security-strict

name	security-strict
description	Use this skill when adding or reviewing code that touches auth, tenancy, input validation, webhooks, secrets, caching, or user-provided content (strict security rules).

Security Skill (Strict) — Freelancerino

Use this skill for any change that could affect confidentiality, integrity, or availability. This is intentionally strict: if a pattern can plausibly cause cross-tenant leakage or unsafe exposure, treat it as a blocker.

This app’s security backbone is:

• Next.js App Router (server-first)
• Clerk auth (solo MVP tenancy)
• Drizzle ORM + Postgres
• next-intl routing (/{locale}/...)

Non‑negotiables (stop-the-line rules)

1) Tenant isolation is mandatory

• Derive workspace from the session, never from client input.
• Every DB query/mutation touching tenant data must include workspace_id filtering.

References:

• Workspace derivation: lib/workspace.ts
• Tenant query patterns: .github/skills/drizzle-tenant-queries/SKILL.md

2) All mutations must be Server Actions (internal)

• Prefer Server Actions for internal CRUD.
• Route Handlers are only for external traffic (webhooks, PDF export, third-party callbacks).

References:

• Server Actions conventions: .github/skills/nextjs-server-actions/SKILL.md

3) Validate all inputs at boundaries

• Validate/parse at module boundaries (Server Actions, Route Handlers, webhook handlers).
• Prefer Zod; reject unknown keys.
• Never trust strings that look like IDs (UUIDs) unless validated.

References:

• Zod patterns: .github/skills/zod-v4/SKILL.md
• Action result union (don’t throw raw errors across RSC): lib/actions/action-result.ts

When returning errors from server code, prefer stable AppErrorCode values from @/lib/errors/codes (use AppError.* constants instead of hardcoded strings).

4) Never leak sensitive data

• Do not log secrets, tokens, cookies, raw webhook bodies, or PII beyond what’s needed.
• Do not return raw errors to the client. Map to safe messages.
• Avoid exposing internal identifiers; prefer UUIDs for public routes.

5) Avoid caching private data incorrectly

• Assume tenant data is private.
• Don’t accidentally cache tenant-scoped responses in shared caches.
  • For fetch, use { cache: "no-store" } when in doubt.
  • For read helpers, cache() memoizes per request; it is not a cross-user cache, but still ensure inputs include workspaceId.

Secure performance (cost without leaks)

• Prefer performance wins that don’t weaken isolation: request-level cache(), query parallelization, and removing N+1.
• If you add instrumentation (query timing/logging), never log PII, raw payloads, headers, cookies, or tokens.
• Any cross-request caching must have workspace-scoped keys/tags; otherwise treat it as a security bug.

Required security checklist (apply to every PR touching app logic)

Auth + tenancy checklist

• All protected routes/actions derive workspace via requireWorkspaceCached() / requireWorkspace().
• No use of client-provided workspaceId (or equivalent) in any server code.
• Every query/update/delete includes workspaceId in where.
• For updates/deletes: guard by both entity id AND workspaceId.
• Cross-tenant join safety: scope both sides when joining tenant-scoped tables.

Input validation checklist

• Use Zod (or equivalent) at boundaries; use safeParse.
• Reject unknown keys (strict object schemas).
• Normalize and trim user inputs where appropriate.
• Validate emails/URLs/UUIDs with explicit schemas.
• For money/time: enforce integer cents + ISO currency; time in UTC.

Output safety checklist

• No dangerouslySetInnerHTML for user content.
• Do not render raw user-provided HTML/Markdown without a proven sanitizer.
• For URLs (redirects, links): allowlist internal paths or validate same-origin.

Secrets + environment checklist

• Secrets are read only on the server (process.env.*), never sent to client.
• Never add NEXT_PUBLIC_* for secrets.
• Do not add debug endpoints exposing environment, config, headers, or DB info.

Webhooks & external endpoints checklist

• Verify signatures (do not process events without verification).
• On verification failure: return 400.
• On transient internal failure: return 500 to trigger retries.
• Treat payload fields as untrusted even after signature verification.

Reference implementation:

• Clerk webhook verification: app/api/clerk/webhook/route.ts

Dependency + supply-chain checklist

• Prefer existing dependencies; avoid adding new ones without a clear need.
• No eval, new Function, dynamic require of untrusted paths.
• Avoid unmaintained packages; confirm minimal attack surface.

Secure implementation patterns

Pattern: safe Server Action (tenant-safe + strict input)

• Use requireWorkspaceCached() to derive { workspace, userId }.
• Zod-validate input.
• Mutate with workspace.id in the where clause.
• Return ActionResult union.

Pseudo-shape (not copy/paste):

• "use server"
• const { workspace } = await requireWorkspaceCached();
• const parsed = Schema.safeParse(input);
• if (!parsed.success) return { status: "error", ... }
• await db.update(table).set(...).where(and(eq(table.id, id), eq(table.workspaceId, workspace.id)))

Pattern: safe Route Handler (webhook)

• Force dynamic if needed: export const dynamic = "force-dynamic".
• Verify signature before doing anything.
• Return 500 on internal failure so the provider retries.

See: app/api/clerk/webhook/route.ts.

Pattern: tenant isolation test mindset

If you add new tenant-scoped entities or modify query helpers, also add/extend an isolation test.

Reference:

• scripts/test-client-isolation.ts

Red flags (treat as security bugs)

• Any DB operation without workspace_id filter.
• Any endpoint that accepts workspaceId from the client.
• Using findFirst({ where: eq(table.id, id) }) for tenant-scoped tables.
• Returning raw DB rows containing PII (emails, tax IDs) without necessity.
• Logging request bodies for webhooks or form submissions.
• Caching tenant data with shared tags that could be used across users.
• Redirects built from searchParams.get("next") without validation.

Edge cases you must handle

• Cross-tenant entity IDs: a valid UUID is still untrusted; always scope by workspace.
• Webhook replay: signature verification helps; consider idempotency when adding webhook side-effects.
• Partial failures: if a multi-step mutation can partially succeed, use transactions.
• Locale in URLs: avoid open-redirect patterns when switching locales; only allow known locales.

Verification before shipping

• Run lint + typecheck.
• Run tenant isolation checks when you touch DB access patterns.

Suggested commands (use project runbooks):

• .github/skills/bun-workflow/SKILL.md
• scripts/test-client-isolation.ts (requires DATABASE_URL)

Repository anchors

• Tenancy/workspace: lib/workspace.ts
• DB schema: db/schema.ts
• Server actions: app/actions/**
• Webhook handler: app/api/clerk/webhook/route.ts
• Validation helpers: lib/validation/*, app/actions/**/schemas.ts