threat-model

name	threat-model
description	Structured threat modeling producing threat catalog with STRIDE categorization, DREAD risk scores, and prioritized mitigation roadmap
license	MIT
metadata	{"category":"compliance","locale":"en","phase":"v1"}

What this skill does

Guides a structured threat modeling exercise for a target system using industry-standard frameworks: STRIDE (threat categorization), DREAD (risk scoring), PASTA (process-driven methodology), and Attack Trees (attack decomposition). Produces a threat catalog with MITRE ATT&CK mappings, a risk matrix, and a prioritized mitigation roadmap.

When to use

• During system design or architecture review to identify security risks before implementation
• When preparing for a security audit or compliance assessment that requires documented threat analysis
• When onboarding a new system into a security program and baseline threat coverage is needed
• When a significant feature or infrastructure change warrants re-evaluation of the attack surface

Prerequisites

• No external tools required (methodology/checklist-based)
• Access to system architecture diagrams, data flow diagrams (DFDs), or equivalent documentation
• Knowledge of the system's technology stack, trust boundaries, and data sensitivity levels
• (Optional) MITRE ATT&CK reference: https://attack.mitre.org

Inputs

Item	Description	Example
SYSTEM_NAME	Name of the system under review	Payment API v3
SYSTEM_TYPE	Type of system	web-app / api / microservice / infrastructure
TECH_STACK	Technology stack	Node.js, PostgreSQL, Redis, AWS ECS
DATA_SENSITIVITY	Highest data classification in scope	PII / PCI / internal / public
REVIEW_SCOPE	Boundaries of the review	All external-facing endpoints and auth flows

Workflow

Step 1: System Decomposition

Identify what needs protecting before identifying threats. Collect the following information about the target system.

Reference: See REFERENCE.md for asset inventory, trust boundaries, and entry points markdown templates.

Data Flow Diagram (DFD) Summary

Describe the primary data flows as a numbered list if a visual DFD is unavailable:

## Key Data Flows

1. User submits credentials → Web tier → Auth service → Credentials DB → JWT issued
2. Authenticated user submits payment → Web tier → Payment service → Payment processor (external) → Transaction DB
3. Admin queries reports → Admin UI → Reporting service → Read replica DB

Step 2: Threat Identification (STRIDE)

Apply the STRIDE model to each DFD element (processes, data stores, data flows, external entities) and each trust boundary crossing. For each threat identified, create a catalog entry using the T-NNN format.

Reference: See REFERENCE.md for the STRIDE categories reference table and threat catalog entry template.

Repeat the threat catalog template for every threat identified across all STRIDE categories and DFD elements.

Step 3: Threat Prioritization (DREAD Scoring)

Score each threat in the catalog using the DREAD model. Each dimension is scored 1–10; the total DREAD score is the average, rounded to one decimal place.

Reference: See REFERENCE.md for DREAD dimensions, scoring table template, and risk level thresholds.

CVSS Mapping (optional)

For threats that require formal CVE-style scoring, calculate a CVSS v3.1 Base Score alongside DREAD using the NVD calculator: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator

Step 4: Mitigation Design

For each HIGH and CRITICAL threat, design concrete mitigations applying defense-in-depth principles.

Reference: See REFERENCE.md for the mitigation roadmap template and 5x5 risk matrix template.

Done when

• System decomposition is complete: assets, trust boundaries, entry points, and data flows documented
• STRIDE analysis has been applied to every DFD element and trust boundary
• Every identified threat has a T-NNN catalog entry with STRIDE category, attack vector, impact, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, and existing/recommended controls
• Every threat has a DREAD score and risk level assignment
• A mitigation roadmap exists for all HIGH and CRITICAL threats
• A risk matrix summarizes the full threat portfolio
• Residual risks are explicitly acknowledged

Failure modes

Issue	Cause	Solution
Incomplete asset inventory	System documentation missing or outdated	Interview system owner; reverse-engineer from network diagrams or source code
STRIDE produces no threats	Analysis too surface-level	Apply STRIDE to each individual data flow, not just the system as a whole
DREAD scores inconsistent across reviewers	Subjective scoring	Calibrate with a reference threat (e.g., score a known CVE before scoring new threats)
Mitigation roadmap not actionable	Controls described too abstractly	Each control should name a specific technology, configuration, or code change
MITRE ATT&CK mapping unclear	Unfamiliarity with the framework	Use the ATT&CK Navigator at https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/ to search by technique

Notes

• This skill covers the four most common threat modeling frameworks. For new systems, start with STRIDE + DREAD. Add PASTA for regulatory-sensitive contexts (PCI DSS, HIPAA) where a full process trace is required.
• Threat models are living documents. Re-run this skill after major architecture changes, new external integrations, or changes to data classification.
• Attack Trees are best suited for high-value specific threats (e.g., "attacker gains admin access"). Construct a tree by placing the attacker's goal at the root and decomposing it into AND/OR sub-goals until leaf nodes are concrete, testable attack steps.
• Pair this skill with owasp-check for web applications and dependency-audit for supply chain threats to achieve broader coverage.
• MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise matrix reference: https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/