REQUIRED before ANY `op` command or whenever a task needs an API key, token, password, credential, or secret (OPENAI_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, deploy tokens, live-test keys). Prompt-free 1Password service-account reads; wrong invocations spam macOS dialogs.
Install with Codex or Claude Copy this prompt, paste it into Codex, Claude, or another assistant, and let it review the skill page and install it for you.
A direct command skips the review prompt. Inspect the source before running it.
REQUIRED before ANY `op` command or whenever a task needs an API key, token, password, credential, or secret (OPENAI_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, deploy tokens, live-test keys). Prompt-free 1Password service-account reads; wrong invocations spam macOS dialogs.
op lives at ~/bin/op on all of Peter's Macs, with a compat symlink /opt/homebrew/bin/op -> ~/bin/op. Do NOT install/upgrade via the Homebrew cask: its versioned Caskroom path gives op a new macOS TCC identity on every upgrade, which re-fires the App Data Protection dialog at Peter. To update: download the official signed pkg from https://app-updates.agilebits.com/product_history/CLI2, pkgutil --check-signature (AgileBits 2BUA8C4S2C) + pkgutil --expand-full, then install -m 755 <payload>/op ~/bin/op. The stable path prevents path/version identity churn; it does not make the macOS grant durable across op processes.
Follow the official CLI get-started steps for anything else. Don't guess install commands.
references/cli-examples.md (real op examples, including safe item create/edit patterns)
Access paths (strict order)
1. Service account — default, zero prompts.OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN is exported from ~/.profile (Codex-managed block), scoped to the Molty vault (read+write). Every service-account command must set both OP_LOAD_DESKTOP_APP_SETTINGS=false and OP_BIOMETRIC_UNLOCK_ENABLED=false. The first prevents the settings-file read; the second is 1Password's official app-integration override.
Required command shape: OP_LOAD_DESKTOP_APP_SETTINGS=false OP_BIOMETRIC_UNLOCK_ENABLED=false OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN="$OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN" op item get "<item>" --vault Molty ....
--vault Molty is required; omitting it fails even with a valid token.
NEVER op signin and NEVER --account on this path. Either one routes through the desktop app and throws an Authorize prompt at Peter. --account + token = interactive path, always wrong.
Older alias MOLTY_OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN = fallback only; may be stale.
Token missing/expired or item read fails: report the exact error and ask. Do NOT silently fall back to the desktop app.
2. Desktop app — explicit consent only. For items genuinely outside Molty (personal Private vault, OpenClaw-Core). No automatic fallback.
STOP and ask in chat first: item name + why needed. Wait for yes.
On a non-primary, VM, or headless host, route this flow to the active physical workstation in the matching personal or work-managed environment; see "Remote routing - desktop path only".
After consent: one task window in the shared op-work session (see below). Inside that window, first unset OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN MOLTY_OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN; an exported service token overrides --account my.1password.com and silently confines reads to Molty. Then run op signin --account my.1password.com once, and batch every interactive read of the whole task into that same window and one op run/op inject invocation when practical. TTY reuse limits 1Password's Authorize prompts; it does not make the separate macOS App Data grant persist across new op PIDs.
No nameplate/sag pre-alerts. Audible page (sag) only if Peter approved the unlock in chat and the 1Password prompt then sits unanswered.
Known Molty items (skip discovery)
Exact titles; go straight to the service-account read. No enumeration needed.
Purpose
Item title
Field
OpenAI (OpenClaw/i18n jobs)
AI API Key - OpenAI - OPENAI_API_KEY - OpenClaw
OPENAI_API_KEY
OpenAI (serviceable access)
AI API Key - OpenAI - OPENAI_API_KEY - Serviceable Access
OPENAI_API_KEY
Anthropic (live tests)
AI API Key - Anthropic - ANTHROPIC_API_KEY - OpenClaw Live Tests
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
Anthropic (clawdbot)
AI API Key - Anthropic - ANTHROPIC_API_KEY - Clawdbot
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
Gemini
AI API Key - Google Gemini - GEMINI_API_KEY - steipete-m5
Release - Homebrew tap dispatch token - openclaw/homebrew-tap
token
Apple notarization (Apple ID fallback)
Release - Apple ID app-specific password - notarization
apple_id, team_id, app_specific_password
ClickClack/Barnacle Molty items are agent copies; canonical items live in the shared OpenClaw vault — on rotation update both.
Release credentials: one tag finds them all
Every signing/notarization/tap credential is tagged release-credential and
named Release - <what> - <scope> (unified 2026-08-09). Do not hunt by guessing
titles — list them:
op item list --vault Molty --tags release-credential
Start with Release - 00 INDEX (read me first): its note maps each GitHub
Actions secret name to the exact item and field, and records the repair recipe.
Keep that index current when adding or rotating a release credential.
Release credentials: GitHub secrets are PER-REPO, not org-level
Verified 2026-08-09: the openclaw org has 21 org-level secrets and none of
them are the release/signing ones. MACOS_SIGNING_P12,
MACOS_SIGNING_P12_PASSWORD, ASC_KEY_ID, ASC_ISSUER_ID,
ASC_PRIVATE_KEY_P8, and HOMEBREW_TAP_TOKEN are set per repository. A
release failing at signing or the Homebrew handoff is therefore usually a
missing/misnamed secret on that one repo, not a broken org secret.
Known trap: openclaw/gogcli carried legacy names
(MACOS_SIGNING_CERT_BASE64, MACOS_SIGNING_CERT_PASSWORD,
MACOS_CODESIGN_IDENTITY) while the shared openclaw/release-workflows
reusable workflow reads the MACOS_SIGNING_P12* / ASC_* names, so the signer
import silently received empty values. Compare a broken repo's secret names
against a known-good one (openclaw/wacrawl) before debugging anything else.
The values for all of these live in Molty (table above), so a repo can be
repaired non-interactively: read the field without printing it, then pipe it
with printf '%s' "$value" | gh secret set <NAME> --repo <r>. Omit --body
entirely: the GitHub CLI reads stdin only when that flag is absent.
Read those fields via the JSON + exact-label method in "Exact field reads"
below — NOT --fields label=<f>. Measured 2026-08-09 on the Foundation p12
item: --fields label=p12_base64 returned 65 characters while the correct
value is 4432. Items with several concealed fields silently resolve the wrong
one, which would push a truncated secret into CI.
Outside Molty by design (desktop path, consent first): OpenClaw Developer ID Release Keychain (OpenClaw-Core vault), npm interactive login+OTP (Private/Npmjs), personal SSH/signing keys. Twilio has no API credential stored anywhere — only a console login (Private); minting one needs the console.
Remote routing - desktop path only
Applies to path 2 (interactive/desktop) flows only; path 1 service-account reads always run locally, no routing.
Identify the current host first (hostname; id -un), then load the remote-Mac skill matching that environment. Keep personal and work-managed Mac topologies separate; never infer identity from a stale IP or a generic "Mac Studio" name.
If the current host is Peter's active physical workstation with a usable 1Password GUI session, keep the entire consented desktop flow local. In the personal environment, the default active workstation is steipete-studio-sf; use steipete-mbp only when Peter says he is using it or live context confirms it is the active approval surface. In the work-managed environment, default to its verified Studio; use its matching MacBook only when Peter identifies it as the active approval surface or live context confirms it.
On a VM, headless host, or other non-active workstation, check the matching topology skill's documented Tailscale command and select only an active Studio or MacBook from that same environment. Verify the configured SSH alias with ssh -o ConnectTimeout=5 -o RequestTTY=no -o RemoteCommand=none <workstation-alias> 'hostname; id -un' before routing the whole interactive flow into that workstation's OWN shared op-work tmux session.
Consent rule unchanged: still ask in chat first (item + why). Routing changes WHERE the prompt appears, not whether to ask.
Only the needed field values cross the SSH channel; same no-print, shape-check-only rules apply on both ends. Kill the remote task window at task end.
If the selected workstation is offline or SSH times out, use another same-environment physical workstation only when Peter or live context confirms it is the active approval surface. Local fallback requires a usable GUI session and explicit verification that the current same-environment host is Peter's active workstation; otherwise, including on any VM/headless host, report what was tried and STOP.
Workflow
Check OS + shell.
Verify CLI present inside tmux: op --version.
REQUIRED: use the shared op-work session; open exactly one task window in it for the whole secret task; kill that window when the task is done.
Known/expected Molty item → service-account read directly (path 1). Verify with OP_LOAD_DESKTOP_APP_SETTINGS=false OP_BIOMETRIC_UNLOCK_ENABLED=false OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN="$OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN" op whoami </dev/null >/dev/null 2>&1; echo op_rc:$? if unsure the token works.
Item unknown → check the table above → vault-scoped metadata search in Molty (service account, safe) → only then the desktop consent ask (path 2).
If a command fails, reuse the same window with tmux send-keys; do not open a second window or session just to retry.
Before a personal interactive flow, unset OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN and MOLTY_OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN inside the task window. Then use --account my.1password.com by default; never my.1password.eu / Titan unless explicitly asked.
Shared Op Tmux Session — one session, one window per task
ALL op work on this machine — every skill, every agent, every task — shares ONE tmux server (clawdbot-op.sock) and ONE session (op-work). Never mint another socket name, tmux server, or session for secret work: every extra session fires an alert at Peter and rots into a zombie holding secrets in its shell env. Sibling skills ($npm, $release-mac-app, ad-hoc flows) use this same session and differ only in window name.
Per task: create ONE window in op-work, named after the task; target it by window id; kill it when the task ends.
SOCKET_DIR="${CLAWDBOT_TMUX_SOCKET_DIR:-${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/clawdbot-tmux-sockets}"mkdir -p "$SOCKET_DIR"
SOCKET="$SOCKET_DIR/clawdbot-op.sock"
SESSION="op-work"# 'shell' is a permanent keeper window: never send work to it, never kill it.
tmux -S "$SOCKET" has-session -t "$SESSION" 2>/dev/null ||
tmux -S "$SOCKET" new -d -s "$SESSION" -n shell
WIN="$(tmux -S "$SOCKET" new-window -d -t "$SESSION" -n "<task-slug>" -P -F '#{window_id}')"
tmux -S "$SOCKET" send-keys -t "$WIN" -- 'OP_LOAD_DESKTOP_APP_SETTINGS=false OP_BIOMETRIC_UNLOCK_ENABLED=false OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN="$OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN" op whoami </dev/null >/dev/null 2>&1; echo op_rc:$?' Enter
tmux -S "$SOCKET" capture-pane -p -J -t "$WIN" -S -200
Service-account op has three required defenses: skip loading desktop settings with OP_LOAD_DESKTOP_APP_SETTINGS=false, force app integration off with OP_BIOMETRIC_UNLOCK_ENABLED=false, and keep stdin/output off the pane TTY by redirecting or capturing it. The biometric override alone is insufficient in op 2.35: its enforced-policy startup still reads the 1Password app's group-container settings. macOS then fires the App Data Protection dialog ("op would like to access data from other apps") and blocks in open() until answered. Only a consented desktop flow (path 2) may omit these overrides and run op directly on the TTY. OP_LOAD_DESKTOP_APP_SETTINGS is recognized by the signed 2.35 binary but absent from public environment-variable docs; after an op update, repeat the prompt-free whoami plus TCC-log proof.
Repeated macOS App Data dialogs
Observed on macOS 26 with op 2.35: TCC records SystemPolicyAppData approval as session/PID-scoped (auth_value=5 plus the approving PID). A later op PID can prompt again despite clicking Allow. Each executable path (~/bin/op, a Homebrew Caskroom version, a temporary copy) is also a separate TCC client. Stable path reduces identities; it cannot cure PID-scoped approval.
Live proof on 2026-07-16: service-token op whoami with only OP_BIOMETRIC_UNLOCK_ENABLED=false still prompted and hung; adding OP_LOAD_DESKTOP_APP_SETTINGS=false returned success with zero new SystemPolicyAppData prompts.
Repeated sheets usually mean concurrent/retrying op commands or stale op daemon processes. Stop the retry loop; inspect pgrep -x op plus the shared socket's panes without printing process arguments. Re-run service-account work with the required override. For desktop work, keep one consented task window and minimize new op processes. Do not keep clicking Allow expecting a permanent grant.
Reuse $WIN for every command, retry, and follow-up of the task. A quoting, item-name, or command failure means send a corrected command into the same window, never a new window or session.
Task end (success or failure): tmux -S "$SOCKET" kill-window -t "$WIN" — exported secrets die with the window's shell. The keeper window keeps op-work alive for the next task.
No op signin in bootstrap. Sign-in belongs only to a consented desktop flow (path 2), inside the task window.
Stale task windows from crashed agents may be killed when their pane shows an idle prompt; never kill a window with a running command, and never kill shell.
Service-Specific Workflows
Keep service-specific auth details in the owning skill.
For npm registry/package work, use $npm; it documents the Molty service-account item, non-interactive auth wrapper, and package reservation helper.
This skill owns only the generic 1Password rules: tmux-only op, targeted reads, the shared op-work session with per-task windows, no broad enumeration, no secret output.
Known working secret-write pattern
New secrets default to the Molty vault via the service account (no prompts). Personal-account writes only on explicit ask. Use your task window in the shared op-work session (bootstrap above); write the exact secret task to a temp script, send it into the window; do not create a second window or session for retries.
cat > /tmp/op-store-secret.sh <<'SCRIPT'#!/usr/bin/env bashset -euo pipefail
set +x
export OP_LOAD_DESKTOP_APP_SETTINGS=falseexport OP_BIOMETRIC_UNLOCK_ENABLED=falseexec </dev/null 2>/dev/null
VAULT="Molty"
ITEM_TITLE="Service API Tokens"
FIELD_NAME="api_token"
EXPECTED_PREFIX=""
NOTES="Created via tmux-safe op workflow"
TOKEN="$(pbpaste)"if [ -n "$EXPECTED_PREFIX" ]; thencase"$TOKEN"in"$EXPECTED_PREFIX"*) ;; *) echo"clipboard value does not match expected prefix" >&2; exit 2;; esacfi
OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN="$OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN" op item create --vault "$VAULT" --category "API Credential" --title "$ITEM_TITLE""$FIELD_NAME[password]=$TOKEN""notesPlain=$NOTES" >/dev/null
OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN="$OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN" op item get "$ITEM_TITLE" --vault "$VAULT" --fields "label=$FIELD_NAME" >/dev/null
echo"stored and verified secret field without printing it"
SCRIPT
chmod 700 /tmp/op-store-secret.sh
tmux -S "$SOCKET" send-keys -t "$WIN" -- "bash /tmp/op-store-secret.sh; rm -f /tmp/op-store-secret.sh" C-m
The op category string is human-readable and case-sensitive in this CLI build; use "API Credential", not api_credential.
Exact field reads
For a known item, verify the field shape before using it live: length, expected prefix, newline count, never value. op --field NAME and --fields label=NAME can return the wrong concealed field when an item has duplicate/legacy credential fields. If shape is wrong, read the known item as JSON and extract the exact label.
Keep JSON extraction scoped to the known item and vault. Do not enumerate vaults/items to discover candidates.
Explicit item search
Only use this when the user explicitly asks to search, gives a screenshot/listing, or the exact title guess failed. Stay vault-scoped (Molty, service account) and metadata-only; print candidate titles/ids/categories/vault names, never fields or values. Prefer exact visible strings from screenshots first: vault name, item title, and field label.
After choosing a candidate, switch back to exact item/field JSON extraction and shape-only validation. No Molty match → desktop consent ask (path 2), never a silent personal-vault read.
Redacted debugging
Interactive-flow debugging only (consented desktop path). Keep the whole pipeline inside the same task window. Inspect status and output length, never secret values.
Path-1 op commands always set OP_LOAD_DESKTOP_APP_SETTINGS=false and OP_BIOMETRIC_UNLOCK_ENABLED=false, pass the service token explicitly, and keep stdin plus secret-bearing stdout off the pane TTY.
Every op run can spawn a background op daemon (cache flags do not prevent it in 2.35). Stale daemons can re-trigger the dialog. Only when no op task is active, pkill -f 'op daemon' is safe; never broadly kill active op commands.
An App Data Allow/Don't Allow choice may be PID-scoped and repeat on the next op process. Stop the source command and fix its invocation instead of approving a prompt loop.
Never eval "$(op completion zsh)" unguarded in rc files; it runs op on every shell start and is a known dialog-spam source.
Prefer op run / op inject over writing secrets to disk.
Desktop app path only after explicit chat consent; the 1Password unlock prompt then handles the actual authorization — no extra chat round trip at prompt time.
If sign-in without app integration is needed, use op account add.
If a command returns "account is not signed in" in a consented interactive flow, re-run op signin inside tmux and let Peter authorize in the app.
sag only when a consented unlock prompt sits unanswered; never as a pre-alert.
Do not run op outside tmux; stop and ask if tmux is unavailable.
