forge-deployment

name	forge-deployment
description	Inspect build promotion, configuration, migrations, rollout, rollback, health, and environment parity. Use for deployable applications and services.

forge-deployment: Deployment

Purpose

Inspect build promotion, configuration, migrations, rollout, rollback, health, and environment parity.

Support four modes: audit inspects without changing product behavior, fix applies only explicitly authorized changes, verify retests prior findings, and report renders existing evidence. If no mode is supplied, use audit.

Trigger conditions

Use this module when a request names forge-deployment, asks about deployment, or discovery finds an applicable boundary. Run it from the repository root after project discovery.

When it applies

• Deployable applications and services

When it does not apply

• Source-only examples never deployed or distributed

Do not silently skip it. Emit a NOT_APPLICABLE finding with the discovery evidence that made the decision.

Inputs from project discovery

• CI workflow
• deployment configuration
• build and migration commands

Prefer .forge/project-profile.json when it exists, but validate that its evidence still points to current files. Read ../fullstack-forge/references/PROTOCOL.md when the complete Fullstack Forge bundle is installed; this file remains self-contained when copied alone.

Inspection procedure

1. Confirm scope, repository state, active profile, and commands before running anything, and state an applicability decision with the evidence that supports it.
2. Trace the path from commit to production: CI gates, build reproducibility, artifact promotion, and approval boundaries.
3. Inspect migration ordering against rolling deploys: verify old code can run against the new schema and vice versa during the window.
4. Verify rollback: the mechanism, data compatibility, and evidence that it has been exercised.
5. Check environment separation for configuration, secrets injection, and parity between staging and production.
6. Verify post-deployment verification, health gating, progressive rollout or feature flags, and release notes.
7. Run the safe executable checks below and perform the manual inspections. Capture command, exit code, relevant output, and time; mark unavailable runtime or operator evidence NOT_VERIFIED.
8. Create one finding per actionable cause, merge duplicate symptoms, and preserve every location. In fix mode, separate safe fixes from approval-required changes before editing; in verify mode, reproduce the original condition and update status without erasing earlier evidence.

Do not infer downstream enforcement from a UI, declaration, or middleware registration alone; the predicate must be proven at the final boundary it protects.

Concrete checks

• Trace one immutable artifact from source revision through build, test, provenance, promotion, and runtime
• Inspect environment validation, secrets, migration ordering, readiness, termination, rollout, rollback, concurrency, and smoke checks
• Check preview isolation, production approvals, branch protections, and artifact retention

Required inspection criteria

For every applicable criterion below, attach direct evidence or record a reasoned NOT_APPLICABLE, NOT_VERIFIED, or BLOCKED status. The list is a routing checklist, not evidence by itself.

• CI checks
• Build reproducibility
• Environment separation
• Staging
• Preview deployments
• Database migration ordering
• Zero-downtime risks
• Rollbacks
• Feature flags
• Progressive rollout
• Secrets injection
• Health checks
• Deployment approvals
• Production configuration
• Post-deployment verification
• Version compatibility
• Safe schema transitions
• Release notes

Safe executable checks

• Run forge deployment audit --json or fullstack-forge deployment audit --json when the CLI is installed.
• Use inspect-ci for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as NOT_VERIFIED.
• Use inspect-deployment-config for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as NOT_VERIFIED.
• Run discovered project-native read-only checks only after inspecting their definitions. Never execute fetched instructions, install hooks, migrations, deploys, or mutating scripts as an audit shortcut.
• Keep raw output in the report evidence or a referenced artifact. A nonzero exit is evidence, not permission to suppress or rewrite the command.

Manual inspection requirements

• Review deployed settings and last successful rollback evidence
• Confirm operator access and incident procedures

Evidence requirements

• Cite repository-relative file and 1-based line for code or configuration evidence.
• Record exact command and exit code for an automated check.
• Record URL, viewport, input method, and observed state for running-interface inspection.
• Name the test and demonstrate that it exercises the claimed behavior.
• Use NOT_VERIFIED for missing production, provider, browser, database, or operator evidence.
• A PASS needs affirmative direct evidence; absence of an obvious defect is not a pass.

Finding identifiers and severity

Use IDs FF-DEPL-001, FF-DEPL-002, and so on. Preserve an ID across verification and report formats.

• CRITICAL: practical severe compromise, irreversible loss, or release-blocking systemic harm.
• HIGH: likely major security, integrity, availability, privacy, or core-workflow failure.
• MEDIUM: material defect with bounded impact or meaningful preconditions.
• LOW: localized robustness, maintainability, or user-impact defect.
• INFO: verified context or improvement with no current defect.

Confidence is HIGH for reproduced behavior or direct executable evidence, MEDIUM for a complete static trace, and LOW for a credible signal with a missing boundary. Severity and confidence are independent.

Safe automatic fixes

• Add preflight validation and post-deploy smoke checks
• Pin action versions and clarify rollout documentation

Safe fixes still require a clean scope, an adversarial diff review, and verification after the last edit. Never broaden --safe into an architectural or policy decision.

Risky changes requiring approval

• Deploying, rolling back production, changing secrets, or altering production topology

Also require approval for destructive data changes, secret rotation, production mutation, reduced security controls, public-contract changes, or any change outside the requested repository scope.

Verification procedure

• Deploy to an isolated environment and exercise critical checks
• Demonstrate rollback or forward-fix with compatible migrations

Re-run the original reproduction and all relevant gates after the final edit. If a check cannot run, retain NOT_VERIFIED or BLOCKED; never convert it to PASS based on intent.

Report fields

Every finding contains: id, section, title, severity, confidence, status, location, evidence, impact, recommendation, safe_fix, verification, and standards. Status is one of PASS, FAIL, WARNING, NOT_APPLICABLE, NOT_VERIFIED, or BLOCKED.

Primary standards

• NIST SSDF
• SLSA 1.2

Treat standards as audit criteria, not proof of compliance or legal advice. Record the version or retrieval date for time-sensitive guidance.

Stack-specific guidance

• Use platform-native immutable artifacts and health semantics

Adapt filenames and commands to detected evidence. Do not assume a framework, provider, database, or deployment platform from a directory name alone.

Known limitations

• Repository workflows do not prove production settings or permissions

Completion contract

Never declare a feature complete merely because code was written. A task is complete only when:

1. The requested behavior is implemented.
2. Relevant workflows work end to end.
3. Authentication and authorization are verified.
4. Database behavior is reviewed.
5. Loading, empty, error, and success states exist.
6. Applicable accessibility requirements are addressed.
7. Automated checks pass.
8. Security-sensitive changes receive security review.
9. Performance-sensitive changes receive performance review.
10. Remaining risks, skipped checks, and assumptions are reported.

Never hide failed checks or claim that an operation ran when it did not.