| name | ipc-security |
| description | Detects IPC receivers that accept input without verifying caller identity. Use when writing URL scheme handlers, Android intent receivers or exported activities, named pipe or socket listeners, XPC service handlers, or any IPC endpoint that processes caller-supplied input without validating the caller's identity or origin. |
IPC Security (A01:2025)
What this checks
Detects IPC receivers that accept input without verifying the caller's identity. Open
IPC channels let malicious apps hijack URL schemes, trigger exported components, or
inject data through shared channels.
Vulnerable patterns
- URL scheme handler that runs an action without validating the incoming scheme, host, and path against a static allowlist
- Exported mobile component (Android activity, service, or broadcast receiver) with no signature-level permission or caller-package check guarding a sensitive action
- Network listener bound to a public interface for what is logically same-host IPC, with no auth token or peer-credential check before the handler acts
- Named pipe, XPC service, or desktop-renderer IPC handler that processes a privileged request without verifying caller identity, code signature, or sender origin
- IPC-supplied value flowing into a process-execution or dynamic-evaluation sink without validation
Fix immediately
Flag the vulnerable code and explain the risk. Then suggest a fix that establishes
these properties:
- URL scheme handlers validate scheme, host, and path against a static allowlist
before running any action. A custom scheme is invokable by any app on the device;
only the handler decides what's legitimate.
- Exported components require a signature-level permission or verify the caller
package explicitly. An exported component with no permission gate is callable by
anything on the device. Intent extras and equivalent caller-supplied payloads are
validated against a schema before use.
- Network listeners bind to the narrowest interface that works. Use a Unix
domain socket or loopback address, never a public-facing bind, when the listener
is for same-host IPC. An auth token or peer-credential check runs before the
handler acts on any command.
- Named pipes, XPC services, and desktop-renderer IPC handlers verify caller
identity โ effective user ID, code-signing requirement, pipe ACL, or sender
origin against an allowlist โ before any privileged action. Renderer-to-main
channels run with context isolation enabled and node integration disabled.
- No IPC-supplied value reaches a process-execution or dynamic-evaluation sink
unvalidated. The channel is an attacker-reachable surface; treat its payloads
like network input.
Translate each principle to the language, platform, and IPC mechanism of the audited
file. Use the platform's documented identity-verification and binding APIs โ do not
invent your own.
Verification
Confirm the following properties hold for every IPC surface present in the change (criteria only apply when the relevant pattern exists):
References
