flutter-api-reverse-engineering

name

flutter-api-reverse-engineering

description

Reverse engineer Flutter/mobile app APIs using Frida dynamic instrumentation, BoringSSL traffic interception, crypto analysis, and standalone client creation. Use this skill when the user wants to: reverse engineer a mobile app's API, intercept HTTPS traffic from a Flutter app, extract auth tokens or crypto keys from Android apps, bypass API encryption/obfuscation layers, create a standalone Python API client from a mobile app, hook native libraries with Frida, analyze AES/Ed25519/X25519 crypto in stripped binaries, or dump SharedPreferences. Triggers on keywords like "逆向", "reverse engineer", "Frida", "intercept API", "hook", "ssl_write", "bypass encryption", "extract token", "API client from app", "BoringSSL", "libapp.so", "libflutter.so", "decompile APK".

Flutter / Mobile App API Reverse Engineering

A systematic methodology for reverse engineering mobile app APIs, from APK analysis through to a fully standalone Python API client. Developed and battle-tested on production Flutter apps with Kiwi SDK encryption, X25519 key exchange, and AES response encryption.

When to Use

• Reverse engineering any Flutter or native Android app's API
• Intercepting HTTPS traffic that resists standard MITM proxies (certificate pinning, local proxies)
• Extracting auth tokens (JWT, session tokens) from running apps
• Analyzing crypto implementations in stripped native libraries
• Creating standalone API clients that bypass app-level encryption

Prerequisites

Required: Python 3, Frida (pip3 install frida frida-tools), adb, Android emulator or rooted device
Optional: jadx (APK decompilation), blutter (Flutter/Dart AOT analysis)

Phase 1: Static Analysis

Start with static analysis to understand the app's architecture before touching Frida.

APK Extraction

# Unpack APK
mkdir apk_extracted && cd apk_extracted
unzip ../app.apk

# List native libraries — these are your hook targets
ls lib/arm64-v8a/
# Common: libflutter.so, libapp.so, lib*.so (custom crypto, SDKs)

Key Files to Examine

AndroidManifest.xml  → package name, permissions, services
lib/arm64/           → native .so libraries (hook targets)
assets/              → config files, embedded keys
shared_prefs/        → via adb, auth tokens and settings

Identify the Crypto Stack

# Search for crypto-related strings in native libs
strings lib/arm64/lib*.so | grep -iE 'aes|ed25519|x25519|curve|sign|encrypt|decrypt|hmac|sha256'

# Check for known SDK libraries
ls lib/arm64/ | grep -iE 'crypto|ssl|curve|kiwi|signal'

Dart/Flutter Specific

# If blutter is available, analyze libapp.so for Dart symbols
blutter libapp.so output_dir/
# Look for: signature functions, HTTP client classes, key storage

Phase 2: Dynamic Setup

Frida Server on Device

# Check device architecture
adb shell getprop ro.product.cpu.abi  # arm64-v8a

# Push and start frida-server
adb push frida-server /data/local/tmp/
adb shell "chmod 755 /data/local/tmp/frida-server"
adb shell "/data/local/tmp/frida-server -D &"

# Verify
adb shell "pidof frida-server"

Enumerate Loaded Modules at Runtime

This is critical — static analysis may miss dynamically loaded libraries.

// Frida script to list crypto-relevant modules
var mods = Process.enumerateModules();
var crypto = mods.filter(m => {
    var n = m.name.toLowerCase();
    return n.includes('crypto') || n.includes('ssl') || n.includes('kiwi') ||
           n.includes('curve') || n.includes('sign') || n.includes('sodium');
});
crypto.forEach(m => console.log(m.name + " base=" + m.base + " exports=" +
    m.enumerateExports().length + " syms=" + m.enumerateSymbols().length));

Phase 3: Traffic Interception

The core technique: hook BoringSSL's ssl_write_chain_func inside libflutter.so to capture plaintext HTTP before TLS encryption.

Why This Works

Flutter embeds BoringSSL statically in libflutter.so. Standard MITM proxies fail because:

• Certificate pinning blocks proxy certificates
• Apps may use local proxy SDKs (like Kiwi) that add another TLS layer
• The app's Dart HTTP client only talks to localhost

By hooking at the BoringSSL level, we see plaintext BEFORE encryption.

Finding ssl_write_chain_func Offset

# The offset varies by Flutter version. Find it by searching for known patterns:
# 1. Look for SSL_write export (even if not called directly)
# 2. ssl_write_chain_func is typically nearby in .text section
# 3. Search for string references: "SSL_write", "ssl_write"

# In Frida, scan for the function:
var flutter = Process.findModuleByName("libflutter.so");
// Try known offsets or scan for function signatures

The ssl_write Hook Pattern

// MUST use spawn mode to catch startup request burst
// frida -f com.package.name -l hook.js

Interceptor.attach(flutter.base.add(SSL_WRITE_OFFSET), {
    onEnter: function(args) {
        var len = args[2].toInt32();
        if (len < 10 || len > 65536) return;
        try {
            var data = args[1].readUtf8String(Math.min(len, 16384));
            if (!data || !/^(GET|POST) /.test(data)) return;
            // Parse HTTP headers from plaintext
            var lines = data.split("\r\n");
            var requestLine = lines[0];
            var headers = {};
            for (var i = 1; i < lines.length; i++) {
                var ci = lines[i].indexOf(": ");
                if (ci > 0) headers[lines[i].substring(0,ci).toLowerCase()] = lines[i].substring(ci+2);
            }
            send({type: "request", requestLine: requestLine, headers: headers});
        } catch(e) {}
    }
});

Spawn vs Attach Mode

• Spawn mode (frida -f package): Catches startup burst. Most apps send 10-30 API requests during launch. This is where auth tokens and initial data loads happen.
• Attach mode (frida -p PID): For ongoing monitoring. Misses startup burst because hooks aren't installed until after app initialization.

Always try spawn mode first.

dlopen Hook for Spawn Mode

Libraries may not be loaded when the script starts. Hook android_dlopen_ext:

Interceptor.attach(Process.getModuleByName("libc.so").getExportByName("android_dlopen_ext"), {
    onLeave: function() {
        if (!hooked && Process.findModuleByName("libflutter.so")) {
            hooked = true;
            hookSslWrite(Process.findModuleByName("libflutter.so"));
        }
    }
});

Phase 4: Auth Token Extraction

JWT Tokens

Many apps use JWT for API auth. Look for tokens in:

1. HTTP headers: token:, Authorization: Bearer, X-Token:
2. SharedPreferences: adb shell cat /data/data/com.package/shared_prefs/*.xml
3. Request bodies: POST login responses

JWT tokens often have very long expiry (sometimes years). Once captured, they work standalone without the app.

Testing Token Directly

import requests
headers = {"token": captured_jwt, "Content-Type": "application/json"}
r = requests.get("https://api.example.com/app/api/account/profile", headers=headers)
print(r.json())  # If code=0, the token works standalone!

The Bypass Discovery Pattern

Many apps have TWO API path sets:

• Encrypted path (/v5/{hash}, custom headers, signatures) — goes through SDK encryption
• Plain path (/app/api/*) — works with just JWT token!

Always try the plain API paths first. The encrypted paths may just be obfuscated mirrors of the same endpoints.

Phase 5: Crypto Analysis

When responses are encrypted or APIs require signatures, analyze the crypto.

AES S-box Scanning

Find AES implementations by scanning for the S-box constant:

// AES forward S-box starts with: 63 7c 77 7b f2 6b 6f c5
var sbox = Memory.scanSync(module.base, module.size, "63 7c 77 7b f2 6b 6f c5");
// Found? AES is implemented in this library.

MemoryAccessMonitor for Key Extraction

The most powerful technique for extracting crypto keys from stripped binaries:

MemoryAccessMonitor.enable([{base: sbox_address, size: 256}], {
    onAccess: function(details) {
        // When AES S-box is read, registers contain the key!
        var ctx = details.context;
        for (var r = 0; r <= 5; r++) {
            var val = ctx["x" + r].readByteArray(32);
            // Check if it looks like a key (ASCII or high-entropy bytes)
        }
        // Re-enable for next access:
        setTimeout(enableMonitor, 50);
    }
});

Timing matters: S-box fires during key schedule (initialization, registers may contain zeros) AND during actual encryption (registers contain the real key). Delay the monitor activation by 5-10 seconds to skip initialization.

Crypto Constant Scanning

// Scan for crypto algorithm signatures in stripped binaries:
var patterns = {
    "Ed25519 basepoint": "58 66 66 66 66 66 66 66",
    "X25519 basepoint":  "09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00",
    "AES S-box":         "63 7c 77 7b f2 6b 6f c5",
    "ChaCha20":          "65 78 70 61 6e 64 20 33",  // "expand 3"
    "ARM NEON AESD":     "?? 58 28 4e",  // Hardware AES decrypt
    "ARM NEON AESE":     "?? 48 28 4e",  // Hardware AES encrypt
};

X25519 Key Exchange Pattern

If secret-key header changes per-request, it's likely an ephemeral X25519 public key:

Client: keypair = X25519_keygen()
Client: secret-key header = Base64(keypair.public)
Server: shared = X25519(server_private, client_public)
Server: aes_key = KDF(shared) → encrypt response
Client: shared = X25519(client_private, server_public)
Client: aes_key = KDF(shared) → decrypt response

To extract the private key: search memory near the public key (typically -32 to -64 bytes offset).

Finding Function Entry Points

When you know an instruction address (from MemoryAccessMonitor backtrace), find the function start by scanning backwards for ARM64 prologue:

function findFuncStart(addr) {
    for (var off = 0; off < 0x800; off += 4) {
        var insn = Instruction.parse(addr.sub(off));
        if (insn.mnemonic === "stp" && insn.opStr.includes("x29")) {
            return addr.sub(off);
        }
    }
    return null;
}

Phase 6: API Replay & Client Creation

Replay Captured Requests

# Replay with captured headers to verify they work
headers = {
    "x-signature": captured_sig,
    "x-token": captured_token,
    "secret-key": captured_sk,
    # ... all captured headers
}
r = requests.get("https://api.example.com" + captured_path, headers=headers)
# HTTP 200 = replay works (signature has no time validation!)

Building the Standalone Client

Structure the client with:

1. Multiple login methods: phone+password, QR code, Frida capture
2. Token caching: Save JWT to file with 0o600 permissions
3. All discovered endpoints: Organized by category
4. CLI interface: argparse with subcommands
5. Raw mode: --path flag for arbitrary API calls
6. JSON output: --json flag for scripting

Security Checklist for Client Code

• Use subprocess.run() not os.system() (shell injection prevention)
• Set token file permissions to 0o600 (owner-only)
• Don't log tokens to stdout
• Don't hardcode real user data in examples
• Handle HTTP errors gracefully (non-JSON responses)
• Add .gitignore for token/credential files

Phase 7: Documentation

Update architecture notes with:

1. Complete API endpoint map with request/response structure
2. Auth flow (which headers, which endpoints need what)
3. Crypto implementation details (algorithms, key locations, S-box offsets)
4. Library roles (which .so does what)
5. CLI tool inventory with usage examples
6. Known limitations and next steps

Quick Reference: Frida Patterns

Technique	Use Case
Interceptor.attach(addr)	Hook known function entry points
MemoryAccessMonitor	Catch reads of crypto constants (S-box, basepoints)
Memory.scanSync(base, size, pattern)	Find crypto constants or strings in memory
Process.enumerateModules()	List loaded libraries
Instruction.parse(addr)	Disassemble at address
Stalker.follow(tid)	Trace execution flow (heavy, use sparingly)
Java.perform()	Hook Java/Kotlin layer (SharedPreferences, OkHttp)

Common Pitfalls

1. Attach mode misses startup burst — Always try spawn mode first
2. Dart AOT functions can't be hooked — Non-standard ARM64 calling convention crashes
3. MemoryAccessMonitor fires only once — Re-enable in the callback with setTimeout
4. Stripped libraries have 0 exports — Use Memory.scanSync for constant patterns
5. Multiple TLS layers — App → local proxy → server means two TLS hops
6. AES S-box fires during init — Delay monitor activation to catch actual encryption
7. Per-session keys — Keys change each app launch; capture and use in same session

Related skills

• api-contract-testing — use after flutter-api-reverse-engineering to establish contracts for the reverse-engineered APIs and create integration tests.