attack-mob-t1409-stored-application-data

name	attack-mob-t1409-stored-application-data
description	Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1409 Stored Application Data in the mobile matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1409, Stored Application Data, or mobile ATT&CK. Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device.
license	MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/
metadata	{"source":"mitre-attack/attack-stix-data","domain":"mobile","attack_id":"T1409","attack_stix_id":"attack-pattern--702055ac-4e54-4ae9-9527-e23a38e0b160","attack_version":"3.1","attack_modified":"2025-10-24T17:48:56.509Z"}

MITRE ATT&CK T1409: Stored Application Data

When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1409, Stored Application Data, mobile ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.

Technique context

• ATT&CK domain: mobile
• ATT&CK ID: T1409
• Technique name: Stored Application Data
• Type: technique
• ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1409
• Tactics: collection
• Platforms: Android, iOS
• Required permissions: Not specified
• Effective permissions: Not specified
• Defenses bypassed: Not specified

ATT&CK description

Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019)

Due to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios:

• An application stores files in unprotected external storage
• An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777)
• The adversary gains root permissions on the device

Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

Bundled resources

• references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
• references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
• references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
• templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
• templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
• templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
• templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
• scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
• assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

Useful telemetry and data sources

• Not specified in the STIX object.

Mitigations to consider

• Use Recent OS Version

Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

• BOULDSPY (malware)
• BusyGasper (malware)
• CarbonSteal (malware)
• DCHSpy (malware)
• Desert Scorpion (malware)
• DoubleAgent (malware)
• Escobar (malware)
• Exodus (malware)
• FakeSpy (malware)
• FlexiSpy (tool)
• FlixOnline (malware)
• FluBot (malware)
• FlyTrap (malware)
• FrozenCell (malware)
• GoldenEagle (malware)
• HilalRAT (malware)
• Hornbill (malware)
• LightSpy (malware)
• Mandrake (malware)
• Operation Triangulation (campaign)

Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

• Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
• Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
• Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
• Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
• Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
• References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.