attack-mob-t1424-process-discovery

name	attack-mob-t1424-process-discovery
description	Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1424 Process Discovery in the mobile matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1424, Process Discovery, or mobile ATT&CK. Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a device.
license	MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/
metadata	{"source":"mitre-attack/attack-stix-data","domain":"mobile","attack_id":"T1424","attack_stix_id":"attack-pattern--1b51f5bc-b97a-498a-8dbd-bc6b1901bf19","attack_version":"2.1","attack_modified":"2025-10-24T17:48:28.244Z"}

MITRE ATT&CK T1424: Process Discovery

When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1424, Process Discovery, mobile ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.

Technique context

• ATT&CK domain: mobile
• ATT&CK ID: T1424
• Technique name: Process Discovery
• Type: technique
• ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1424
• Tactics: discovery
• Platforms: Android, iOS
• Required permissions: Not specified
• Effective permissions: Not specified
• Defenses bypassed: Not specified

ATT&CK description

Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a device. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on devices within a network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Recent Android security enhancements have made it more difficult to obtain a list of running processes. On Android 7 and later, there is no way for an application to obtain the process list without abusing elevated privileges. This is due to the Android kernel utilizing the hidepid mount feature. Prior to Android 7, applications could utilize the ps command or examine the /proc directory on the device.(Citation: Android-SELinuxChanges)

In iOS, applications have previously been able to use the sysctl command to obtain a list of running processes. This functionality has been removed in later iOS versions.

Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

Bundled resources

• references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
• references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
• references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
• templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
• templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
• templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
• templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
• scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
• assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

Useful telemetry and data sources

• Not specified in the STIX object.

Mitigations to consider

• Attestation
• Use Recent OS Version

Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

• Agent Smith (malware)
• Anubis (malware)
• Binary Validator (malware)
• CherryBlos (malware)
• GolfSpy (malware)
• HenBox (malware)
• LightSpy (malware)
• Operation Triangulation (campaign)
• Rotexy (malware)
• SharkBot (malware)
• TriangleDB (malware)
• WolfRAT (malware)
• YiSpecter (malware)

Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

• Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
• Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
• Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
• Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
• Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
• References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.