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security

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Expert guidance for writing secure Rails applications. Use when dealing with security, CSRF protection, XSS prevention, SQL injection, authentication, authorization, sanitize, html_safe, credentials, secrets, content security policy, session security, mass assignment, strong parameters, secure headers, file uploads, open redirects, or vulnerability remediation. Covers every major attack vector and the Rails-idiomatic defenses.

التثبيت

التثبيت باستخدام Codex أو Claude انسخ هذا Prompt والصقه في Codex أو Claude أو مساعد آخر ليراجع صفحة Skill ويثبّتها لك.

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المصدر

ThinkOodle

ThinkOodle/rails-skills

فتح مستودع GitHub عرض مستودعات المنشئ

تنزيل

تشغيل في Manus

المهن ذات الصلةSOC

استنادا إلى تصنيف SOC المهني

محللو أمن المعلوماتمهن الحاسوب والرياضيات·SOC 15-1212

مستكشف الملفات

11 ملفات

SKILL.md

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المزيد من هذا المستودع

نفس المستودع

action-cable

ThinkOodle/rails-skills

Expert guidance for implementing real-time features with Action Cable in Rails applications. Use when working with websockets, channels, subscriptions, broadcasting, live updates, push notifications, or Solid Cable. Covers connection authentication, channel creation, streaming, client-side JS, testing, and deployment. Clarifies when to use Action Cable directly vs Turbo Streams broadcasting.

2026-03-065

action-controller

ThinkOodle/rails-skills

Expert guidance for writing Rails controllers with Action Controller. Use when writing controller actions, strong parameters, before_action filters, rendering responses, redirects, flash messages, sessions, cookies, rescue_from error handling, streaming, CSRF protection, or HTTP authentication. Covers params permitting (especially nested params — the

2026-03-065

action-mailbox

ThinkOodle/rails-skills

Expert guidance for receiving and processing inbound emails with Action Mailbox in Rails. Use when setting up inbound email processing, routing emails to mailboxes, configuring ingress providers (Mailgun, SendGrid, Postfix, etc.), handling attachments, bouncing emails, or testing with fixtures. Covers "action mailbox", "inbound email", "receive email", "process email", "email routing", "mailbox", "incoming email", "email processing", "ingress", "InboundEmail".

2026-03-065

action-mailer

ThinkOodle/rails-skills

Expert guidance for Action Mailer in Rails applications. Use when creating mailers, sending emails, building email templates, configuring delivery, writing mailer previews, or working with transactional email. Triggers on "mailer", "email", "send email", "action mailer", "mail template", "deliver_later", "email notification", "transactional email", "mailer preview", "welcome email", "notification email".

2026-03-065

action-text

ThinkOodle/rails-skills

Expert guidance for implementing rich text editing with Action Text in Rails. Use when adding rich text fields, configuring Lexxy or Trix editors, rendering rich text content, handling attachments and embeds, creating custom attachables, styling rich text, or fixing N+1 queries with rich text. Triggers on "action text", "rich text", "lexxy", "trix", "WYSIWYG", "rich text editor", "has_rich_text", "text editor", "rich content", "embedded content", "rich_text_area", "action-text-attachment".

2026-03-065

active-job

ThinkOodle/rails-skills

Expert guidance for creating, queuing, and managing background jobs with Active Job and Solid Queue in Rails 8+. Use when creating background jobs, queuing work with perform_later, configuring Solid Queue, handling retries and errors (retry_on, discard_on), sending emails asynchronously (deliver_later), testing jobs, or managing queue priorities. Covers job creation, enqueuing, callbacks, serialization (GlobalID), bulk enqueuing, concurrency controls, recurring tasks, and job continuations.

2026-03-065

name	security
description	Expert guidance for writing secure Rails applications. Use when dealing with security, CSRF protection, XSS prevention, SQL injection, authentication, authorization, sanitize, html_safe, credentials, secrets, content security policy, session security, mass assignment, strong parameters, secure headers, file uploads, open redirects, or vulnerability remediation. Covers every major attack vector and the Rails-idiomatic defenses.
allowed-tools	Read, Grep, Glob, Write, Edit, Bash(bin/rails credentials:*), Bash(bin/rails secret), Bash(bundle audit), Bash(brakeman)

Rails Security Expert

Write secure Rails code by default. Security mistakes are the most dangerous mistakes an agent can make — an XSS hole or SQL injection can compromise every user instantly. When in doubt, choose the safer path.

Philosophy

Core Principles:

Secure by default — Rails has excellent built-in protections. Never disable them without explicit, documented justification
Defense in depth — Layer protections. Don't rely on a single mechanism
Permit-list over deny-list — Always prefer allowed lists over blocked lists for input validation, URL schemes, HTML tags, redirect targets
Never trust user input — Every param, header, cookie, and URL segment is attacker-controlled until proven otherwise
Fail closed — When authorization is ambiguous, deny access. When input is suspicious, reject it
Minimize exposure — Log less, expose less, store less. Filter sensitive params, avoid leaking stack traces, encrypt at rest

When To Use This Skill

Adding authentication or authorization logic
Writing controllers that accept user input
Rendering user-generated content in views
Building API endpoints
Working with file uploads or downloads
Configuring sessions, cookies, or CSRF protection
Managing secrets and credentials
Setting HTTP security headers or CSP
Reviewing code for security vulnerabilities
Fixing reported CVEs or security issues

Instructions

Step 1: Audit the Existing Security Posture

Check what's already in place before changing anything — understanding the existing security posture prevents accidentally weakening it:

# Check CSRF configuration
rg "protect_from_forgery" app/controllers/

# Check strong params usage
rg "params\.permit\|params\.require" app/controllers/

# Check for dangerous patterns
rg "\.html_safe|raw\(|raw " app/views/ app/helpers/
rg "\.where\(\".*#\{" app/ --type ruby
rg "redirect_to.*params" app/controllers/

# Check security headers
rg "content_security_policy" config/
rg "force_ssl" config/

# Check filter_parameters
cat config/initializers/filter_parameter_logging.rb

# Check credentials setup
ls config/credentials* config/master.key 2>/dev/null

Step 2: CSRF Protection

Never disable CSRF protection. Rails enables it by default — it's your primary defense against cross-site request forgery.

# ApplicationController — this should ALREADY be here
class ApplicationController < ActionController::Base
  protect_from_forgery with: :exception
end

How it works:

Every non-GET request requires an authenticity token
Include <%= csrf_meta_tags %> in your layout <head> for Turbo/Ajax
API controllers using token auth may skip CSRF — but only if they don't use cookie-based sessions (cookie sessions + no CSRF = attackers can forge requests)
Never use skip_forgery_protection on controllers that serve browser sessions

# API-only controllers with token auth — acceptable to skip
class Api::BaseController < ActionController::API
  # No cookie session = no CSRF needed
  # But MUST authenticate via Authorization header
end

# WRONG — disabling CSRF on a browser-facing controller
class PaymentsController < ApplicationController
  skip_forgery_protection  # NEVER DO THIS
end

Step 3: XSS Prevention

Rails auto-escapes all ERB output by default. This is your primary XSS defense — bypassing it means any user-controlled string can inject scripts into other users' browsers.

# SAFE — auto-escaped (default)
<%= user.name %>
<%= user.bio %>

# DANGEROUS — bypasses escaping. Only use for trusted, sanitized HTML
<%= raw(content) %>              # AVOID
<%= content.html_safe %>         # AVOID
<%== content %>                  # AVOID

# CORRECT way to render trusted HTML — sanitize first
<%= sanitize(user.bio, tags: %w[p br strong em a ul ol li], attributes: %w[href title]) %>

html_safe discipline:

NEVER call .html_safe on user input — this is an instant XSS hole
NEVER call .html_safe on strings built with interpolation of user data — the interpolated values bypass escaping
Only use .html_safe on string literals you fully control
When building HTML in helpers, use tag builder or content_tag — they handle escaping automatically

# WRONG — XSS vulnerability
def greeting(user)
  "<h1>Hello, #{user.name}</h1>".html_safe
end

# CORRECT — use tag helpers
def greeting(user)
  tag.h1("Hello, #{user.name}")
end

# CORRECT — escape manually if you must build strings
def greeting(user)
  "<h1>Hello, #{ERB::Util.html_escape(user.name)}</h1>".html_safe
end

sanitize() usage:

Specify allowed tags and attributes explicitly — the default allowlist may be broader than you need
For rich text, prefer Action Text which handles sanitization automatically

Step 4: SQL Injection Prevention

Never interpolate user input into SQL strings. Interpolation lets attackers inject arbitrary SQL — they can read, modify, or delete any data in your database.

# DANGEROUS — SQL injection
User.where("name = '#{params[:name]}'")
User.where("email LIKE '%#{params[:q]}%'")
Order.where("status = '#{status}' AND user_id = #{user_id}")

# SAFE — parameterized queries
User.where("name = ?", params[:name])
User.where("email LIKE ?", "%#{User.sanitize_sql_like(params[:q])}%")
Order.where(status: status, user_id: user_id)

# SAFE — named parameters
User.where("name = :name AND role = :role", name: params[:name], role: params[:role])

# SAFE — hash conditions (preferred)
User.where(name: params[:name])

LIKE queries need special handling:

# WRONG — user can inject % and _ wildcards
User.where("name LIKE ?", "%#{params[:q]}%")

# CORRECT — sanitize LIKE wildcards
User.where("name LIKE ?", "%#{User.sanitize_sql_like(params[:q])}%")

Less obvious injection vectors — these methods also pass strings directly to SQL:

order() — never pass raw user input (attackers can inject subqueries)
pluck(), select(), group(), having(), joins() with string args
find_by_sql(), connection.execute()
Arel.sql() — only use with trusted strings, never user input

# WRONG — order injection
Post.order(params[:sort])

# CORRECT — permit-list of allowed columns
allowed = %w[created_at title updated_at]
direction = %w[asc desc].include?(params[:dir]) ? params[:dir] : "asc"
column = allowed.include?(params[:sort]) ? params[:sort] : "created_at"
Post.order("#{column} #{direction}")

Step 5: Mass Assignment Protection

Use strong parameters for every model write. Raw params let attackers set any attribute — including admin flags, roles, and associations they shouldn't touch.

# WRONG — mass assignment vulnerability
User.create(params[:user])
@user.update(params[:user])
User.new(params.permit!)  # permit! allows everything

# CORRECT — strong parameters
def user_params
  params.require(:user).permit(:name, :email, :bio)
end

@user.update(user_params)

Strong params guidelines:

Define a private *_params method in every controller
Only permit attributes the user should be able to set
NEVER permit :role, :admin, :is_admin, :verified or similar privilege attributes from user input — this is how privilege escalation happens
Nested attributes need explicit permitting

def post_params
  params.require(:post).permit(
    :title, :body, :published,
    tags: [],
    images_attributes: [:id, :url, :caption, :_destroy]
  )
end

Step 6: Authentication

Use the Rails 8+ authentication generator as your starting point:

bin/rails generate authentication

Key authentication practices:

Use has_secure_password — it handles bcrypt hashing correctly
Use authenticate_by — it's timing-safe, preventing attackers from enumerating valid accounts by measuring response time
Call reset_session after login to prevent session fixation (where an attacker pre-sets a session ID)
Require current password for password/email changes
Use generic error messages: "Invalid email or password" (not "User not found") — specific messages reveal which accounts exist

# Session creation — correct pattern
class SessionsController < ApplicationController
  def create
    if user = User.authenticate_by(
      email_address: params[:email_address],
      password: params[:password]
    )
      reset_session  # Prevent session fixation
      start_new_session_for user
      redirect_to root_path
    else
      redirect_to new_session_path, alert: "Invalid email or password."
    end
  end
end

Rate limiting login attempts:

class SessionsController < ApplicationController
  rate_limit to: 10, within: 3.minutes, only: :create
end

Step 7: Authorization

Scope queries to the current user. Without scoping, any authenticated user can access any record just by changing the ID in the URL.

# WRONG — any user can access any project by changing the ID
@project = Project.find(params[:id])

# CORRECT — scope to current user
@project = Current.user.projects.find(params[:id])

# CORRECT — use policy objects (Pundit, Action Policy, etc.)
@project = authorize Project.find(params[:id])

Authorization checklist:

Scope every query to the authenticated user's permissions
Check authorization on every action (before_action)
Use before_action :authenticate for all protected resources
Prefer deny-by-default: before_action in ApplicationController with selective skip_before_action is safer than opt-in only: (new actions are protected by default instead of accidentally exposed)

class ApplicationController < ActionController::Base
  before_action :require_authentication
  # All controllers require auth unless explicitly skipped
end

class PublicPagesController < ApplicationController
  skip_before_action :require_authentication, only: [:home, :about]
end

Step 8: Session Security

# config/environments/production.rb
config.force_ssl = true  # HSTS + secure cookies + HTTPS redirect

# Session cookie settings (Rails defaults are good, but verify)
Rails.application.config.session_store :cookie_store,
  key: "_myapp_session",
  secure: Rails.env.production?,
  httponly: true,
  same_site: :lax

Session guidelines:

Store only IDs in the session — sensitive data in cookies is readable even when signed
Call reset_session after login (prevents session fixation)
Implement session expiry (absolute + idle timeout)
force_ssl = true in production — without it, session cookies travel over plain HTTP and can be stolen on public networks

Step 9: Secrets and Credentials

Use Rails credentials or environment variables for secrets. Hardcoded secrets end up in version control, where anyone with repo access (or a leaked backup) gets your API keys.

# Edit credentials
EDITOR=vim bin/rails credentials:edit

# Environment-specific credentials
EDITOR=vim bin/rails credentials:edit --environment production

# Access credentials
Rails.application.credentials.secret_key_base
Rails.application.credentials.dig(:aws, :access_key_id)

# Use bang version to fail loud if missing
Rails.application.credentials.some_api_key!

Key management:

NEVER commit config/master.key or config/credentials/*.key — these decrypt all your secrets
Add them to .gitignore (Rails does this by default, but verify)
Use ENV["RAILS_MASTER_KEY"] in production
Avoid logging or exposing credentials in error messages
Rotate secrets immediately if they may have been exposed

Step 10: Content Security Policy

# config/initializers/content_security_policy.rb
Rails.application.config.content_security_policy do |policy|
  policy.default_src :self, :https
  policy.font_src    :self, :https, :data
  policy.img_src     :self, :https, :data
  policy.object_src  :none
  policy.script_src  :self, :https
  policy.style_src   :self, :https
  policy.connect_src :self, :https
  policy.frame_ancestors :none
  policy.report_uri "/csp-violation-report-endpoint"
end

# Use nonces instead of 'unsafe-inline'
Rails.application.config.content_security_policy_nonce_generator =
  ->(request) { SecureRandom.base64(16) }
Rails.application.config.content_security_policy_nonce_directives = %w[script-src]

Layout must include:

<head>
  <%= csrf_meta_tags %>
  <%= csp_meta_tag %>
  <%= javascript_include_tag "application", nonce: true %>
  <%= stylesheet_link_tag "application", nonce: true %>
</head>

Step 11: Logging Security

# config/initializers/filter_parameter_logging.rb
Rails.application.config.filter_parameters += [
  :passw, :secret, :token, :_key, :crypt, :salt, :certificate, :otp,
  :ssn, :credit_card, :card_number, :cvv, :authorization
]

Avoid logging (these show up in log files, error trackers, and potentially third-party services):

Passwords, tokens, API keys, secrets
Credit card numbers, SSNs, PII
Full request bodies that may contain sensitive data

Step 12: Redirect Security

# WRONG — open redirect vulnerability
redirect_to params[:return_to]

# CORRECT — only allow internal paths
redirect_to safe_redirect_path(params[:return_to])

# Helper implementation
def safe_redirect_path(path)
  uri = URI.parse(path.to_s)
  if uri.relative? && uri.path.start_with?("/")
    uri.path
  else
    root_path
  end
rescue URI::InvalidURIError
  root_path
end

# SIMPLEST — use url_from (Rails 7+)
redirect_to url_from(params[:return_to]) || root_path

Step 13: File Upload Security

# Validate content type
class Document < ApplicationRecord
  has_one_attached :file

  validates :file, content_type: %w[application/pdf image/png image/jpeg],
                   size: { less_than: 10.megabytes }
end

# NEVER serve uploads from your app domain in production
# Use a separate domain/CDN or Active Storage's redirect mode

# NEVER use user-provided filenames for storage
# Active Storage handles this — it uses random keys

File upload guidelines:

Validate content type AND file extension — attackers can spoof one but rarely both
Set maximum file size limits to prevent denial-of-service via large uploads
Store uploads outside the web root (Active Storage does this automatically)
Never execute uploaded files
Process images/media asynchronously — image processing libraries can have vulnerabilities
Scan for malware in sensitive applications

Quick Reference

Dangerous Patterns to Grep For

# XSS: rg "\.html_safe|raw\(|<%==" app/
# SQL injection: rg '\.where\(".*#\{' app/ --type ruby
# Order injection: rg '\.order\(params' app/ --type ruby
# Mass assignment: rg 'params\.permit!' app/controllers/
# Open redirects: rg 'redirect_to.*params' app/controllers/
# CSRF disabled: rg 'skip_forgery_protection' app/controllers/
# Hardcoded secrets: rg '(api_key|secret|password|token)\s*=' app/ config/ -i
# Command injection: rg 'system\(|exec\(|`.*#\{' app/ --type ruby

Regex Gotcha

# WRONG — ^ and $ match LINE boundaries in Ruby, not string boundaries
validates :url, format: { with: /^https?:\/\/.+$/ }

# CORRECT — use \A and \z for string boundaries
validates :url, format: { with: /\Ahttps?:\/\/.+\z/ }

Anti-Patterns — Each of These Is a Vulnerability

html_safe on user input — Instant XSS. Attackers inject scripts that run in other users' browsers
String interpolation in SQL — SQL injection lets attackers read/modify/delete your entire database
params.permit! — Permits everything, letting attackers set admin flags, roles, or any attribute
skip_forgery_protection on browser controllers — Lets malicious sites submit forms on behalf of your users
redirect_to params[:url] — Open redirect. Attackers craft links that look like your site but redirect to phishing pages
Hardcoded secrets in source — Anyone with repo access (or a leaked backup) gets your API keys
Kernel#open with user input — open("| rm -rf /") executes shell commands. Use File.open, URI.open, or IO.open
Disabling force_ssl in production — Session cookies travel in plaintext, stealable on any shared network
Logging sensitive data — Logs end up in error trackers, log aggregators, and developer machines
Trusting client-side validation — Attackers bypass JavaScript trivially; server-side validation is the real gate

Security Audit Checklist

Before shipping any feature, verify: