tlamatini-csrf-exempt-audit

name	tlamatini-csrf-exempt-audit
description	Enumerate every @csrf_exempt-decorated view in Tlamatini/agent/views.py and classify whether each one really needs the exemption.
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CSRF-exempt audit

The TlamatiniVsOpenClaw report counted 60+ @csrf_exempt decorators in Tlamatini/agent/views.py. Most are necessary for WebSocket-adjacent JSON endpoints, but the wholesale exemption is a security smell.

Procedure

1. Grep Tlamatini/agent/views.py for @csrf_exempt.
2. For each match, inspect the view above it and classify:
   • unsafe-without-csrf: state-changing POST that should NOT be exempt.
   • safe-because-websocket: feeds a WebSocket session-restore path.
   • safe-because-internal-tool: only callable by Tlamatini's own JS; a CSRF token would be appropriate.
   • unknown: needs human review.
3. For each non-safe-because-websocket row, propose the smallest fix (token tag, middleware exception, view rewrite).

Return { total, classifications: [{view_name, kind}], recommendations: [...] }.