detecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints

name	detecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints
description	Detects fileless malware and in-memory attacks that execute entirely in RAM without writing persistent files to disk, evading traditional antivirus. Use when building detections for PowerShell-based attacks, reflective DLL injection, WMI persistence, and registry-resident malware. Activates for requests involving fileless malware detection, in-memory attacks, PowerShell exploitation, or living-off-the-land techniques.
domain	cybersecurity
subdomain	endpoint-security
tags	["endpoint","fileless-malware","memory-attacks","PowerShell","detection-engineering"]
version	1.0.0
author	mahipal
license	Apache-2.0
nist_csf	["PR.PS-01","PR.PS-02","DE.CM-01","PR.IR-01"]
mitre_attack	["T1055","T1547","T1059","T1036","T1053"]

Detecting Fileless Attacks on Endpoints

When to Use

Use this skill when:

• Building detection rules for fileless malware that operates entirely in memory
• Hunting for PowerShell-based attacks, reflective DLL injection, and WMI abuse
• Configuring endpoint telemetry (Sysmon, AMSI, PowerShell logging) to capture fileless indicators
• Investigating incidents where traditional AV found no malicious files

Do not use for detecting file-based malware or for malware reverse engineering.

Prerequisites

• Sysmon with process creation and WMI event logging enabled
• PowerShell Script Block Logging and Module Logging enabled
• AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) enabled for script content inspection
• EDR with behavioral detection capabilities (MDE, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne)

Workflow

Step 1: Enable Required Telemetry

# Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging (GPO or registry)
New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging" `
  -Name EnableScriptBlockLogging -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD -Force

# Enable PowerShell Module Logging
New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging" `
  -Name EnableModuleLogging -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD -Force

# Enable PowerShell Transcription
New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription" `
  -Name EnableTranscripting -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD -Force

# Sysmon config for fileless detection (key events):
# Event ID 1: Process creation (captures CommandLine)
# Event ID 7: Image loaded (DLL loading)
# Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread (injection)
# Event ID 10: Process access (LSASS access)
# Event ID 19/20/21: WMI events

Step 2: Detect PowerShell-Based Attacks

# Indicators of malicious PowerShell:

# Encoded command execution
EventID: 1
CommandLine contains: "powershell" AND ("-enc" OR "-e " OR "-encodedcommand" OR "FromBase64String")

# Download cradle patterns
CommandLine contains: "IEX" AND ("Net.WebClient" OR "DownloadString" OR "Invoke-WebRequest")
CommandLine contains: "Invoke-Expression" AND "New-Object"

# AMSI bypass attempts (Event ID 4104 - Script Block)
ScriptBlock contains: ("Amsi"+"Utils") OR ("amsi"+"InitFailed") OR "SetValue.*amsi"

# Splunk query for suspicious PowerShell:
index=windows source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational" EventCode=4104
| where match(ScriptBlockText, "(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|downloadstring|net\.webclient|frombase64|bypass|amsi.utils)")
| table _time host ScriptBlockText

Step 3: Detect Process Injection Techniques

# Reflective DLL injection - loads DLL from memory without touching disk
# Detection: Sysmon Event 7 (ImageLoaded) where image path is unusual
EventID: 7
ImageLoaded NOT starts with: "C:\Windows\" AND NOT starts with: "C:\Program Files"

# Process hollowing - creates process in suspended state, replaces memory
# Detection: Process creation followed by immediate memory write
EventID: 1 + 10 correlation
# Process created then accessed with PROCESS_VM_WRITE

# APC injection - queues code to thread's async procedure call queue
# Detection: Sysmon CreateRemoteThread from non-system process
EventID: 8
SourceImage NOT IN (known_legitimate_sources)

# MDE KQL:
DeviceEvents
| where ActionType in ("CreateRemoteThreadApiCall", "NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in ("MsMpEng.exe", "svchost.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
    InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName