القائمة
Review a task for prompt-injection, exfiltration, secrets, approval, and trust-boundary risks. Use before networked tools, MCP, auth flows, production actions, or security-sensitive edits.
التثبيت باستخدام Codex أو Claude انسخ هذا Prompt والصقه في Codex أو Claude أو مساعد آخر ليراجع صفحة Skill ويثبّتها لك.
استنادا إلى تصنيف SOC المهني
Synchronize the Obsidian vault (Meta-YGN/) with the current codebase state. Use after releases, major changes, or when vault docs may be stale.
Run a minimal metacognitive evaluation pass over the current task or repository change. Use to assess quality, calibration, and overhead.
Pressure-test the current plan or conclusion. Use when reasoning may be too linear, confidence seems too high, or there are plausible counter-hypotheses.
Compact the session into goal, verified facts, dead ends, open risks, and next actions. Use before long sessions, handoffs, context limits, or after repeated failed attempts.
Escalate when uncertainty is too high, risk exceeds agent capability, or human judgment is required. Use when verification fails, threats are found, or the agent is stuck.
Classify the task, identify risk, choose a strategy, and set a proof plan before non-trivial work. Use for architecture, migrations, auth, billing, concurrency, large refactors, or whenever failure would be costly.
| name | metacog-threat-model |
| description | Review a task for prompt-injection, exfiltration, secrets, approval, and trust-boundary risks. Use before networked tools, MCP, auth flows, production actions, or security-sensitive edits. |
| user-invocable | true |
| context | fork |
| agent | general-purpose |
| allowed-tools | Read, Grep, Glob, Bash |
Review the current task through a trust-boundary lens.
| Category | Check | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Secrets exposure | Are any secrets, tokens, or keys at risk of being read, logged, or leaked? | |
| Risky file paths | Does the task touch .env, credentials, keys, or deployment configs? | |
| Prompt injection | Could untrusted input (user data, MCP responses, file content) influence agent behavior? | |
| External tool trust | Are MCP or external tools being trusted without verification? | |
| Irreversible actions | Are there destructive operations (delete, push, deploy, publish) without rollback? | |
| Missing approval gates | Should a human approve before this action proceeds? | |
| Unclear rollback | If this goes wrong, is the recovery path documented? |
Threat summary: [one-sentence risk assessment]
Blocked actions: [list any operations that should be denied]
Required approvals: [list any operations that need human confirmation]
Safe next step: [the action that can proceed safely]
Rules: