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deep-context

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UpdatedMay 29, 2026 at 02:51

Deep system-understanding pass before threat modeling. The context-analyst agent reads the code (line-by-line where it matters) and builds a grounded model — modules, entry points, actors, trust boundaries, data stores, system invariants — with file:line evidence, written to .kuzushi/deep-context.json. Context only — it never finds vulns, fixes, or severities. Best run after x-ray, before /threat-model.

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allsmog

allsmog/kuzushi-security-plugin

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Information Security AnalystsComputer and Mathematical Occupations·SOC 15-1212

SKILL.md

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name	deep-context
description	Deep system-understanding pass before threat modeling. The context-analyst agent reads the code (line-by-line where it matters) and builds a grounded model — modules, entry points, actors, trust boundaries, data stores, system invariants — with file:line evidence, written to .kuzushi/deep-context.json. Context only — it never finds vulns, fixes, or severities. Best run after x-ray, before /threat-model.
context	fork
agent	context-analyst
user-invocable	false

Deep context

Build a grounded understanding of the system before hunting bugs (shallow context is where missed bugs and false positives come from).

Run node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/cmd/deep-context-prepare.mjs" --target "<repo root>". Read the prep's prepPath (inventory + x-ray entry points as leads).
Work the three phases — orientation (modules / entry points / actors / data stores) → ultra-granular analysis of the security-relevant components (read line-by-line, trace cross-function flows, record the invariants the code assumes) → a global data-flow + trust model — grounding every claim in a file you read (tree_sitter:*, LSP, Grep). Record anything suspicious as an open question, never a finding.
Write the { systemOverview, modules, entryPoints, actors, trustBoundaries, dataStores, invariants, openQuestions } bundle to the prep's draftPath, then run the assembleCommand — it enforces the context-only boundary and persists .kuzushi/deep-context.json.
Report the overview, the counts, the key invariants, and the open questions. /threat-model will build on it.

When NOT to use

When a quick inventory is enough — that's the SessionStart context / /threat-model's own scope; this is the slower, deeper reasoning pass.
To find or fix bugs — strictly out of scope here; use /threat-hunt, /taint-analysis, /systems-hunt, and /verify.

Rationalizations to Reject

"The framework implies the design." → Read the code; assumed designs miss real trust boundaries.
"That looks like a bug — flag it." → Record an openQuestion; the hunts adjudicate, not this stage.
"Skip the confusing module." → That's often where bugs hide; if you can't resolve it, say so in openQuestions rather than glossing over it.

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name	deep-context
description	Deep system-understanding pass before threat modeling. The context-analyst agent reads the code (line-by-line where it matters) and builds a grounded model — modules, entry points, actors, trust boundaries, data stores, system invariants — with file:line evidence, written to .kuzushi/deep-context.json. Context only — it never finds vulns, fixes, or severities. Best run after x-ray, before /threat-model.
context	fork
agent	context-analyst
user-invocable	false

Deep context

Build a grounded understanding of the system before hunting bugs (shallow context is where missed bugs and false positives come from).

Run node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/cmd/deep-context-prepare.mjs" --target "<repo root>". Read the prep's prepPath (inventory + x-ray entry points as leads).
Work the three phases — orientation (modules / entry points / actors / data stores) → ultra-granular analysis of the security-relevant components (read line-by-line, trace cross-function flows, record the invariants the code assumes) → a global data-flow + trust model — grounding every claim in a file you read (tree_sitter:*, LSP, Grep). Record anything suspicious as an open question, never a finding.
Write the { systemOverview, modules, entryPoints, actors, trustBoundaries, dataStores, invariants, openQuestions } bundle to the prep's draftPath, then run the assembleCommand — it enforces the context-only boundary and persists .kuzushi/deep-context.json.
Report the overview, the counts, the key invariants, and the open questions. /threat-model will build on it.

When NOT to use

When a quick inventory is enough — that's the SessionStart context / /threat-model's own scope; this is the slower, deeper reasoning pass.
To find or fix bugs — strictly out of scope here; use /threat-hunt, /taint-analysis, /systems-hunt, and /verify.

Rationalizations to Reject

"The framework implies the design." → Read the code; assumed designs miss real trust boundaries.
"That looks like a bug — flag it." → Record an openQuestion; the hunts adjudicate, not this stage.
"Skip the confusing module." → That's often where bugs hide; if you can't resolve it, say so in openQuestions rather than glossing over it.