crypto

name	crypto
description	Writing and formatting guidance for CRYPTO (International Cryptology Conference) papers. Use when drafting, formatting, or submitting to CRYPTO 2026. Covers Springer LNCS llncs.cls format with splncs04 bibliography style, double-blind anonymity, 30-page limit (LNCS standard), formal security proofs, and camera-ready preparation.

CRYPTO 2026 Conference Writing Skill

CCF-A | Security | Publisher: Springer Conference: https://crypto.iacr.org/2026 Template: CRYPTO/llncs.cls (Springer LNCS format)

Document Setup

Preamble Structure

\documentclass[runningheads]{llncs}

% Required packages
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{amsmath}
\usepackage{amssymb}
\usepackage{url}
\usepackage{hyperref}

Required Packages

\documentclass[runningheads]{llncs}
\usepackage{graphicx}           % Figures
\usepackage{amsmath}            % Math
\usepackage{amssymb}            % Symbols
\usepackage{url}                % URLs in references
\usepackage{hyperref}           % Clickable links

Page Limits

Section	Limit
Main paper	30 pages (LNCS standard)
References	Included in page count
Appendix	Typically included

CRYPTO follows LNCS guidelines with approximately 30 pages (including references). Check the specific Call for Papers for the current year's limit.

Anonymity Requirements

CRYPTO uses double-blind review:

1. No author names or affiliations in submission
2. Use third person for self-citations: "Smith et al. showed..." not "we showed..."
3. Anonymize all URLs (e.g., ePrint links with author names)
4. Clear PDF metadata
5. Remove acknowledgments from submission

Camera-Ready Differences

After acceptance:

1. Add complete author information with affiliations
2. Include acknowledgments
3. Add footnote for contact author
4. Ensure PDF/A compliance for Springer publication

Section Organization

CRYPTO papers follow the cryptographic research structure:

1. Introduction — Problem, contributions (enumerate contributions)
2. Technical Overview — High-level summary of the approach
3. Preliminaries — Definitions, notation, hardness assumptions
4. Main Construction / Protocol — Core cryptographic contribution
5. Security Analysis — Proofs, reductions, formal security definitions
6. Performance / Comparison (if applicable) — Efficiency analysis
7. Related Work — Positioning against prior cryptographic constructions
8. Conclusion — Summary
9. References

Cryptographic Conventions

CRYPTO papers emphasize formal security proofs and theoretical depth:

Security Definitions

\section{Preliminaries}

\subsection{Cryptographic Primitives}
A \textbf{digital signature scheme} $\Sigma = (\Gen, \Sign, \Ver)$
consists of three PPT algorithms:

\begin{itemize}
  \item $\Gen(1^\lambda) \to (\vk, \sk)$: Key generation
  \item $\Sign(\sk, m) \to \sigma$: Signing
  \item $\Ver(\vk, m, \sigma) \to \{0,1\}$: Verification
\end{itemize}

\subsection{Security Definitions}
We define strong EUF-CMA security:

\begin{definition}[Strong Existential Unforgeability under CMA]
A signature scheme $\Sigma$ is strongly EUF-CMA secure if
for all PPT adversaries $\mathcal{A}$:
\begin{align}
  \Adv{\text{EUF-CMA}}{\Sigma}(\lambda) = 
  \Pr[\text{Forge}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1] \leq \negl(\lambda)
\end{align}
where Forge$_{\mathcal{A}}$ is the experiment where $\mathcal{A}$
gets $\vk$ and access to a signing oracle, and wins if it
outputs a valid $(m^*, \sigma^*)$ pair where $m^*$ was never
queried to the signing oracle.
\end{definition}

Proof Structure

\section{Security Analysis}

\subsection{Theorem (EUF-CMA Security)}
\textbf{Scheme $\Sigma$ achieves EUF-CMA security under the
CDH assumption.}

\begin{Proof}
We prove this by reduction to the CDH problem.

Suppose there exists an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that breaks $\Sigma$.
We construct a reduction $\mathcal{B}$ that solves CDH:

\begin{enumerate}
  \item $\mathcal{B}$ receives $(g, g^a, g^b)$ from its CDH challenger.
  \item $\mathcal{B}$ runs $\Gen(1^\lambda)$ to get $(\vk, \sk)$,
    but programs the verification key to be $vk = g^a$.
  \item $\mathcal{B}$ runs $\mathcal{A}$ with $\vk$ and
    answers signing queries by...
  \item When $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a forgery $(m^*, \sigma^*)$,
    $\mathcal{B}$ extracts...
  \item $\mathcal{B}$ outputs $g^{ab}$ as the CDH solution.
\end{enumerate}

The reduction succeeds because...
\end{Proof}

Performance Analysis

\section{Instantiation}

We instantiate our construction over a BN curve:
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
  \toprule
  Operation & Time & Communication \\
  \midrule
  Sign & 0.8 ms & -- \\
  Verify & 1.2 ms & -- \\
  Total & 2.0 ms & 64 bytes \\
  \bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
Our scheme is the fastest post-quantum signature of
its class, achieving 2.5$\times$ speedup over the
previous best construction.

Figures and Tables

• Use vector formats (.pdf) for all figures
• Ensure readability at LNCS margins
• Include protocol diagrams and reduction graphs

\begin{figure}[t]
  \centering
  \includegraphics[width=0.85\linewidth]{figs/construction}
  \caption{Our signature scheme: (a) key generation, (b) signing
    algorithm showing the hash-and-sign structure, (c) verification.
    All operations are performed in the group $\mathbb{G}$
    of order $q$.}
  \label{fig:construction}
\end{figure}

References (Springer LNCS)

\bibliographystyle{splncs04}
\bibliography{references}

% Citations:
\cite{doe2025}          % [1]

Formatting Rules

• Format: Springer LNCS (single-column, typeset)
• Paper size: A4
• Body font: 10pt typical
• Margins: Per LNCS guidelines
• References: Numbered, square brackets

Submission Checklist

• Page count within LNCS guidelines
• All author identification removed
• Third-person self-citations only
• Formal security definitions included
• Proofs are complete and rigorous
• Anonymized all URLs
• PDF metadata cleared
• References in LNCS format

Camera-Ready Checklist

• Add author information and affiliations
• Add acknowledgments
• Verify PDF/A compliance
• Check figure quality