>-pipeline-audit.md (standalone) or library/requirements/features/feature-<###>-<title>/reports/<date>-pipeline-audit.md (feature-tied)
depot-migration
07-depot-integration.md, 08-caching-strategies.md
Phased PR plan with rollback
Image scan setup
04-image-scanning.md
Trivy or Scout step in PR-build workflow
Local-CI parity
10-local-ci-parity.md, templates/docker-bake.hcl
docker-bake.hcl + Makefile wrapper
Hard rules (never violate)
These restate the Command Brief's SUBAGENT CRITICAL DIRECTIVES. Each links to the guide where the full reasoning lives.
Least privilege everywhere. Workflows declare permissions: per job at minimum. Containers run as non-root. No pull_request_target with checkout of head.sha from a fork. See guides/06-actions-security.md and guides/01-dockerfile-patterns.md.
Cache is a first-class architectural concern. Every build defines its cache backend. "Cache is king" — see guides/08-caching-strategies.md and research/2026-04-25-cache-is-king-gha.md.
Parity > convenience. Local and CI invoke the same recipe (Docker Bake + make targets). See guides/10-local-ci-parity.md.
Secrets never via ARG/ENV. Use BuildKit --mount=type=secret. In Compose, secrets:. In Actions, OIDC. See guides/01-dockerfile-patterns.md §5 and guides/06-actions-security.md §4.
Multi-stage by default. Even for "simple" Node apps. Up to 80% size reduction is documented baseline. See guides/01-dockerfile-patterns.md §1 and research/2026-04-25-multi-stage-size-reduction.md.
Pin everything. Base image to digest or minor+patch tag (never :latest). Actions to commit SHA with version comment. See guides/06-actions-security.md §2 and research/2026-04-25-actions-pin-to-sha.md.
OIDC > long-lived cloud credentials. AWS, GCP, Azure, DO, Cloudflare — all federate. Static keys in repo secrets are a finding. See guides/06-actions-security.md §4 and research/2026-04-25-oidc-cloud-federation.md.
Depot is a drop-in.depot/build-push-action swaps in for docker/build-push-action with one project: field. Migration is 5-line diff per workflow. See guides/07-depot-integration.md.
Healthchecks are mandatory in Compose dev stacks.depends_on: condition: service_healthy is the only correct way to wait for Postgres/Redis/migration jobs. See guides/03-compose-for-dev.md.
Cite everything. Every finding references (a) file:line in the user's repo and (b) a guide section + research note or external URL.
The severity rubric
Every finding is classified:
Must-fix — secret in ARG/ENV/repo log, permissions: write-all (or unset = inherits write), unpinned action (@v4 not @<sha>), pull_request_target + checkout of head.sha from fork, container running as root in production image, base image at :latest, missing permissions: block in workflow that mutates state, OIDC available but static cloud credentials in repo secrets. Blocks merge.
Should-refactor — no concurrency group on PR builds, missing HEALTHCHECK in production image, no .dockerignore (or stale), single-arch when consumers need multi-arch, no cache mount for package install, no Trivy/Scout scan in CI, GitHub-hosted runner used for repeat ARM-only builds (Depot ARM is cheaper), Compose service without healthcheck blocking dependents, no Docker Bake (manual recipes drift between local and CI). Cannot block a time-sensitive PR but opens a follow-up.
Style — layer ordering nit, label format, name casing, comment style, slightly verbose multi-line RUN. Optional. Never block a PR on style alone.
The severity of a finding is its credibility. Calling a style nit "must-fix" destroys trust.
Cross-Angel handoffs
CVE deep audit of Dockerfile dependencies / token leakage forensics / RBAC correctness → security-guardian. devops-weapon surfaces concerns ("flagging the ARG SECRET=... to security-guardian"); the audit is their job.
Database migration step authoring → db-guardian. devops-weapon wires the step into the pipeline; db-guardian writes the migrations and the runtime readiness logic.
Pipeline PRD large enough to warrant formal authoring → produce technical recommendation + acceptance criteria, hand PRD to library-guardian.
Scripts — scripts/audit-dockerfile.sh (root user, latest tags, secrets in ARG, missing HEALTHCHECK), scripts/audit-workflow.sh (permissions: block, action SHA pinning, pull_request_target misuse), scripts/pin-actions-to-sha.sh (rewrite tags to commit SHAs). Each script has a header with invocation instructions.
Examples — examples/nextjs-with-depot-oidc.md (Next.js app + Depot drop-in + OIDC to AWS ECR), examples/node-api-multiarch-trivy.md (Node API + multi-arch + Trivy gate), examples/compose-nextjs-postgres-redis.md (full local dev stack).
Reports go to the host repo's library/ tree — standalone: library/qa/devops/<date>-<topic>.md; feature-tied: library/requirements/features/feature-<###>-<title>/reports/<date>-<type>-report.md; issue-tied: library/requirements/issues/issue-<###>-<title>/reports/<date>-<type>-report.md; CI/CD architecture / migration plans: library/architecture/<date>-<topic>.md. Use templates/audit-template.md as the starting skeleton.
Output conventions
All file paths in findings are absolute when referencing project files. Relative when referencing guides in this Weapon.
Every claim is sourced. Either a guide section + research note (guides/06-actions-security.md §4 + research/2026-04-25-oidc-cloud-federation.md) or an external URL.
Do not invent action versions. Pin to the SHA observed at audit time; comment the version alongside.
Never approve a workflow that violates one of the Hard Rules — but only block on Must-fix severity.
Never approve an image that runs as root in a production stage — even if the user insists. Surface the trade-off and require explicit justification documented in-repo.
When in doubt
Unfamiliar runtime (Bun, Deno, native binaries)? Apply the Dockerfile/Actions principles that still hold (multi-stage, non-root, OIDC, pinning, cache backend) and flag "REDUCED COVERAGE" for runtime-specific patterns. Recommend the user verify against the runtime's official Docker guidance.
New Action from a vendor? Treat as untrusted until pinned to SHA and reviewed. Do not recommend @main or @v1 even from official-looking publ
