common-security

name	common-security
description	Security guardrails for Envilder (CLI, GitHub Action, SDKs, CDK, website). Covers secret handling, credential hygiene, supply chain safety, input validation, and CI/CD security. Use when reviewing code for security, handling secrets, validating CLI input, or reviewing GitHub Actions workflows.
user-invocable	false

Security Skill

Security guardrails adapted to the Envilder project: a CLI + GitHub Action + multi-runtime SDK platform that manages secrets from AWS SSM and Azure Key Vault.

When to Use

• Reviewing code that handles secrets or cloud credentials
• Adding new CLI options or GHA inputs that accept external data
• Reviewing GitHub Actions workflows for credential safety
• Adding new infrastructure (CDK stacks)
• Reviewing SDK code that interacts with cloud provider APIs
• Modifying the website (Astro) with user-visible content

1. Secret Handling

Never Expose Secrets in Output

• CLI/GHA: Use EnvironmentVariable.maskedValue (shows last 3 chars) for logging
• SDKs: Never log resolved secret values: log only the key name
• Tests: Use envilder.json to resolve test tokens; never hardcode tokens
• Website: No secrets: it's a static site

Storage Rules

Context	Where secrets live	Never
Production	AWS SSM Parameter Store (encrypted)	In code, env vars, or config files
Production (Azure)	Azure Key Vault	In code or checked-in files
CI	GitHub Secrets → OIDC → SSM	As plaintext in workflow YAML
Local dev	AWS profile → SSM (via envilder.json)	In .env files committed to Git
Tests	TestContainers (LocalStack/Lowkey Vault)	Real credentials in test code

Secretlint Enforcement

Secretlint runs on every pnpm lint invocation and scans all files for credential patterns (AWS keys, tokens, private keys). If Secretlint fails, the commit is blocked.

2. Credential Hygiene in CI/CD

GitHub Actions OIDC

• Always use aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials with role-to-assume
• Never store AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY as GitHub Secrets
• OIDC tokens are short-lived and scoped: no rotation needed

GitHub Action Inputs

• GHA reads inputs from process.env.INPUT_*: validate before use
• The map input (file path) must be validated to prevent path traversal
• Never interpolate GHA inputs directly into shell commands

Workflow Permissions

• Use minimal permissions: block in every workflow
• contents: read for checkout, id-token: write for OIDC
• Never use permissions: write-all

3. Input Validation

CLI

• Commander validates option types: but validate semantic constraints:
  • --map path must exist and be a .json file
  • --provider must be one of aws | azure (case-insensitive)
  • --vault-url must be a valid HTTPS URL matching *.vault.azure.net
• Never pass CLI arguments to shell commands unsanitized
• Use custom domain errors (InvalidArgumentError): not generic exceptions

SDKs

• Map file paths: validate existence before parsing
• JSON parsing: handle malformed JSON gracefully (domain error, not stack trace)
• Provider names: strict enum matching, reject unknown values
• Cross-provider validation: profile + Azure → InvalidArgumentError

Website

• Static site (Astro): no user input at runtime
• Build-time i18n: translation keys are developer-controlled, not user-supplied

4. Supply Chain Security

Dependency Pinning

Stack	Mechanism	File
TypeScript	pnpm-lock.yaml + catalog: versions	pnpm-workspace.yaml
.NET	Central Package Management	Directory.Packages.props
Python	uv.lock (deterministic)	uv.lock

Rules

• Lock files must be committed: never .gitignore them
• Dependabot (or Renovate) configured for automatic dependency updates
• Review advisories on every dependency update PR
• @vercel/ncc bundles GHA: verify bundle is up-to-date (pnpm verify:gha)
• Pin GitHub Actions to full commit SHA (not @v4 tags) in production workflows

CDK

• Keep aws-cdk-lib up to date: security patches affect deployed infra
• CDK synth output (cdk.out/) is .gitignored: never commit CloudFormation templates

5. SDK-Specific Security

AWS SSM Provider

• Always use WithDecryption: true for SecureString parameters
• Never log the decrypted parameter value
• Credential chain: SDK default chain (env vars → profile → instance role)
• If profile is specified, only use CredentialProfileStoreChain: don't mix

Azure Key Vault Provider

• Use DefaultAzureCredential: never hardcode clientId/clientSecret
• Vault URL validation: must match https://*.vault.azure.net
• TLS certificate validation: enabled in production, only disabled in tests against Lowkey Vault (emulator)

Cross-Provider

• EnvilderOptions overrides $config: validate that overrides don't introduce insecure combinations (e.g., disabling encryption)
• Missing secrets → null/None (silent). Validation is opt-in via validateSecrets(): document this to users clearly

6. Website Security

• Astro generates static HTML: no server-side injection possible
• External links: use rel="noopener noreferrer" on target="_blank" links
• No inline scripts or dangerouslySetInnerHTML equivalents
• CSP headers configured at CDN/CloudFront level (via CDK)

7. Testing Security

• Acceptance tests use emulators (LocalStack, Lowkey Vault): never real cloud endpoints
• LOCALSTACK_AUTH_TOKEN resolved via Envilder itself (dogfooding): stored in SSM, never in code
• Test cleanup: containers destroyed after test run (TestContainers lifecycle)
• TLS disabled only for Lowkey Vault container tests (self-signed cert)

Quick Security Checklist

Before merging any PR, verify:

• No secrets hardcoded in code, config, or test files
• Secretlint passes (pnpm lint)
• CLI/SDK input validated with domain errors (not generic exceptions)
• Cloud credentials use OIDC (CI) or SDK default chain (runtime)
• Secrets logged only via maskedValue (last 3 chars visible)
• Lock files updated if dependencies changed
• GHA workflows use minimal permissions:
• No shell=True or unsanitized argument interpolation in scripts