This skill should be used when the user asks to "triage a vulnerability report", "assess a CVE", "evaluate a bug bounty submission", "decide if a finding is valid", "review a security finding", "dismiss a vulnerability", "should we fix this CVE", "prioritize a vulnerability report", or needs to determine whether an incoming vulnerability report warrants investigation. Applies 7 brocards (rules of thumb) to systematically accept, dismiss, or request more information on vulnerability reports, or needs to filter raw findings from agentic vulnerability discovery pipelines before human review.
This skill should be used when the user asks to "triage a vulnerability report", "assess a CVE", "evaluate a bug bounty submission", "decide if a finding is valid", "review a security finding", "dismiss a vulnerability", "should we fix this CVE", "prioritize a vulnerability report", or needs to determine whether an incoming vulnerability report warrants investigation. Applies 7 brocards (rules of thumb) to systematically accept, dismiss, or request more information on vulnerability reports, or needs to filter raw findings from agentic vulnerability discovery pipelines before human review.
Vulnerability Triage Brocards
Systematically evaluate incoming vulnerability reports against 7 principled
criteria before committing resources to deeper analysis. Each brocard is a
falsifiable test: if a report fails any brocard, document the reason and
dismiss or request clarification. If a report survives all 7, escalate it.
Filtering findings from agentic vulnerability discovery pipelines
before human review -- the primary use case; most automated runs
produce findings that fail one or more brocards and can be dismissed
without auditor time
Triaging findings during a ToB audit to decide which warrant
escalation to PoC development
Evaluating third-party CVEs or advisories against a codebase under
active audit to decide if they affect engagement scope
Reviewing bug bounty submissions or external vulnerability reports
for ToB open-source projects
Providing structured, defensible justification when recommending a
client dismiss or deprioritize a reported CVE
When NOT to Use
Hunting for new bugs during an audit -- use other skills
Proving exploitability of a confirmed finding -- use a
dedicated PoC/exploitability skill
-- use a dedicated crash
triage skill
Triaging fuzzer crashes in C/C++
Pipeline Position
This skill is the quality gate between automated discovery and human
review. Findings that survive triage proceed to PoC development and
formal writeup.
flowchart TD
A([agentic vulnerability discovery]) -->|raw findings| B[vulnerability-triage-brocards]
B -->|DISMISS| C([Document brocard # and reasoning])
B -->|NEEDS-MORE-INFO| D([Request specific evidence])
B -->|ACCEPT| E[PoC / exploitability proof]
E --> F[vulnerability report writeup]
Triage Workflow
For each incoming vulnerability report, evaluate it against all 7 brocards
sequentially. By default, stop at the first DISMISS verdict and report it.
If the user requests a full evaluation, continue through all 7 brocards
regardless of intermediate failures. For each brocard, record one of three
verdicts:
PASS -- the report survives this test
DISMISS -- the report fails this test; document the reason
NEEDS-MORE-INFO -- insufficient evidence to evaluate; specify what is
missing
Brocard 1: No Vulnerability Without a Threat Model
Dismiss any report that lacks a coherent threat model. The report must
articulate: (a) who the attacker is, (b) what capability the attacker has,
(c) how the attacker exploits the behavior, and (d) what harm results.
Reports that describe a code behavior without connecting it to attacker-
reachable harm fail this brocard.
Quick test: Can the report answer "an attacker with [capability] can
[action] to achieve [impact]"? If not, dismiss or request clarification.
Brocard 2: No Exploit from the Heavens
Dismiss any report where the attacker capabilities required to trigger the
vulnerability equal or exceed the impact of the vulnerability itself. If the
attacker must already possess the power the exploit would grant, the
vulnerability is redundant.
Quick test: Does triggering the exploit require capabilities that already
subsume its impact? If yes, dismiss.
Brocard 3: No Vulnerability Outside of Usage
Dismiss any report describing behavior that is theoretically possible but
does not occur in actual software usage. Check whether the vulnerable code
path is reachable in practice.
Quick test: Is the vulnerable code path exercised by any real caller?
If not, dismiss. If the report targets a library, ask if we should check
downstream usage.
Brocard 4: No Vulnerability from Standard Behavior
Dismiss any report where the behavior results from correct implementation of
a specification. The vulnerability, if any, exists in the standard -- not the
implementation.
Nuance: If an implementation voluntarily adopts a stricter posture than
the standard requires, and that strictness fails, the implementation is
vulnerable even though the standard permits the behavior.
Quick test: Does the specification require or permit this behavior? If
yes, the report targets the standard, not the code.
Brocard 5: No Vulnerability from Documented Behavior
Dismiss any report describing behavior that is explicitly documented,
especially when the documentation includes security implications or usage
caveats.
Nuance: Downstream usage that violates documented guidelines may
constitute a valid vulnerability in the downstream project, not the
documented component.
Quick test: Does the project's documentation describe this behavior and
warn against misuse? If yes, dismiss the report against the project itself.
Brocard 6: No Cure Worse Than the Disease
Dismiss any report whose remediation would cause more harm than the
vulnerability itself. Evaluate: (a) severity of the vulnerability in
practice, (b) cost and disruption of the proposed fix, (c) blast radius of
the remediation (dependency graph, ecosystem impact).
Quick test: Would fixing this cause more disruption than the
vulnerability itself? If yes, dismiss or downgrade severity.
Brocard 7: The Report Is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient
A CVE identifier or formal report does not prove a vulnerability exists.
Conversely, absence of a report does not prove safety. Evaluate the
technical merits independently of report metadata.
Quick test: Strip the CVE number and CVSS score. Does the technical
description alone justify action? Judge on evidence, not authority.
Output Format
After evaluating all 7 brocards, produce a structured triage summary:
"We can't prove it's NOT exploitable" -- the burden of proof is on the
reporter to demonstrate a threat model (Brocard 1)
"Other projects patched it" -- other projects may have different usage
patterns (Brocard 3)
"We should include it to pad the report" -- ToB reports reflect
technical reality, not finding count targets; a dismissed report with
documented reasoning is more valuable than a false positive in a
final deliverable
