t1558-003-kerberoasting

name	T1558.003_kerberoasting
description	Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.
category	authentication
version	18.1
author	cyberstrike-official
tags	["mitre-attack","enterprise","t1558.003","credential-access","windows","sub-technique"]
technique_id	T1558.003
tactic	credential-access
all_tactics	["credential-access"]
platforms	["Windows"]
mitre_url	https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003
tech_stack	["windows"]
cwe_ids	["CWE-522"]
chains_with	["T1558","T1558.001","T1558.002","T1558.004","T1558.005"]
prerequisites	["T1558"]
severity_boost	{"T1558":"Chain with T1558 for deeper attack path","T1558.001":"Chain with T1558.001 for deeper attack path","T1558.002":"Chain with T1558.002 for deeper attack path"}

T1558.003 Kerberoasting

Sub-technique of: T1558

High-Level Description

Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.

Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service).

Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.

This same behavior could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.

Cracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts.

Kill Chain Phase

• Credential Access (TA0006)

Platforms: Windows

What to Check

• Identify if Kerberoasting technique is applicable to target environment
• Check Windows systems for indicators of Kerberoasting
• Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (3 known mitigations)
• Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

How to Test

Atomic Red Team Tests

The following tests are from Atomic Red Team and provide actionable ways to test this technique:

Atomic Test 1: Request for service tickets

This test uses the Powershell Empire Module: Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1 The following are further sources and credits for this attack: [Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz source] (https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/kerberoasting-without-mimikatz/) [Invoke-Kerberoast source] (https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Recon/Invoke-Kerberoast/) when executed successfully , the test displays available services with their hashes. If the testing domain doesn't have any service principal name configured, there is no output