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Showing SKILL.md
Based on SOC occupation classification
| name | cis-bind9-v301-2-9 |
| description | Isolate BIND with chroot'ed Subdirectory (Automated) |
| category | cis-bind |
| version | 3.0.1 |
| author | cyberstrike-official |
| tags | ["cis","bind","dns","isc-bind","bind9","permissions-ownership"] |
| cis_id | 2.9 |
| cis_benchmark | CIS ISC BIND DNS Server 9.9 Benchmark v3.0.1 |
| tech_stack | ["bind","isc-bind","dns","linux"] |
| cwe_ids | [] |
| chains_with | [] |
| prerequisites | [] |
| severity_boost | {} |
The chroot() system call causes an application to run with limited file system access so that a subdirectory becomes the root directory for the application environment. When this is done, the application is "jailed" and no longer has access to the entire file structure but is limited to the given subdirectory.
Although there are ways that a chroot jail can be broken, most methods require that a process be running as root in order to escape. Since BIND should be run as a different user than root, a chroot is an effective defense, to limit access to sensitive system configuration files. In the event that BIND has a vulnerability that allows code execution, the attack will not have access to the real system files such as /etc/password, but will be limited to the files placed in the chroot subdirectory.
Not Applicable
Run the following two commands to find the root directory of the currently running named process. If the named process is chroot'ed, then the listing will show a symbolic link to the chroot subdirectory. If process is not chroot'ed, then the symbolic link will point to the real root directory /.
# NAMEDPID=$(pidof named)
# ls -ld /proc/$NAMEDPID/root
lrwxrwxrwx 1 named named 0 Sep 10 13:21 /proc/423/root -> /var/named/chroot
Perform the following:
bind-chroot package to provide the chroot directories.# systemctl stop named.service
# yum install bind-chroot
/etc/sysconfig/named configuration file to have a line similar to the one shown below that sets the ROOTDIR environment variable.ROOTDIR="/var/named/chroot"
/var/named/chroot//etc files such as /etc/named.conf and /etc/rndc.key to the real files in the chroot'ed subdirectory, so that utilities like rndc will work as expected. Do not create symbolic links or hard links from inside the chroot to external resources! Instead use symbolic links to point from the outside resources into the chroot.# systemctl start named.service
The BIND service is not chroot'ed by default.
Not Applicable
| Controls Version | Control | IG 1 | IG 2 | IG 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| v6 | 14.4 - Protect Information with Access Control Lists | Y | Y | Y |
| Tactic | Technique |
|---|---|
| Defense Evasion | T1222 - File and Directory Permissions Modification |
| Privilege Escalation | T1611 - Escape to Host |