| name | eshu |
| description | A recipient can run eshu evidence bundle validate against a redacted
evidence_bundle.v1. The bundle is share-safe; reproduce handles point at
bounded CLI/API/MCP calls the recipient can run against their own
instance. Profiles are local_lightweight, local_authoritative,
local_full_stack, or production. A profile row marked unsupported MUST
return `unsupported_capability`. Truth ceilings live in
specs/capability-matrix.v1.yaml and go/internal/query/contract.go. Every
fragment's default rendering works in local_lightweight and
local_authoritative profiles without a configured LLM provider. LLM
augmentation is policy-gated. llm:no-provider is a first-class status,
not an error. Eshu's operating order is fixed: accuracy, then
performance, then concurrency. An agent MUST prove correctness before
proving speed. The active collector set is whatever is enabled in the
active runtime profile. Per-collector MCP tools are enumerated from the
live capability catalog, not from a static prose list. The fragment
renders differently per deployment. Intake never writes graph state. The
reducer is the only writer of canonical graph truth. MCP tool calls
route through dispatchTool into the shared HTTP query handlers. Queue
claims are leased, retryable, supersedable, and dead-letterable.
API/MCP/CLI responses carry a `truth` envelope with `exact`, `derived`,
or `fallback` levels. High-authority capabilities MUST return
`unsupported_capability` rather than silently downgrading.
|
Eshu Agent Skill
This skill is auto-generated from skill-fragments/. Do not edit it by hand; run go run ./cmd/skillgen gen to regenerate.
Bundle Reproduction
Eshu Bundle Reproduction
An evidence_bundle.v1 is the portable Eshu evidence unit. It is
designed to be share-safe, deterministic, and reproducible.
A recipient can run eshu evidence bundle validate against a
redacted evidence_bundle.v1 to confirm the bundle shape, the
provenance chain, and the cited fragments.
The bundle is share-safe by construction:
- No private endpoints, credentials, raw prompts, or local paths
appear in the bundle.
- Provenance is the durable fact row, not the collection
environment.
- Reproduce handles point at bounded CLI/API/MCP calls the
recipient can run against their own instance.
A bundle that fails validate is not shareable. Treat a bundle
that ships private material as a wire-contract bug.
Capability Profiles
Eshu Capability Profiles
Every Eshu runtime runs under exactly one capability profile. The
profile determines which capabilities are supported, what their
authoritative truth level is, and which MCP/API surface is exposed.
The four profiles are:
local_lightweight — code-only discovery, in-memory graph, no
collector fan-out. Used for fast local iteration.
local_authoritative — code plus local relationships (Terraform,
Helm, Kustomize, Argo). Used for local-host deployment tracing.
local_full_stack — code plus relationships plus a live graph
backend (NornicDB default; Neo4j compatibility only when it
satisfies the shared Cypher/Bolt contract). Used for full local
proof runs.
production — the deployed Eshu service. Same surface as
local_full_stack plus collector queues, Postgres, and the
hosted status surface.
A profile row marked unsupported MUST return
unsupported_capability from MCP and API surfaces. The truth ceiling
for a capability (the maximum truth level the profile can return)
lives in specs/capability-matrix.v1.yaml and is enforced by
go/internal/query/contract.go.
Local First
Eshu Local-First
Eshu works without an LLM provider key.
Every fragment's default rendering MUST work in local_lightweight
and local_authoritative profiles without a configured LLM provider.
The deterministic query, graph, and CLI surfaces are the primary
interface. LLM augmentation is policy-gated and never the only path
to a correct answer.
The semantic queue recognizes the following planner labels:
llm:no-provider — no LLM provider is configured for this run.
This is a first-class status, not an error.
llm:policy-denied — the active policy denied LLM augmentation
for this chunk.
llm:budget-denied — the configured budget exhausted before the
chunk was processed.
llm:unsafe — the guard preflight classified the chunk as unsafe
for LLM augmentation.
llm:unchanged — the chunk was processed but produced no change.
llm:changed — the chunk was processed and produced a change.
deleted-source — the source record was deleted between attempts.
These labels are deterministic, status-row safe, and low-cardinality
for telemetry.
Operating Standard
Eshu Operating Standard
For runtime work the order is fixed.
- Accuracy — persisted facts, graph truth, API/MCP/CLI truth, and
fixture intent agree. The graph, the query, and the deployment tell
the same story.
- Performance — the correct path has a before/after or
no-regression measurement on the same input shape. The cost of the
happy path is measured, not assumed.
- Concurrency — idempotency, retry boundaries, claim ordering,
transaction scope, conflict keys, and dead-letter behavior hold
under intended worker counts. The path is safe under contention.
If any one of the three fails, the work is not done.
Per Collector Matrix
Eshu Per-Collector Matrix
The active collector set is whatever is enabled in the active runtime
profile. Per-collector MCP tools are enumerated from the live
capability catalog (go/internal/capabilitycatalog/catalog.go), not
from a static prose list.
This means the same fragment renders differently per deployment:
- A code-only deployment lists code-only collectors.
- A full-stack deployment with Terraform plus AWS plus Kubernetes
lists the cloud and platform collectors too.
- A specialized security deployment may list only the security
collectors.
The active collector set on the deployment where this skill was
rendered is enumerated by the generator in the
Active Collectors on This Deployment section that follows the
rendered fragment body.
Active Collectors on This Deployment
The active collector set on this deployment is enumerated below. Disabling a collector hides its MCP surface from the generated skill.
- aws (enabled)
- documentation (enabled)
- git (enabled)
- grafana (enabled)
- jira (enabled)
- loki (enabled)
- oci_registry (enabled)
- package_registry (enabled)
- pagerduty (enabled)
- prometheus_mimir (enabled)
- sbom_attestation (enabled)
- scanner_worker (enabled)
- security_alert (enabled)
- tempo (enabled)
- terraform_state (enabled)
- vulnerability_intelligence (enabled)
- webhook (enabled)
Reducer Invariant
Eshu Reducer Invariant
Eshu's intake services observe source truth and enqueue work. The
resolution engine (the reducer) is the only writer of canonical graph
state.
This is the single most important rule for the agent surface. It
means:
- An intake service (collector, ingester, projector) MUST NOT write
to the shared graph. It only emits facts and enqueues work.
- The reducer owns the canonical graph truth. It applies a
deterministic, idempotent projection from facts to graph nodes and
edges.
- MCP tool calls MUST route through
dispatchTool into the shared
HTTP query handlers (go/internal/mcp/dispatch.go:15). The
reducer's queue claims are leased, retryable, supersedable, and
dead-letterable (go/internal/storage/postgres/AGENTS.md:49-78).
If a write appears in the wrong seam, the result is a non-idempotent
graph mutation that races with reducer projection. Treat that as a
P0 bug.
Truth Labels
Eshu Truth Labels
Every API, MCP, and CLI response that returns Eshu-claimed data MUST
carry a truth envelope. The envelope distinguishes a result that came
from persisted facts at full fidelity from a result that was computed
on the fly or that fell back to a degraded source.
The three valid levels are:
exact — the answer is the persisted fact row, returned byte-for-byte
from the source of truth.
derived — the answer was computed from one or more persisted facts
through a bounded query, projection, or materialization step.
fallback — the answer was served from a partial, cached, or
downgraded source because the high-authority source was unavailable.
A high-authority capability that is unsupported in the active runtime
profile MUST return unsupported_capability rather than emit a
silently downgraded fallback result. Silent downgrade of a
high-authority claim is a wire-contract bug.