| name | crypto-compliance |
| description | The banned-primitive gate. Routed to when changed code hashes, signs, encrypts, derives keys, generates security-relevant randomness, configures TLS, or imports a crypto library. Rejects broken primitives, disabled TLS verification, and home-rolled crypto; the approved-primitive list lives in security-controls.md. The auth-crypto-reviewer agent is dispatched as the reviewer. |
crypto-compliance
The banned-primitive gate. Routed to when changed code uses cryptography, hashing, signing, key derivation, security-relevant random generation, or TLS configuration.
Pre-flight
Read these, or STOP and surface the gap — never guess the policy:
{{PROJECT_DIR}}/.codearbiter/security-controls.md — the project's approved and forbidden primitives, key requirements, and TLS minimum. If this file is unreadable, BLOCK; do not infer the policy.
Phase 1 — Banned-primitive scan · gate: BLOCK
Scan every crypto operation in the changed code against security-controls.md. Apply the project's forbidden list; where it is silent, the following BLOCK unconditionally:
- Broken primitives —
md5, sha1/sha-1 (including in HMAC or "just for IDs"), des, 3des, rc4, and RSA keys below 2048 bits.
- Disabled TLS verification —
rejectUnauthorized: false, verify: false, or any disabling of certificate peer verification, on any connection.
- Home-rolled crypto — a hand-built cipher, AEAD, KDF, signature scheme, or any reimplementation of a primitive in userland instead of a vetted, approved one.
- Unapproved primitive or library — any algorithm, mode, key size, or crypto library not on the approved list in
security-controls.md.
Dispatch the auth-crypto-reviewer agent ({{PLUGIN_ROOT}}/agents/auth-crypto-reviewer.md) to confirm these findings against security-controls.md.
Gate: no banned or unapproved primitive, no disabled TLS verification, and no home-rolled crypto in the changed code.
On pass — record the gate: follow {{PLUGIN_ROOT}}/includes/security-gate-record.md (the shared record mechanism). For this gate the relevant commit hook is H-09b (crypto/TLS). On any BLOCK, do NOT record the pass.
Out-of-scope finding: do not act on it and do not author an ADR (ADRs are user-attributed, via /adr only). Mark it inline with [NEEDS-TRIAGE]; never silently drop it.
Hard rules
- MUST read
security-controls.md before scanning — BLOCK if it cannot be read.
- MUST NOT use MD5, SHA1, DES, 3DES, RC4, or RSA below 2048 bits — even for non-security checksums or IDs.
- MUST NOT set
verify: false or rejectUnauthorized: false, or otherwise disable certificate verification, on any TLS connection.
- MUST NOT use a home-rolled or userland-reimplemented cryptographic primitive.
- MUST NOT use any primitive, key size, or crypto library not on the approved list in
security-controls.md.
- MUST record the
security-gate-passed marker (via hooks/security-pass.py) ONLY when the gate genuinely passes — the marker is what unblocks the commit (hook H-09b), so a premature or unconditional recording defeats the gate.
