| name | T1606.002_saml-tokens |
| description | An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate. |
| category | authentication |
| version | 18.1 |
| author | cyberstrike-official |
| tags | ["mitre-attack","enterprise","t1606.002","credential-access","saas","windows","iaas","office-suite","identity-provider","sub-technique"] |
| technique_id | T1606.002 |
| tactic | credential-access |
| all_tactics | ["credential-access"] |
| platforms | ["SaaS","Windows","IaaS","Office Suite","Identity Provider"] |
| mitre_url | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002 |
| tech_stack | ["saas","windows","cloud","office","identity"] |
| cwe_ids | ["CWE-522"] |
| chains_with | ["T1606","T1606.001"] |
| prerequisites | ["T1606"] |
| severity_boost | {"T1606":"Chain with T1606 for deeper attack path","T1606.001":"Chain with T1606.001 for deeper attack path"} |
T1606.002 SAML Tokens
Sub-technique of: T1606
High-Level Description
An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate. The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy. Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.
An adversary may utilize Private Keys to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate. This differs from Steal Application Access Token and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.
An adversary may gain administrative Entra ID privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to Use Alternate Authentication Material, which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.
Kill Chain Phase
- Credential Access (TA0006)
Platforms: SaaS, Windows, IaaS, Office Suite, Identity Provider
What to Check
How to Test
Manual Testing
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Identify Attack Surface: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to SAML Tokens by examining the target platforms (SaaS, Windows, IaaS).
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Assess Existing Defenses: Review whether mitigations for T1606.002 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.