| name | ctf-reverse |
| description | Reverse engineering techniques for CTF challenges. Use when analyzing binaries, game clients, obfuscated code, or esoteric languages. |
| user-invocable | false |
| allowed-tools | ["Bash","Read","Write","Edit","Glob","Grep","Task","WebFetch","WebSearch"] |
CTF Reverse Engineering
Quick reference for RE challenges. For detailed techniques, see supporting files.
Additional Resources
- tools.md - Tool-specific commands (GDB, Ghidra, radare2, IDA)
- patterns.md - Common patterns, VMs, obfuscation, anti-debugging
Problem-Solving Workflow
- Start with strings extraction - many easy challenges have plaintext flags
- Try ltrace/strace - dynamic analysis often reveals flags without reversing
- Map control flow before modifying execution
- Automate manual processes via scripting (r2pipe, Python)
- Validate assumptions by comparing decompiler outputs
Quick Wins (Try First!)
strings binary | grep -E "flag\{|CTF\{|pico"
strings binary | grep -iE "flag|secret|password"
rabin2 -z binary | grep -i "flag"
ltrace ./binary
strace -f -s 500 ./binary
xxd binary | grep -i flag
./binary AAAA
echo "test" | ./binary
Initial Analysis
file binary
checksec --file=binary
chmod +x binary
Memory Dumping Strategy
Key insight: Let the program compute the answer, then dump it.
gdb ./binary
start
b *main+0x198
run
x/s $rsi
x/38c $rsi
Decoy Flag Detection
Pattern: Multiple fake targets before real check.
Identification:
- Look for multiple comparison targets in sequence
- Check for different success messages
- Trace which comparison is checked LAST
Solution: Set breakpoint at FINAL comparison, not earlier ones.
GDB PIE Debugging
PIE binaries randomize base address. Use relative breakpoints:
gdb ./binary
start
b *main+0xca
run
Comparison Direction (Critical!)
Two patterns:
transform(flag) == stored_target - Reverse the transform
transform(stored_target) == flag - Flag IS the transformed data!
Pattern 2 solution: Don't reverse - just apply transform to stored target.
Common Encryption Patterns
- XOR with single byte - try all 256 values
- XOR with known plaintext (
flag{, CTF{)
- RC4 with hardcoded key
- Custom permutation + XOR
- XOR with position index (
^ i or ^ (i & 0xff)) layered with a repeating key
Quick Tool Reference
r2 -d ./binary
aaa
afl
pdf @ main
analyzeHeadless project/ tmp -import binary -postScript script.py
ida64 binary
Binary Types
Python .pyc
import marshal, dis
with open('file.pyc', 'rb') as f:
f.read(16)
code = marshal.load(f)
dis.dis(code)
WASM
wasm2c checker.wasm -o checker.c
gcc -O3 checker.c wasm-rt-impl.c -o checker
Android APK
apktool d app.apk -o decoded/
jadx app.apk
grep -r "flag" decoded/res/values/strings.xml
.NET
- dnSpy - debugging + decompilation
- ILSpy - decompiler
Packed (UPX)
upx -d packed -o unpacked
Anti-Debugging Bypass
Common checks:
IsDebuggerPresent() (Windows)
ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME) (Linux)
/proc/self/status TracerPid
- Timing checks
Bypass: Set breakpoint at check, modify register to bypass conditional.
S-Box / Keystream Patterns
Xorshift32: Shifts 13, 17, 5
Xorshift64: Shifts 12, 25, 27
Magic constants: 0x2545f4914f6cdd1d, 0x9e3779b97f4a7c15
Custom VM Analysis
- Identify structure: registers, memory, IP
- Reverse
executeIns for opcode meanings
- Write disassembler mapping opcodes to mnemonics
- Often easier to bruteforce than fully reverse
- Look for the bytecode file loaded via command-line arg
VM challenge workflow (C'est La V(M)ie):
Common VM opcodes to look for:
| Pattern in decompiler | Likely instruction |
|---|
global[param1] = param2 | MOVI (move immediate) |
global[p1] = global[p2] | MOVR (move register) |
global[p1] ^= global[p2] | XOR |
global[p1] op global[p2]; set flag | CMP |
if (flag) IP = param | JZ/JNZ |
read(stdin, &global[p1], 1) | READ |
write(stdout, &global[p1], 1) | PRINT |
Python Bytecode Reversing
Pattern (Slithering Bytes): Given dis.dis() output of a flag checker.
Key instructions:
LOAD_GLOBAL / LOAD_FAST — push name/variable onto stack
CALL N — pop function + N args, call, push result
BINARY_SUBSCR — pop index and sequence, push seq[idx]
COMPARE_OP — pop two values, compare (55=!=, 40===)
POP_JUMP_IF_TRUE/FALSE — conditional branch
Reversing XOR flag checkers:
odd_table = [...]
even_table = [...]
flag = [''] * 30
for i, val in enumerate(even_table):
flag[i*2] = chr(val ^ key_even)
for i, val in enumerate(odd_table):
flag[i*2+1] = chr(val ^ key_odd)
Signal-Based Binary Exploration
Pattern (Signal Signal Little Star): Binary uses UNIX signals as a binary tree navigation mechanism.
Identification:
- Multiple
sigaction() calls with SA_SIGINFO
sigaltstack() setup (alternate signal stack)
- Handler decodes embedded payload, installs next pair of signals
- Two types: Node (installs children) vs Leaf (prints message + exits)
Solving approach:
- Hook
sigaction via LD_PRELOAD to log signal installations
- DFS through the binary tree by sending signals
- At each stage, observe which 2 signals are installed
- Send one, check if program exits (leaf) or installs 2 more (node)
- If wrong leaf, backtrack and try sibling
int sigaction(int signum, const struct sigaction *act, ...) {
if (act && (act->sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO))
log("SET %d SA_SIGINFO=1\n", signum);
return real_sigaction(signum, act, oldact);
}
Malware Anti-Analysis Bypass via Patching
Pattern (Carrot): Malware with multiple environment checks before executing payload.
Common checks to patch:
| Check | Technique | Patch |
|---|
ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME) | Anti-debug | Change cmp -1 to cmp 0 |
sleep(150) | Anti-sandbox timing | Change sleep value to 1 |
/proc/cpuinfo "hypervisor" | Anti-VM | Flip JNZ to JZ |
| "VMware"/"VirtualBox" strings | Anti-VM | Flip JNZ to JZ |
getpwuid username check | Environment | Flip comparison |
LD_PRELOAD check | Anti-hook | Skip check |
| Fan count / hardware check | Anti-VM | Flip JLE to JGE |
| Hostname check | Environment | Flip JNZ to JZ |
Ghidra patching workflow:
- Find check function, identify the conditional jump
- Click on instruction →
Ctrl+Shift+G → modify opcode
- For
JNZ (0x75) → JZ (0x74), or vice versa
- For immediate values: change operand bytes directly
- Export: press
O → choose "Original File" format
chmod +x the patched binary
Server-side validation bypass:
- If patched binary sends system info to remote server, patch the data too
- Modify string addresses in data-gathering functions
- Change format strings to embed correct values directly
Expected Values Tables
Locating:
objdump -s -j .rodata binary | less
x86-64 Gotchas
Sign extension: 0xffffffc7 behaves differently in XOR vs addition
esi_xor = esi & 0xff
result = (r13 + esi) & 0xffffffff
Iterative Solver Pattern
for pos in range(flag_length):
for c in range(256):
computed = compute_output(c, current_state)
if computed == EXPECTED[pos]:
flag.append(c)
update_state(c, computed)
break
Uniform transform shortcut: if changing one input byte only changes one output byte,
build a 0..255 mapping by repeating a single byte across the whole input, then invert.
Unicorn Emulation (Complex State)
from unicorn import *
from unicorn.x86_const import *
mu = Uc(UC_ARCH_X86, UC_MODE_64)
mu.emu_start(start_addr, end_addr)
Mixed-mode pitfall: if a 64-bit stub jumps into 32-bit code via retf/retfq, you must
switch to a UC_MODE_32 emulator and copy GPRs, EFLAGS, and XMM regs; missing XMM state
will corrupt SSE-based transforms.
Multi-Stage Shellcode Loaders
Pattern (I Heard You Liked Loaders): Nested shellcode with XOR decode loops and anti-debug.
Debugging workflow:
- Break at
call rax in launcher, step into shellcode
- Bypass ptrace anti-debug: step to syscall,
set $rax=0
- Step through XOR decode loop (or break on
int3 if hidden)
- Repeat for each stage until final payload
Flag extraction from mov instructions:
values = [0x6174654d, 0x7b465443, ...]
flag = b''.join(v.to_bytes(4, 'little') for v in values)
Timing Side-Channel Attack
Pattern (Clock Out): Validation time varies per correct character (longer sleep on match).
Exploitation:
import time
from pwn import *
flag = ""
for pos in range(flag_length):
best_char, best_time = '', 0
for c in string.printable:
io = remote(host, port)
start = time.time()
io.sendline((flag + c).ljust(total_len, 'X'))
io.recvall()
elapsed = time.time() - start
if elapsed > best_time:
best_time = elapsed
best_char = c
io.close()
flag += best_char
Godot Game Asset Extraction
Pattern (Steal the Xmas): Encrypted Godot .pck packages.
Tools:
- gdsdecomp - Extract Godot packages
- KeyDot - Extract encryption key from Godot executables
Workflow:
- Run KeyDot against game executable → extract encryption key
- Input key into gdsdecomp
- Extract and open project in Godot editor
- Search scripts/resources for flag data
Unstripped Binary Information Leaks
Pattern (Bad Opsec): Debug info and file paths leak author identity.
Quick checks:
strings binary | grep "/home/"
strings binary | grep "/Users/"
file binary
readelf -S binary | grep debug
Custom Mangle Function Reversing
Pattern (Flag Appraisal): Binary mangles input 2 bytes at a time with intermediate state, compares to static target.
Approach:
- Extract static target bytes from
.rodata section
- Understand mangle: processes pairs with running state value
- Write inverse function (process in reverse, undo each operation)
- Feed target bytes through inverse → recovers flag
Hex-Encoded String Comparison
Pattern (Spider's Curse): Input converted to hex, compared against hex constant.
Quick solve: Extract hex constant from strings/Ghidra, decode:
echo "4d65746143..." | xxd -r -p