attack-mob-t1420-file-and-directory-discovery

name	attack-mob-t1420-file-and-directory-discovery
description	Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1420 File and Directory Discovery in the mobile matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1420, File and Directory Discovery, or mobile ATT&CK. Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or search in specific device locations for desired information within a filesystem.
license	MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/
metadata	{"source":"mitre-attack/attack-stix-data","domain":"mobile","attack_id":"T1420","attack_stix_id":"attack-pattern--cf28ca46-1fd3-46b4-b1f6-ec0b72361848","attack_version":"1.2","attack_modified":"2025-10-24T17:49:24.899Z"}

MITRE ATT&CK T1420: File and Directory Discovery

When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1420, File and Directory Discovery, mobile ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.

Technique context

• ATT&CK domain: mobile
• ATT&CK ID: T1420
• Technique name: File and Directory Discovery
• Type: technique
• ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1420
• Tactics: discovery
• Platforms: Android, iOS
• Required permissions: Not specified
• Effective permissions: Not specified
• Defenses bypassed: Not specified

ATT&CK description

Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or search in specific device locations for desired information within a filesystem. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including deciding if the adversary should fully infect the target and/or attempt specific actions.

On Android, Linux file permissions and SELinux policies typically stringently restrict what can be accessed by apps without taking advantage of a privilege escalation exploit. The contents of the external storage directory are generally visible, which could present concerns if sensitive data is inappropriately stored there. iOS's security architecture generally restricts the ability to perform any type of File and Directory Discovery without use of escalated privileges.

Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

Bundled resources

• references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
• references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
• references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
• templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
• templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
• templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
• templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
• scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
• assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

Useful telemetry and data sources

• Not specified in the STIX object.

Mitigations to consider

• Use Recent OS Version

Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

• AhRat (malware)
• C0033 (campaign)
• CarbonSteal (malware)
• CherryBlos (malware)
• Desert Scorpion (malware)
• DocSwap (malware)
• DoubleAgent (malware)
• Escobar (malware)
• FrozenCell (malware)
• Golden Cup (malware)
• GoldenEagle (malware)
• Hornbill (malware)
• Operation Dust Storm (campaign)
• Operation Triangulation (campaign)
• RatMilad (malware)
• SameCoin (malware)
• SilkBean (malware)
• Tiktok Pro (malware)
• TriangleDB (malware)
• VajraSpy (malware)

Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

• Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
• Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
• Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
• Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
• Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
• References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.